Adam Henrique signed a $24 million, 6 year deal today with New Jersey. This deal piqued my interest because it involved my favorite team and not one of your dumb teams that you somehow follow. It's also interesting because it reveals one of the stranger parts of the way NHL teams operate these days with their RFAs coming off entry-level contracts.
We're seeing more and more of these sorts of contracts for players coming off ELCs - indeed, it's getting rarer for top players not to get one. Evander Kane, Tyler Seguin, Taylor Hall, Jordan Eberle, Jamie Benn, the list goes on - teams are betting on their young stars. They are no longer trying to squeeze every dime out of them before they become UFA age. The list of 'star' players coming off ELCs who haven't gotten long contracts includes PK Subban, and will likely include Derek Stepan and Nazem Kadri. Indeed, most of these 'bridge' deals are signed by teams who stay at or near the salary cap. The paradox of the bridge deal is this: a cap team figures to be very good, and a very good team tends to lift all boats. This makes the player on the bridge deal more expensive in the future, exacerbating that team's cap situation. Likewise, a team in the Devils' situation able to sign Henrique long-term like this without any pending cap issues may not be a very good team, making his deal look worse than it otherwise might be on a cap team.
Monday, August 26, 2013
Thursday, July 11, 2013
Ilya Kovalchuk's Retirement and Its Effect On The Devils
Twitter is an endlessly clucking echo chamber where good sense is discarded in favor of snark, so I figured I'd throw up something here about Ilya Kovalchuk's sudden retirement. I don't really know where to begin (even though I was planning on writing an article like this anyway), so let's start with his performance:
Last season was a struggle for Ilya both at even strength and 5 on 4 - He scored 7 goals in 37 games in those situations. Indeed, his Corsi ON was particularly awful, barely positive despite cherry zone starts and weak competition. His On-Ice shooting percentage, once the engine which drove his performance, had also cratered as a Devil - it's hard to see where the superstar player was 5 on 5 as a New Jersey Devil if we look at his rates. He was 134th out of 360 forwards in goals scored per 60 minutes 5 on 5 since signing his new contract after having been 3rd in that mark the previous 3 years. Particularly galling was his on-ice shot rate - it stayed flat, and his shooting percentage had died too. The Devils actually generated more shots while Kovalchuk was off the ice than on, not exactly a great endorsement for a player who is supposed to bring tons of offense.
However, he was a dominant short-handed player in the times he was put there, leading the league in Goals/60 by a wide margin over his 160 minutes played 4 on 5 over the last 3 seasons.
Kovalchuk also led the league in power play ice time - predictably, his power play scoring rates were not high. Kovalchuk ranked 135th out of 173 qualified forwards players in Goals/60 at 5 on 4. Granted, he did play the point and many of these players did not, but he had also led the league in power play goals from that spot back in 2005-06. And indeed, he was only 86th in this mark out of 211 players between 2007-08 and 2009-10. His power play efficacy, like anyone else's, is quite difficult to ascertain, but I imagine he is above average at this. How many wins a year that's worth is anyone's guess.
The question is, can the Devils sign someone on the free agent market or acquire someone cheaply in trade who matches these kinds of numbers? The answer seems to be no, of course not. However, with payments due to Kovalchuk equal to $11.2M per season over the next 5 years, I find it hard to believe the Devils can't do better than this in free agency or via a salary dump. They will be affected in 2013-14, but Kovalchuk's talent for shooting well above average had disappeared as a Devil, whether by a focus on defense, a move to right wing, chance, or some other reason, and so too had any reason to think he is an exceptional player. An above-average one, sure, but exceptional? No. I see no reason to think that the Devils aren't a playoff team next year without Kovalchuk, provided they do at least get one player to replace some of his ice time.
