Monday, October 31, 2011

A Short Note On Second Contracts

I should've posted this last week, but the David Booth trade was interesting to me for a few reasons. If you recall, and who would in this information overload society, the trade was:

From FLA: David Booth, VAN's 3rd round pick
From VAN: Mikael Samuelsson, Marco Sturm

The things that are interesting:

- Vancouver dealt a player they signed in the off-season. Marco Sturm played exactly 6 games for Vancouver before being dealt. That's rare, but I suspect it will become slightly more common.

- Vancouver took more risk in the deal despite getting the younger player. David Booth is only 26, soon to be 27, but taking on his contract which has 3 more years after this one on it, is without question a large gamble. If he tanks, that contract may be difficult to move. Meanwhile, both Sturm and Samuelsson are on the final years of their contracts, and both could probably be moved at the trade deadline for extra draft picks.

The second contract can be an albatross just as much as a contract on a late 30s player. Take Derick Brassard, a player fighting for ice time in Columbus. He's getting less than 15 minutes a game, despite having been signed to 4 year, 12.8 million dollar contract. In the old days, a player like Brassard would never command that kind of money, and would almost certainly be in another organization by this point. This is something to keep an eye on as we see more and more of these enormous second contracts - some players will be cap albatrosses at 25, and some players' careers will be significantly hurt by contracts they sign at age 21 or 22.

Saturday, October 29, 2011

How Much of Shooting Percentage Is Skill?

The correct answer, as it is for most questions, is "it depends." In this case, on sample size.

In a recent post at Arctic Ice Hockey, the indispensable Gabe Desjardins argued that we should move away from working on metrics for shot quality because there isn't much payoff. This has motivated me to write a follow up on an article I wrote a couple months ago on how luck vs skill influence shooting percentage based on sample size. In that article, I took two teams, one above average and one below average at shooting, and examined how likely the good team is to shoot at a higher percentage for a given numbers of shots. Here I will look at how much variation in shooting percentage is explained by skill and luck for different numbers of shots.

Methodology

My methodology is a sort of mirror image of what JLikens did in his article on the same subject and Vic Ferrari's imaginary dice rolling. JLikens assumed each team had the same real shooting percentage and ran simulations to see how much variation in results there would be after a season worth of even-strength shots. In my simulations I will create a distribution of shooting talent and see how much that skill explains variation in results for a given number of shots.

Here are the steps:
- Going by this more recent JLikens article in each of 10,000 simulations I created 30 teams by drawing a shooting percentage from Beta(263,2977), a distribution pretty close to that of actual even-strength team shooting skill in the NHL.
- All 30 teams take the same number of shots, which score a goal or not based on the probability given by the team's shooting skill.
- For each simulation, I calculate the R^2 between shooting percentage on those shots and the shooting talent of the teams. The average of these tells us how much variation in shooting percentage results is explained by shooting ability.
- The rest is luck.

Results

Here is a table with the results. The first column is the time period in question. The second is the number of shots each team took in the simulations. The third column is the percentage of variation in even-strength shooting-percentage results that is explained by the skill component - the average R^2 of all simulations. The last column is simply 100% minus that and represents the percentage of variation that is due to random chance, luck if you will.

Time PeriodShotsSkillLuck
Season to today2509.9%90.1%
1/4 season50015.7%84.3%
half season1,00025.1%74.9%
1 season2,00038.9%61.1%
2 seasons4,00055.4%44.6%
3 seasons6,00064.9%35.1%
4 seasons8,00070.9%29.1%
5 seasons10,00075.3%24.7%
6 seasons12,00078.4%21.6%
7 seasons14,00080.9%19.1%
8 seasons16,00082.9%17.1%
9 seasons18,00084.5%15.5%
10 seasons20,00086%14%

Here's a graph:


Put in words, at this point in the season shooting results are 90% luck and 10% skill. This is likely an underestimate, as I'll discuss below. Over a whole season it goes to a little over 60% random chance. It takes about 140 games worth of shots for results to be 50/50.