Wednesday, June 19, 2013
The Risks Of This Year's Free Agent Class
It's mid-June, which means two things: two teams most of us don't care about are playing for the Stanley Cup, I guess, and free agency is about to get underway. For the non-game-watchers (who I now dub the Corsiati), free agency is an ever-entertaining-spectacle, as teams foolishly outbid each other for mid-range talent that they then trade to one another halfway through the contract. It's a game of blind musical chairs where the winner is the person outside the circle laughing at the people playing.
This year is different from all others in the salary cap era in that the cap is actually falling. While few teams treated the $70.3 million salary cap like a real figure last off-season, it's still going to put a strain on the dollars available this season. We only need consult capgeek to see how this $64.3M cap will affect clubs - 6 teams are already over $60M, and only 6 are currently below next year's $44M floor. We know there are compliance buyouts coming, but while those do increase the amount of room available, they also increase the number of free agents in the pool. In addition, some big spender teams that appear to have a lot of room, like the Rangers, have to re-sign most of their core players this year or next, which will no doubt strain the budget.
The wags have already weighed on the free-agent signings that have taken place so far - Sergei Gonchar at 2 years and $10M and Mark Streit at 4 years and $21M - stating that the 'market has been set' and that prices will explode. The trouble with these deals is not so much the money as it is the years. Gonchar is 39, turning 40 at the end of next season, and Streit is 36 in December. While both played at a high level this season, it's not hard to see Father Time creeping up on them (neither appeared to drive play at ES this year). First, a dispelling - there's no reason for a player traded to a new team before signing a contract, as Gonchar and Streit were, to give that team a discount. Gonchar was only dealt for a conditional pick, but Streit was traded for a non-refundable pick (and a non-prospect). In fact, in Streit's case, it's a reason to drive a harder bargain. We've seen contracts like this in the past with Ehrhoff, Bryzgalov, and Wideman - they do not seem to be discounts. They seem to be overpays based on the fact that a team 'had' to have this player. (I know, I know, Ehrhoff was terrific this year, he's still signed for 8 more years). So let's dispense with the talk that these contracts have somehow 'set the market' - they've done no such thing. Ian White and Marek Zidlicky will get contracts based on what other teams are willing to pay them, not what they themselves demand to be paid as a result of Gonchar and Streit's deals. However, there's another way in which these contracts do appear to set a kind of market for the deals to come - the money isn't totally outrageous, but the number of years are. That's the kind of market it figures to be.
There's not a lot of money available in free agency and it's thought that the salary cap will go up in future seasons. What can teams offer to outbid one another? Absent a state or province with no income tax or the chance to play for a contender, there's not much - except years on the contract. It will not be dollars per year that necessarily determine who goes where, it'll be how many years a team is offering. And indeed, with a rising salary cap, why not take the risk that Mike Ribeiro will be productive at 36? Won't his cap hit just be the NHL average by the time the contract ends? Isn't medical science always advancing? So on July 5 when your team appears to have landed a 'bargain' compared to years past, make sure to check the number of years on the deal - those July fist-pumps could easily curdle into an endless checking of capgeek's buyout calculator by the time 2015 rolls around.
This year is different from all others in the salary cap era in that the cap is actually falling. While few teams treated the $70.3 million salary cap like a real figure last off-season, it's still going to put a strain on the dollars available this season. We only need consult capgeek to see how this $64.3M cap will affect clubs - 6 teams are already over $60M, and only 6 are currently below next year's $44M floor. We know there are compliance buyouts coming, but while those do increase the amount of room available, they also increase the number of free agents in the pool. In addition, some big spender teams that appear to have a lot of room, like the Rangers, have to re-sign most of their core players this year or next, which will no doubt strain the budget.
The wags have already weighed on the free-agent signings that have taken place so far - Sergei Gonchar at 2 years and $10M and Mark Streit at 4 years and $21M - stating that the 'market has been set' and that prices will explode. The trouble with these deals is not so much the money as it is the years. Gonchar is 39, turning 40 at the end of next season, and Streit is 36 in December. While both played at a high level this season, it's not hard to see Father Time creeping up on them (neither appeared to drive play at ES this year). First, a dispelling - there's no reason for a player traded to a new team before signing a contract, as Gonchar and Streit were, to give that team a discount. Gonchar was only dealt for a conditional pick, but Streit was traded for a non-refundable pick (and a non-prospect). In fact, in Streit's case, it's a reason to drive a harder bargain. We've seen contracts like this in the past with Ehrhoff, Bryzgalov, and Wideman - they do not seem to be discounts. They seem to be overpays based on the fact that a team 'had' to have this player. (I know, I know, Ehrhoff was terrific this year, he's still signed for 8 more years). So let's dispense with the talk that these contracts have somehow 'set the market' - they've done no such thing. Ian White and Marek Zidlicky will get contracts based on what other teams are willing to pay them, not what they themselves demand to be paid as a result of Gonchar and Streit's deals. However, there's another way in which these contracts do appear to set a kind of market for the deals to come - the money isn't totally outrageous, but the number of years are. That's the kind of market it figures to be.
There's not a lot of money available in free agency and it's thought that the salary cap will go up in future seasons. What can teams offer to outbid one another? Absent a state or province with no income tax or the chance to play for a contender, there's not much - except years on the contract. It will not be dollars per year that necessarily determine who goes where, it'll be how many years a team is offering. And indeed, with a rising salary cap, why not take the risk that Mike Ribeiro will be productive at 36? Won't his cap hit just be the NHL average by the time the contract ends? Isn't medical science always advancing? So on July 5 when your team appears to have landed a 'bargain' compared to years past, make sure to check the number of years on the deal - those July fist-pumps could easily curdle into an endless checking of capgeek's buyout calculator by the time 2015 rolls around.
Tuesday, April 30, 2013
Shot Differentials Of Non-Playoff Teams 1995-2013
One of the more disappointing aspects of the hockey stat revolution, if it can even be called that, is that time stops in October 2007. Corsi data goes back no further. Were we to make a graphical representation of our knowledge, we'd have a section labeled October 2007-April 2013 and outside of that would be tigers, griffins, wyverns, and other mythical creatures marking unknown territory. It's a bit of a pin in the balloon of the certainty with which we stat types speak that we have to say things like 'Since 2007-2008...' - I mean, it's a year we all remember pretty well. It's hard to be blown away by anything in that range.
I consider the modern era and thus the Corsi revolution to have begun in around 1995-96. Standup goalies were on the way out, the neutral zone trap was in vogue, and we no longer see teams who win the Stanley Cup with a negative shot differential anymore (like the 80s Oilers). Plus we got 4 more expansion teams which significantly altered one's chances of making the playoffs - before the second round of expansion, 61.5% of teams made the playoffs, now we're down to 53.3%. I just wanted to see how important shots were in a grander scheme than the last six years, so I went all the way back to 1995 and with some hockey-reference finagling, looked at all the non-playoff teams and their shot differentials.
GIANT CAVEAT: I realize that these are loaded up with score effects - teams with poor goaltending are more likely to have good shot differentials because they trail in games more frequently, and teams who miss the playoffs are also likely to be trailing more often. Still, taking a wide view of this data, I think we can still learn a lot from it.
Of the 231 teams to miss the playoffs in the years between 1995 and 2013, 55 had 50% of the shots or better. I didn't run a similar study on the playoff teams to see how many of them had positive shot differentials, but it's pretty clear it's a substantial number. Of those teams who had 50% or better shot percentages and missed the playoffs, 27 of them had made the playoffs the year previous, with an average shot differential of 50.4%, and won an average of nearly 3 playoff games (this counts all teams, whether they made or missed the playoffs, so an average of 3 is pretty good). The 1996 and 2013 Devils, 2003 and 2007 Carolina Hurricanes, 2004 Mighty Ducks of Anaheim, and the 1999 Washington Capitals are six teams who missed the playoffs after having reached the Cup Final the year before, all of whom had shot differentials over 50% the next season. They are also 6 out of the 7 teams who've missed the playoffs after making the Cup Finals the year previous - the other one, the 2006 Oilers, had a positive shot differential the year before their Cup season.