Some thoughts

I'm making several assumptions that are not valid. The biggest and most obviously dubious is that shooting-percentage skill will be the same for every shot. In reality, if a team shoots at an 8.5% clip their top line will shoot higher, their fourth line lower, they'll do better against weaker opponents and worse against good goaltenders and so on. Injuries, trades, free agency and coaching changes are obviously a big issue as well. On a related note, I assume that each team takes the same number of shots. In practice, teams obviously take more or fewer shots than average over a given stretch. To make things more problematic, it is probably the case that teams that shoot more often tend to be better at making their shots. One thing all of these factors have in common is that they will increase the randomness factor. Think of the above estimates as lower bounds on how much luck explains variation in shooting percentage or an upper bound for how much skill matters.

Wednesday, October 26, 2011

A Contract I Actually Like: Martin Hanzal

Two days before the Phoenix Coyotes were set to open the 2011-2012 regular season, they announced the signing of Martin Hanzal to a brand-new 5 year, $15.5 million contract extension. Though it wasn’t earth-shattering news and most likely ignored by the majority of NHL fans, there are a few things that stand out making this deal very good for the Coyotes.

1. Term

Hanzal was scheduled to become a restricted free agent after this season. Under the current terms of the CBA, he would have been eligible for unrestricted free agency status after the 2013-14 season, his 7th in the league. Rather than risk the (slim) possibility of another GM firing an offer sheet his way, Phoenix was able to buy the rest of his RFA eligibility and an additional three seasons of UFA status.

2. Salary

Hanzal’s extension will earn him an average annual salary of $3.1 million, his number against the cap. Because he was set to become a restricted free agent, Phoenix had the luxury of exclusive control over Hanzal and did a good job not to overpay for his services. Regardless of how the cap is drawn up in the next CBA, Hanzal's cap hit will not tie up a significant portion of Phoenix's money, always a plus for teams operating with an internal budget.

3. On-Ice Production

Speaking of said services, let’s take a look at exactly what Hanzal brings to the table. Per NHL.com, here are Hanzal's ice time numbers from his first four seasons:

YearAgeGPES TOI/GamePP TOI/GamePK TOI/GameTOT TOI/Game
07-08207212:492:431:1116:44
08-09217412:480:482:4416:21
09-10228114:162:052:0618:28
10-11236114:223:002:0719:30

As we can see, Hanzal is playing in every possible situation for Phoenix, the very definition of versatility. What is more, Hanzal entered the league garnering top-6 minutes and steadily increased his ice time to become the team's leader last season. How has Hanzal handled these assignments? Upon first glance, his point totals don't seem to be passing the test of a top-6 forward:

YearAgeGPES G (Team Rank)ES A (Team Rank)ES Pts (Team Rank)PP G (Team Rank)PP A (Team Rank)PP Pts (Team Rank)
07-0820726 (7)16 (5)22 (6)1 (9)11 (3)12 (T-5)
08-0921749 (6)17 (T-4)26 (T-5)0 (T-14)2 (T-8)2 (T-10)
09-1022819 (T-8)18 (5)27 (T-7)2 (T-7)4 (7)6 (T-7)
10-1123619 (T-7)10 (10)19 (T-9)7 (3)0 (T-11)7 (4)

However, Hanzal is yet another case where applying proper context is vital to determine his value. If we take a look at some key numbers thanks to Behind The Net, Time on Ice and Eric T., we find an entirely different story:

YearAgeGPCorsiRelQoC (League Rank - Min 20 GP)Balanced CorsiBalanced Corsi RelZone Start %Zone Finish %Corsi/60ZS Adjusted CorsiScore-Tied Fenwick %
07-0820720.873 (37)4.564.6647.149.1-1.52-0.99852.8
08-0921741.177 (7)3.2911.2938.445.5-5.76-3.67245.5
09-1022811.006 (11)7.613.0746.650.94.95.51254.3
10-1123610.837 (21)9.28.346.549.17.17.7352.8

During his rookie year, Hanzal was thrown to the wolves at even strength, facing the 37th toughest CorsiRelQoC score in the entire league. He hasn't slowed down since, routinely showing up on the list of players who face the league's elite night-in and night-out. His Balanced Corsi scores show that he is performing well above his expectation pushing the play forward in these situations, handling extremely tough assignments with relative ease. Though his Power Play stats have been less than impressive, Phoenix has never ranked above 19th in SF/60 on the PP during Hanzal's time in the desert. Regardless, his excellent play at even strength means that Phoenix will have a young and versatile tough-minutes forward locked up no matter where the franchise finds itself at the expiration of the contract.