Two teams continually missed the playoffs with a 50+% shot differential - the late 90s Calgary Flames and the late 00s Toronto Maple Leafs. The obvious culprits are terrible goaltending and mediocre shooting - we all know the late 00s Leafs had wretched goaltending in the form of Andrew Raycroft and Vesa Toskala, and the Flames fared no better with a murderer's row of Trevor Kidd, Rick Tabaracci, and Fred Braithwaite.
So how did teams do the season after missing the playoffs with a 50+% shot differential? Not as well as they had done the season before missing the playoffs. Their shot differential is about the same, but only 21 of 52 teams made the playoffs, and all teams only averaged 2.13 playoff wins. However, only 29 teams maintained the 50+% shot differential, and 18 of those made the playoffs. This means that only 3 of the remaining 23 teams who shot worse than 50% made the playoffs the next season. Since poor goaltending is a likely culprit in most of these teams missing the postseason to begin with, it's not that surprising that they couldn't be saved once they fell under the 50% threshold.
I wanted to look at teams with sub 50% shot differentials to see how they do the year after, but I think that is unfortunately mucked up by the fact that this era has a bunch of expansion teams who were pretty likely to struggle for several years. I think we can get by with just Fenwick/Corsi numbers to examine that phenomenon. Regardless, if you have a 50% shot differential or better, you're likely to make the playoffs, and if you didn't make the playoffs with that shot differential, you're likely to make it the next year if you can maintain that level. There's anomalies for sure - the late 90s Flames, the late 00s Leafs, and the 03 and 04 Hurricanes who were particularly ghastly for a team that managed a positive shot differential - but shots are good. Outshooting the other team is good. You tend to make the playoffs if you do it and you tend to miss the playoffs if you don't.
I consider the modern era and thus the Corsi revolution to have begun in around 1995-96. Standup goalies were on the way out, the neutral zone trap was in vogue, and we no longer see teams who win the Stanley Cup with a negative shot differential anymore (like the 80s Oilers). Plus we got 4 more expansion teams which significantly altered one's chances of making the playoffs - before the second round of expansion, 61.5% of teams made the playoffs, now we're down to 53.3%. I just wanted to see how important shots were in a grander scheme than the last six years, so I went all the way back to 1995 and with some hockey-reference finagling, looked at all the non-playoff teams and their shot differentials.
GIANT CAVEAT: I realize that these are loaded up with score effects - teams with poor goaltending are more likely to have good shot differentials because they trail in games more frequently, and teams who miss the playoffs are also likely to be trailing more often. Still, taking a wide view of this data, I think we can still learn a lot from it.
Of the 231 teams to miss the playoffs in the years between 1995 and 2013, 55 had 50% of the shots or better. I didn't run a similar study on the playoff teams to see how many of them had positive shot differentials, but it's pretty clear it's a substantial number. Of those teams who had 50% or better shot percentages and missed the playoffs, 27 of them had made the playoffs the year previous, with an average shot differential of 50.4%, and won an average of nearly 3 playoff games (this counts all teams, whether they made or missed the playoffs, so an average of 3 is pretty good). The 1996 and 2013 Devils, 2003 and 2007 Carolina Hurricanes, 2004 Mighty Ducks of Anaheim, and the 1999 Washington Capitals are six teams who missed the playoffs after having reached the Cup Final the year before, all of whom had shot differentials over 50% the next season. They are also 6 out of the 7 teams who've missed the playoffs after making the Cup Finals the year previous - the other one, the 2006 Oilers, had a positive shot differential the year before their Cup season.
Two teams continually missed the playoffs with a 50+% shot differential - the late 90s Calgary Flames and the late 00s Toronto Maple Leafs. The obvious culprits are terrible goaltending and mediocre shooting - we all know the late 00s Leafs had wretched goaltending in the form of Andrew Raycroft and Vesa Toskala, and the Flames fared no better with a murderer's row of Trevor Kidd, Rick Tabaracci, and Fred Braithwaite.
So how did teams do the season after missing the playoffs with a 50+% shot differential? Not as well as they had done the season before missing the playoffs. Their shot differential is about the same, but only 21 of 52 teams made the playoffs, and all teams only averaged 2.13 playoff wins. However, only 29 teams maintained the 50+% shot differential, and 18 of those made the playoffs. This means that only 3 of the remaining 23 teams who shot worse than 50% made the playoffs the next season. Since poor goaltending is a likely culprit in most of these teams missing the postseason to begin with, it's not that surprising that they couldn't be saved once they fell under the 50% threshold.
I wanted to look at teams with sub 50% shot differentials to see how they do the year after, but I think that is unfortunately mucked up by the fact that this era has a bunch of expansion teams who were pretty likely to struggle for several years. I think we can get by with just Fenwick/Corsi numbers to examine that phenomenon. Regardless, if you have a 50% shot differential or better, you're likely to make the playoffs, and if you didn't make the playoffs with that shot differential, you're likely to make it the next year if you can maintain that level. There's anomalies for sure - the late 90s Flames, the late 00s Leafs, and the 03 and 04 Hurricanes who were particularly ghastly for a team that managed a positive shot differential - but shots are good. Outshooting the other team is good. You tend to make the playoffs if you do it and you tend to miss the playoffs if you don't.
Friday, April 19, 2013
A Note About Alex Ovechkin's "Resurgence"
Thus far, one of the most talked about stories of the shortened NHL season has been the resurgence of one Alex Ovechkin. Currently on pace to rival some of his gaudy goal totals from 2005-2010, the Great Eight has found twine 28 times in 44 games, good for a 52 goal pace in a normal 82 game season. During this, his age 27 season, Ovechkin is again producing like his 24 year old self.
Since we know that players generally peak around age 25, the inner skeptic fueled me to take a deeper look into just where Ovechkin's sudden spike in production is coming from. Following the lead of the fine folks at Russian Machine Never Breaks, below is a breakdown of Ovechkin's 5v5 and 5v4 numbers in 2013 compared with his 5-year averages from 2007-12 (numbers via stats.hockeyanalysis.com).
Ovechkin 5v5
Ovechkin 5v4
There are two points to take home: first, Ovechkin's goals are coming less from even strength play, as his shot rates have slightly improved from last season but still fall below his insane 5-year average. While it's true that even a slightly mortal Alex Ovechkin still shoots with the league's best, Ovie's declining 5v5 totals just aren't in line with what we'd expect from 50-goal Alex Ovechkin.
Second, Ovechkin is shooting a hot 23% on the power play this season. Compare that with his 5-year average of 13.12%, a number closer in line with the league average 5v4 scoring rate, and we better understand why 50-goal Alex Ovechkin again walks the earth. Chris Gordon's observation that
It's very possible that Alex Ovechkin is an above-average power play shooter, but approaching 10% better than league-average is far less likely. 50-goal Alex Ovechkin may have returned in 2013, but when it's entirely on the heels of something as volatile as PP SH%, next season's narratives almost write themselves. If Ovechkin can sustain the increase in PP shots he's getting in Oates's system, 40-goal Ovechkin may have a victory lap or two before Father Time reigns him in. However, projecting a player like Ovechkin to sustain this scoring rate becomes far less certain when he's depending on more goals to come from the inherent volatility involved with scoring on the PP.