Tuesday, October 25, 2011

On the Chris Kunitz Extension

Since there is no time like two weeks after it was signed, let's take a look at the Chris Kunitz contract extension.

The Terms

Kunitz's current cap hit of $3.75M was extended for another 2 years with salary to match. There are a couple things to note about this. For one, it was signed at the start of the season, a practice Triumph discussed in a recent post. From the Pens' perspective, this opens them up to risk in case Kunitz gets an injury or is otherwise drastically less productive this year than he has been in recent years. I don't think this is quite as bad for the Penguins as other teams since they should be willing to spend over the cap by burying his contract if necessary. On the positive side of things, Shero doesn't risk Kunitz testing the free-agent market which could drive his price up.

Kunitz's age is a factor here. At 32 it seems likely that his skills will start to decline. Based on that, it may be surprising that he's not taking a salary cut but you have to remember the salary cap. The first season of his current deal, 2008-2009, the salary cap was $56.7 million. It is currently at $64.3M so his cap hit is down from 6.6% of the salary cap to 5.8%. Putting it in 2009 cap-hit dollars would make his salary $3.3 million, so it is a small drop.

Pittsburgh's Cap Situation

The Penguins are a unique team due to having Crosby, Malkin and to some extent Staal down the middle. I'll discuss the player-evaluation side of that later, but there are major salary-cap implications as well. Next offseason looks pretty standard as far as the cap goes, but bombs are about to fall on the Pens' cap situation. Here are the major players hitting unrestricted free agency, their current cap hit and the summer they become free agents.

PlayerCap Hit $MYear
Sidney Crosby8.72013
Jordan Staal42013
Evgeni Malkin8.72014
Kris Letang3.52014
Brooks Orpik3.752014
Chris Kunitz3.752014

Orpik seems like the odd man out there, but the rest of that group figures to get a raise and to be honest it's hard to see Shero being able to keep all of them together. In any case, cap space will be at a premium those seasons and Kunitz's contract runs out the summer after Crosby and Staal would need to be re-signed.

Even-Strength Production

The traditional fans would discuss his leadership and Cup experience helping tremendously in the 2009 Cup run. As important as that may have been, I prefer to look at measurable contributions.

Due especially to Crosby, one needs to take a with-or-without-you (WOWY) approach to analyze the production of wingers for the Penguins. Kunitz is a good example of that; he has spent more than half his time in Pittsburgh on Crosby's wing. Here is a table of the Corsi rate for Crosby, Malkin, Staal and none of those with and without Kunitz, as well as the time in minutes that Kunitz spent with them. I'm excluding time where two of Crosby, Malkin and Staal were on the ice together.

Centerw/ Kunitzw/out Kunitzwith TOI (m)
Crosby10.174.912808.3
Malkin5.093-5.336141.4
Staal16.6655.867302.4
None3.4842.025223.9

As you can see, Kunitz improved every line. Crosby's Corsi rate was nearly twice as high when Kunitz was beside him and in smaller samples Malkin and Staal's production was substantially higher with him. I should point out that Malkin's possession numbers without Crosby were drastically better in his shortened 2010-2011 season than previous years and over half of Kunitz's time with Malkin was last year. Kunitz gets some credit for that, but it seems like Malkin was better as well. The fourth line got marginally better results.

It's pretty clear that Kunitz has been a big boost.

Two Potential Concerns: Injuries and Scoring

In the summer, Pensburgh wrote a nice summary of both Kunitz's injuries and scoring with the Penguins. For a left winger, his points totals have been underwhelming due in part to his injuries. According to this guideline at PPP, an average first-line left winger would put in 27 goals. In the last three seasons, Kunitz put up 23, 13 and 23 goals. Going to points, the average for a first line left wing is 50 and Kunitz put up 48, 32 and 53 the last three years. So he's somewhere between an average first-line winger and an average second-line winger when it comes to scoring. A big reason for this is obviously missing significant time the last two years.