Since we know that players generally peak around age 25, the inner skeptic fueled me to take a deeper look into just where Ovechkin's sudden spike in production is coming from. Following the lead of the fine folks at Russian Machine Never Breaks, below is a breakdown of Ovechkin's 5v5 and 5v4 numbers in 2013 compared with his 5-year averages from 2007-12 (numbers via stats.hockeyanalysis.com).
| Year | G | A | SOG | SOG/60 | SH% |
| 2012-13 | 12 | 12 | 122 | 10.848 | 0.0984 |
| 2011-12 | 19 | 15 | 206 | 10.352 | 0.0922 |
| 2010-11 | 17 | 30 | 230 | 11.207 | 0.0739 |
| 2009-10 | 32 | 33 | 246 | 13.115 | 0.1301 |
| 2008-09 | 27 | 23 | 305 | 14.971 | 0.0885 |
| 2007-08 | 34 | 27 | 285 | 13.124 | 0.1193 |
| 2007-12 (Avg) | 25.8 | 25.6 | 254.4 | 12.561 | 0.1014 |
| Year | G | A | SOG | SOG/60 | SH% |
| 2012-13 | 15 | 8 | 66 | 20.173 | 0.2273 |
| 2011-12 | 13 | 9 | 77 | 17.268 | 0.1688 |
| 2010-11 | 5 | 13 | 83 | 15.407 | 0.0602 |
| 2009-10 | 13 | 19 | 90 | 15.998 | 0.1444 |
| 2008-09 | 17 | 23 | 167 | 24.901 | 0.1018 |
| 2007-08 | 21 | 11 | 109 | 15.618 | 0.1927 |
| 2007-12 (Avg) | 13.8 | 15 | 105.2 | 18.04 | 0.1312 |
There are two points to take home: first, Ovechkin's goals are coming less from even strength play, as his shot rates have slightly improved from last season but still fall below his insane 5-year average. While it's true that even a slightly mortal Alex Ovechkin still shoots with the league's best, Ovie's declining 5v5 totals just aren't in line with what we'd expect from 50-goal Alex Ovechkin.
Second, Ovechkin is shooting a hot 23% on the power play this season. Compare that with his 5-year average of 13.12%, a number closer in line with the league average 5v4 scoring rate, and we better understand why 50-goal Alex Ovechkin again walks the earth. Chris Gordon's observation that
The goals must come from somewhere else, and they do. The Caps feed him the puck so he can launch a quick shot from the circles, usually on the power play.is spot-on, but comes with a "yeah, but..." attached if we're to look toward the future.
It's very possible that Alex Ovechkin is an above-average power play shooter, but approaching 10% better than league-average is far less likely. 50-goal Alex Ovechkin may have returned in 2013, but when it's entirely on the heels of something as volatile as PP SH%, next season's narratives almost write themselves. If Ovechkin can sustain the increase in PP shots he's getting in Oates's system, 40-goal Ovechkin may have a victory lap or two before Father Time reigns him in. However, projecting a player like Ovechkin to sustain this scoring rate becomes far less certain when he's depending on more goals to come from the inherent volatility involved with scoring on the PP.
Thursday, April 4, 2013
Special Teams Shot Differential
Mike 'Doc' Emrick purports to hate numbers and mentions how bad he is with them, but one of the numbers he liked and mentioned often during his regular broadcasting days was something called Special Teams Index - it was quite basic, you summed a team's power play percentage and a penalty kill percentage, and voila - there was your Special Teams Index. 100 is average, anything 5-10+ points above is real good, anything 5-10+ points below is real bad. Easy stuff, right?
These days, we know a bit better - we know that penalty killing and power play success is driven by the number of shots a team is able to both get and prevent and that teams don't have a huge amount of control over either shooting percentage or goaltending. Furthermore, power play and penalty killing percentage don't take into account how many short handed goals a team either allows or scores, much less shots. So knowing that shots tend to be more meaningful than goals when we think about what's going to happen in the future, I whipped all these new items into something I call Special Teams Shot Differential - It's the sum of a team's power play shot differential (Shots For per 60 minutes - Shots Allowed per 60 minutes) and penalty killing shot differential. Here's a table of the whole league, with their 5v4 and 4v5 goal differentials on beside it (numbers courtesy of behindthenet.ca, which is updating wonkily and thus these numbers may be slightly incorrect).
Now I haven't included power play differential in this at all, so some things will be skewed - some teams who are close to 0 in shot differential may be generating more shots than they allow by virtue of drawing more penalties and vice versa. Still, we see the teams who have a bad shot differential tend to give up goals on special teams, and teams who have good shot differentials score them. Most surprising on this list to me was Anaheim, who've led a charmed existence at even strength but are really quite good on special teams and are not fully seeing the benefits of that (Their -26 PP/PK differential is the culprit here - ditto Boston, who's having a remarkable year on the PK). Still, though, we see just how little 5v4 and 4v5 power plays and penalty kills matter in the big picture - few teams have a differential plus or minus 10, those that do are largely driven by luck, and we're nearly halfway done with a regular season.
These days, we know a bit better - we know that penalty killing and power play success is driven by the number of shots a team is able to both get and prevent and that teams don't have a huge amount of control over either shooting percentage or goaltending. Furthermore, power play and penalty killing percentage don't take into account how many short handed goals a team either allows or scores, much less shots. So knowing that shots tend to be more meaningful than goals when we think about what's going to happen in the future, I whipped all these new items into something I call Special Teams Shot Differential - It's the sum of a team's power play shot differential (Shots For per 60 minutes - Shots Allowed per 60 minutes) and penalty killing shot differential. Here's a table of the whole league, with their 5v4 and 4v5 goal differentials on beside it (numbers courtesy of behindthenet.ca, which is updating wonkily and thus these numbers may be slightly incorrect).
| Team | Shot Differential | Goal Differential |
| PHI | 17.9 | 8 |
| ANA | 17.5 | -3 |
| BOS | 12.9 | 6 |
| STL | 13.1 | 4 |
| NJD | 12.2 | 2 |
| OTT | 6.8 | 7 |
| LAK | 6.5 | 4 |
| SJS | 6.0 | 8 |
| CBJ | 3.7 | 4 |
| NYI | 3.6 | 8 |
| PIT | 2.6 | 0 |
| MTL | 2.5 | 6 |
| MIN | 2.2 | 0 |
| NSH | 1.9 | -7 |
| TOR | 1.3 | 3 |
| DET | 0.3 | -4 |
| FLA | -0.2 | -2 |
| PHX | -0.9 | -2 |
| CHI | -1.1 | 0 |
| WPG | -2.3 | -7 |
| CGY | -3.9 | 4 |
| CAR | -7.6 | -11 |
| VAN | -8.3 | -11 |
| COL | -9.1 | -9 |
| NYR | -10.3 | -7 |
| DAL | -11.1 | 0 |
| BUF | -11.5 | -15 |
| EDM | -12.2 | 12 |
| TBL | -13 | -3 |
| WSH | -17.6 | 4 |
Now I haven't included power play differential in this at all, so some things will be skewed - some teams who are close to 0 in shot differential may be generating more shots than they allow by virtue of drawing more penalties and vice versa. Still, we see the teams who have a bad shot differential tend to give up goals on special teams, and teams who have good shot differentials score them. Most surprising on this list to me was Anaheim, who've led a charmed existence at even strength but are really quite good on special teams and are not fully seeing the benefits of that (Their -26 PP/PK differential is the culprit here - ditto Boston, who's having a remarkable year on the PK). Still, though, we see just how little 5v4 and 4v5 power plays and penalty kills matter in the big picture - few teams have a differential plus or minus 10, those that do are largely driven by luck, and we're nearly halfway done with a regular season.
Monday, March 25, 2013
The NHL Trade Deadline Doesn't Owe You Anything
It's become fashionable in NHL blogger circles to lament the death of trade deadline excitement. Every year, we hear the same thing: TSN's Trade Deadline Show is so boring! Where's the action? Where's the surprise? It's just six guys in a studio, one of whom can't stop raving about big body presence. People take the day off work in Canada to watch the events as they unfold, enduring the same ten second highlight package of Florida's best 2nd line forward twenty times to hear James Duthie announce that someone you've never heard of has been dealt for a 6th round pick. If you're reading this and were planning to take off work, don't - it's likely that nothing much happens.