Another factor is that Kunitz's individual points percentage is nothing to write home about. He registered a goal or assist on 69.4% of all 5-on-5 goals scored with him on the ice, 7th highest among forwards on the team. This combined with his Corsi numbers make sense given his role - he is important in driving play, helping to move the puck into the offensive zone and keep it there, but Crosby is typically the man with the puck in the attacking end. I don't think his somewhat low scoring for a first-line winger is an issue given his role.

The Verdict

Overall, I think it's a good deal for both sides. Kunitz has been a very good role player the last 2+ seasons for the Penguins. While he is on the wrong side of 30, it seems reasonable to expect a similar level over the life of the contract. Injury concerns and his contract ending the season after Crosby and Staal are due to sign their extensions keep me from saying it is a great deal for the Pens, but even Shero would have to spend some money on wingers.

Monday, October 24, 2011

Zone Start Adjustments: A Rejected Idea

We got a lot of feedback from my recent article going over a method for adjusting for zone starts. Among the suggestions was actually my initial idea which I later rejected - look at the player's Corsi rate in each situation and weight them using average ice time in each situation. I rejected this idea in favor of the reverse - use the player's ice time and the league average Corsi rate in each situation to determine what the average player would get with the player's ice time and subtract that. In this article, I will discuss my initial idea, why I rejected it and how the results differ. The good news is that both methodologies yield quite similar results.

The idea is to use each player's Corsi rate in each type of start - the first shift after an offensive-zone faceoff, time after offensive-zone faceoffs but where a change has been made, time after neutral-zone faceoffs, time after defensive-zone faceoffs following a change and the first shift following a defensive-zone faceoff. Take those rates, assume the player has average ice time and you get an idea what that player's Corsi would be with even starts. To see how it works in practice, let's use the player that made me rethink things, Dan Carcillo.

Here are Carcillo's numbers in each zone:

Dan CarcilloCorsi / 60
Ozone - faceoff shift67.071
Ozone - after change-0.777
Neutral Zone-15.666
Dzone - after change-13.988
Dzone - faceoff shift-64.128

Here is the average percentage of minutes in each type of start:

Ozone - faceoff11.4%
Ozone - change19.3%
Neutral38.7%
Dzone - change19.3%
Dzone - faceoff11.4%

Averaging using those percentages as weights, gives us -8.574. In other words, if Carcillo got the results he did in each type of start and faced average time his ES Corsi rate would be -8.574. That seems pretty reasonable, the fancy thing I came up with last time put him at -9.956 and his even-strength Corsi rate was -11.441 with a 5-on-5 ozone% of 40.6 according to BTN.

The part that concerned me is that Carcillo's Corsi rate the first shift in the offensive zone was 67.071. He played 38 such minutes, which is a small sample and puts him 595th in such time but he did play 57 games last year. Someone playing a decent number of games and getting 40% ozone starts is just the kind of player we'd likely be the most interested in finding adjustments for. Among players with his ozone faceoff shift time or more, Carcillo had the 12th highest Corsi in the league the first shift after an offensive-zone faceoff. This fails the eye test and his ice time is an indication - he was only 21st on the Flyers at PP time.

This raises a theoretical problem with the metric - we are taking the average of five averages, some of which have very small sample sizes. Eric T from BSH suggested lumping in all the situations which are more-or-less neutral - neutral-zone faceoffs and time after faceoffs at either end after a change has been made. That's a great suggestion, which I'll look into later, but time the first shift after a faceoff at either end is the most problematic so it won't help. For Carcillo, it's very clear that his numbers are skewed for that first average. In contrast to the idea I proposed last week, the methodology of averaging averages will lead to bigger problems with small samples. It's not surprising that Carcillo's numbers in the rejected metric are better than the version that made the cut.

What's the Difference?


While I didn't know this at the time I published my article last week, I was quite happy to see that there is very little difference between the two ways of adjusting for zone starts for players that have played a decent amount. Here is a graph with the Zone Start Adjusted Corsi using the methodology I put forward about a week ago and the rejected idea I've discussed in this article for all players with at least 300 minutes of even-strength ice time last year. Needless to say, they are extremely similar.


Given how little difference there is in results, I think the better method to use is the one in the previous article - subtract off what the league average Corsi player would get with the player's ice time. It should do better with the smaller samples common in one season.

Here is a link to a google spreadsheet with ZSAC and ZSAC2, which is the methodology discussed here. I've also included the Corsi rate for each player following offensive-zone starts, defensive-zone starts and in neutral situations.

Tuesday, October 18, 2011

On The Practice Of Signing Players To Contracts A Year Before Their Current Contract Expires

On Tuesday of last week, the Boston Bruins announced that they've signed Rich Peverley to a 3-year contract extension. On Thursday of last week, Pittsburgh announced that Chris Kunitz had agreed to a two year extension. This in itself isn't really news - teams are signing players 365 days a year. But that trend is news - teams are now much more willing to negotiate with players a year in advance, even players who aren't superstars.

According to the CBA, a player signed to a multi-year contract can sign a new contract beginning on July 1 the year before his current contract expires. A player signed to a one-year contract is eligible to sign a new deal beginning on January 1 before his deal expires.

Unfortunately, the Internet isn't that good at logging contracts before 2008, but the thing that's interesting to me is that we're not just seeing star players sign deals a year before their current one expires - 'star' players who've done this recently include Zdeno Chara, Tyler Myers, Chris Pronger, and Marc Savard. We continue to see it even though there are plenty of cautionary tales for both player and team - Marc Savard took his brutal blindside hit from Matt Cooke later in that season, and has only managed to play 25 games under his new deal. It's very likely that Savard will never play again. We've also seen the player get screwed over - Jeff Carter was traded from Philadelphia to Columbus before the 11 year deal he signed with Philly even took effect. It's very likely that had Carter not signed that deal, he would not have been worth the 1st round pick and Jakub Voracek that Philadelphia acquired in exchange for Carter - Columbus would have had no idea whether he wanted to stay there. Now he's stuck there.

What's more interesting to me is that this trend has trickled down to less important players. I already mentioned Peverley, but the Capitals locked up Jason Chimera for 2 more years a few weeks ago. Why? I don't know. Chimera played 13 minutes a game last season. Still, the Capitals saw fit to give him a 2 year deal worth 1.75M per season that doesn't take effect until next year.

Let's look at the pros and cons of this move from the team's perspective.

Pros

Get The Player Locked Up - This is self-evident, but it needs mentioning. There's no need to scour the trade market or free agency at season's end, you know this guy is going to be on your team.

Perhaps Get A Discount? - The earlier a player is signed, the more vague next season's cap number will be. If a player is signed in July of the year before his contract expires, he and the team will likely be negotiating a contract based on the current year's salary cap number. The cap has gone up every year, and only once by an insignificant amount - the team is likely gaining some sort of savings. Remember, for teams that have effectively unlimited budgets (Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, Philadelphia, New York R., Washington, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Detroit, Buffalo), this is huge - it's not a question of how much money you spend, but how much money you spend relative to the cap. If a guy is theoretically worth 1/30th of the cap today, and also worth 1/30th of the cap next season, signing him at 1/30th of the cap now means that he will be more valuable next season when the cap rises - there's going to be $X additional dollars available in the budget.

Give The Player Additional Trade Value - There's a sizable portion of the NHL that has trouble attracting free agents. Either the team is bad or plays in an undesirable place. It's disingenuous for teams to sign players to contracts they have no intention of honoring, but it's a practice I expect to see more and more often. If you're a team that struggles to sign players, getting a guy who's been extended is almost certainly more favorable than getting a rental.

As More Teams Adopt This Policy, The Price of All Available Free Agents Rises - This seems a tad paradoxical, but bear with me. Each early signing takes another potential body off the market. It also incrementally raises the price for each body that ends up on the market - teams always need players, and since there are so many teams who effectively don't have a salary cap, those teams are always looking to improve if they have available dollars. Furthermore, a team that loses a player to free agency will often try to replace that player via free agency. Demand always outstrips supply when it comes to free agency.

This leaves teams in a bind - they may want to risk that their potential UFA player gets to market for fear of overpaying him. On the other hand, they may already see that potential replacements either aren't on the market now, or quite possibly won't be on the market when July 1 rolls around. Furthermore, even if their replacements are on the market, they may well be overpriced because of demand. One would think that the market would correct for this, that players would recognize that they figure to make a lot more money by waiting until July 1 and playing all the bidders against one another. However, it's become clear in the salary cap world that not every player is out for the biggest dollar amount - many are willing to give up the promise of potential dollars if they're being compensated fairly and they're comfortable on the team, in the city, etc. The players who are unhappy in their current situation are the ones who figure to reap the greatest financial rewards.

Cons

Risk. We've already seen more than one of these deals go bad. I don't think the Bruins are being significantly affected by the Savard signing, but it can still be a pain to work around these things, as it can dry up the amount of cap room a team has at the deadline. Yes, it's true, if you have a player on injured reserve, you can replace his salary with People yelled and screamed about the Flyers never getting anyone at the deadline from 2008 to 2010, but that was for a simple reason - they had all kinds of dead IR money on their cap preventing them from banking cap space and thus discouraging them from making any but the most minor of moves. That's of course not the only risk - the other risk is that the player's performance declines precipitously. or that they suffer a calamitous injury before their current contract is up. Tom Poti was signed to an extension by the Capitals during last season's training camp and has played 21 games since then. It's thought that he may have to retire.

That's really the only downside, though, and for teams who figure to spend near the cap, it's not much of one. I expect to see more and more of these signings going forward.

I can see why teams are locking up young players like Tavares, Van Riemsdyk, and Myers to contracts like this - it's entirely possible that those players will improve greatly this season, making their value difficult to ascertain. The player and the team are each taking some risk there (with the exception of Van Riemsdyk since that contract is insane). However, with older players, the risk is more on the team than on the player - the player probably isn't passing up very much money by signing early. We've already seen some of these deals go bust before they start - it will be interesting to see which teams are either emboldened by success or dissuaded by failure with these sorts of contracts, and who's still signing them several years from now.

Sunday, October 16, 2011

Part III: The Aftermath of the Mike Richards and Jeff Carter Deals

Earlier this summer, I wrote extensively on the deals that sent Mike Richards and Jeff Carter from dry island Philadelphia to L. A. and Columbus respectively, promising a trilogy of sorts. After looking at what the Flyers gained in both the trades and free agency, the final step is to evaluate what the Flyers lost in those deals. While this post is certainly long overdue, the aftermath of last night’s 3-2 Kings victory over the Flyers in their only meeting this season seems like the perfect remaining opportunity to bring closure to this saga.

Beginning with my familiar approach, let’s take a look at both Richards and Carter’s average ice time from last season per nhl.com:

PlayerGames PlayedES TOI/GameTeam RankPP TOI/GameTeam RankSH TOI/GameTeam RankTotal TOI/GTeam Rank
Richards8113:4742:5632:08318:522
Carter8014:3922:5640:39618:144

Unsurprisingly, we see that both guys gave the Flyers a good chunk of minutes in all situations. With the exception of Carter’s reduced role on the PK thanks to the emergence of Darroll Powe, Flyers head coach Peter Laviolette was not afraid to send out either player when he felt he needed a boost in any particular area of the ice. In order to give these minutes their proper context, we will begin by looking into where both players stacked up amongst Flyer forwards in point production, once again thanks to nhl.com:

PlayerES G (Team Rank)ES A (Team Rank)ES Pts (Team Rank)PP G (Team Rank)PP A (Team Rank)PP Pts (Team Rank)
Richards15 (T-5)24 (4)39 (6)5 (T-4)16 (1)21 (1)
Carter28 (T-1)21 (5)49 (3)8 (1)9 (T-3)17 (3)

As we can see, both players seemed to match their top-6 ice time with top-6 scoring numbers both at even strength and on the power play. If we take a look at a few more key statistics according to Behind the Net and Time on Ice, it will become quite apparent why Richards and Carter are so good at what they do:

PlayerCorsi ONCorsiRelScore-Tied Fenwick %CorsiRelQoCSF/60Zone Start %Zone Finish %
Richards-1.231.153.60.75230.646.850.1
Carter3.347.850.50.89629.243.851.9

Breaking these numbers down, beginning with Richards, his negative Corsi score is perhaps the first thing that stands about his totals. However, if we judge his performance according to Eric T.’s Balanced Corsi, we see that according to his zone start he is actually around 3 shots better per 60 minutes than we might expect. His balanced zone shift is also a little higher than we might expect, and if we couple this data with his extremely impressive 53.6% Fenwick with the score tied, there is a lot here to suggest that Richards is carrying the water at even strength.

Moving to Carter, his totals are just as impressive. Carter actually was put in tougher defensive spots than Richards, and his Corsi ON score is a little more than 4 shots higher per 60 minutes. His Balanced Corsi is around 7 shots higher than what we might expect from a player put in similar situations, and his BZS is around 3 percent to the good. His Fenwick score, though lower than Richards still suggests that he was also doing a major part driving the play forward for the Flyers considering his zone starts.

What is even more impressive is that the above analysis doesn’t even take into account the elephant in the room: quality of competition. Below is a chart of the toughest CorsiRelQoC scores of every player listed as a Center on Behind the Net last season, minimum 20 games played:

RankPlayerTeamCorsiRelQoC
1BRANDONDUBINSKYNYR1.436
2ARTEMANISIMOVNYR1.412
3HENRIKZETTERBERGDET1.383
4DAVEBOLLANDCHI1.353
5PAVELDATSYUKDET1.175
6BRIANROLSTONN.J1.084
7JORDANSTAALPIT1.037
8PATRICEBERGERONBOS1.026
9OLLIJOKINENCGY1.006
10STEPHENWEISSFLA1.004
11PATRICKMARLEAUS.J0.998
12NATETHOMPSONT.B0.973
13MARCUSJOHANSSONWSH0.953
14BROOKSLAICHWSH0.95
15BRADMARCHANDBOS0.921
16DAVIDBACKESSTL0.907
17JEFFCARTERPHI0.896
18TOMASPLEKANECMTL0.895
19SAKUKOIVUANA0.879
20DARRYLBOYCETOR0.857
21MARTINHANZALPHX0.837
22JERREDSMITHSONNSH0.83
23STEVEOTTDAL0.809
24DAVIDLEGWANDNSH0.805
25PAULSTASTNYCOL0.802
26MIKERIBEIRODAL0.8
27MARTYREASONERFLA0.796
28BRENDANMORRISONCGY0.771
29MIKERICHARDSPHI0.752
30JORDANCARONBOS0.745

Both Richards and Carter show up in the conversation with guys who are playing against some of the toughest players in the league. Though they may not score upwards of 80 points per season, both players are certainly producing at elite levels considering the players that they are expected to face night-in and night-out.

What is more, thanks to JaredL we are able to take a look at how the Flyers performed during the past two seasons with and without either Richards or Carter on the ice:

Player On-IceCorsi/60Time (mins)Corsi QoC
Both3.398211.850.646
Richards1.2862053.550.51
Carter4.9531950.4670.386
Neither-2.3223514.417-0.214

Unsurprisingly, these numbers fall in line with everything else we’ve seen – they were able to send the play in the right direction while eating the majority of the team’s tough-minute assignments. Jared was also kind enough to provide data that looks into how some of the Flyers’ other key players performed in situations both with and excluding one of Richards or Carter on the ice during the same time-frame:

Player On-IceWithCorsi/60Time (mins)Corsi QoC
GirouxEither4.6981379.3170.839
GirouxNeither4.204784.9-0.456
BriereEither8.912895.3830.069
BriereNeither-0.7751238.7170.224
HartnellEither2.674987.267-0.576
HartnellNeither-1.2301121.8830.329
van RiemsdykEither2.1941148.4670.528
van RiemsdykNeither4.426704.967-0.169

Once again, we see that no matter the situation, each player was better with one of either Richards or Carter on the ice except for James van Reimsdyk whose data has a noticeable discrepancy in quality of competition. In order for the Flyers to remain one of the premier Stanley Cup contenders in the Eastern Conference, it is looking more and more like the big line of JVR, Claude Giroux and Jaromir Jagr is going to be asked to carry the mail against top-tier competition in the absence of Richards and Carter. These numbers seem to suggest that it is certainly possible, but we will have to wait until each plays an adequate number of contests before we can finally say whether Paul Holmgren’s plan will pay off in the long run. So far, the Flyers are off to an excellent start, but Giroux & Co. will have to keep up their play in the absence of what was one of the league's most formidable one-two punches up front.