I get excited for Deadline Day too, but I get excited when my team signs undrafted free agents that no one's ever heard of. Trades fire my inner gambler - I get to ruminate on whether a team gave up too much and what they can hope for out of this player. It's obviously more exciting when my team makes a move, as I immediately begin to think about how this player slots into the lineup and where he presumably stands on the depth chart. So I'm not saying Deadline Day is inherently boring, just that the NHL has changed a great deal since it was established as a national holiday north of the border. Let's go down the reasons:
1: The NHL used to be separated into two categories: teams that could afford to sign their free agents and those that couldn't.
When the UFA age was 31 and there was no salary cap, there were usually only a few teams interested in players in July. Everyone else sat by and let their franchises get picked clean. Rather than sit idly, teams out of the playoff race would deal their UFAs at the trade deadline, and thus was deadline fever born. This year, people thought Ryan Getzlaf and Corey Perry would be deadline bait, but both were signed to 8 year contracts instead; I'm pretty sure the motivation for signing was to ruin all our deadline speculations and fun. Last year, we saw Ales Hemsky stay in Edmonton rather than find his way to a Cup contender like we'd all thought. With the salary floor, it's hard to point to many franchises who straight up cannot afford a certain player.
2: Teams didn't know about or did not care about the value of prospects like they do now
I say this glibly, but some of those deadline deals in the 90s and early 2000s cost teams substantial young players. We seldom see this anymore - most players moved at the deadline go for a draft pick. I've written elsewhere about the difference between a prospect and a draft pick, but prospects are usually worth more because they are closer to being NHLers. This is why the Brenden Morrow trade is such a surprise - Joe Morrow seems like a darn good prospect, and they don't go in these sorts of deals. Teams now hang on to their prospects because the salary cap makes them some of the most valuable commodities.
3: If you want to make a big deal, you want to do it with as much time left in the season as possible
There are still some big names moved before the deadline - trouble for the TSN crew, they move days before. If you are going to give up something significant for a player, you want more games with him to acclimate to your team. If Jarome Iginla is traded, I expect for it to happen well before the deadline - there's no reason to drag it out, his price probably isn't moving much, nor are his suitors getting more desperate.
4: The NHL has more parity than ever
It's hard for teams to pack it in when they're a few points out of a playoff spot, and right now almost the entire NHL is 'a few points out of a playoff spot' if they're not already in one. There are only 4 teams that currently sit more than 5 points out of a playoff berth. With the loser point firmly in place, it makes it much more difficult for teams in 13th place to clamber over all the other clubs to earn a playoff spot, but the standings are deceivingly close. It's a rare franchise that can pass on the chance at postseason play.
2008 seems to have been the acme of Trade Deadline fever - Marian Hossa, Sergei Fedorov, Brad Richards, Brian Campbell, Cristobal Huet, Bryce Salvador, Brad Stuart, and Adam Foote were all traded on Deadline Day. It's time for TSN and the NHL chattering class to scale back the expectations - with fewer teams playing free agency chicken with their big-name players, a greater ability for teams to afford their stars (with 8 year deals instead of 7), and teams realizing that dealing for excellent players at the deadline is not always a panacea, deadline fever will be a thing of the past. Sad for us, but good for the NHL: It's an unhealthy league where excellent players are often on the move for future considerations.
I get excited for Deadline Day too, but I get excited when my team signs undrafted free agents that no one's ever heard of. Trades fire my inner gambler - I get to ruminate on whether a team gave up too much and what they can hope for out of this player. It's obviously more exciting when my team makes a move, as I immediately begin to think about how this player slots into the lineup and where he presumably stands on the depth chart. So I'm not saying Deadline Day is inherently boring, just that the NHL has changed a great deal since it was established as a national holiday north of the border. Let's go down the reasons:
1: The NHL used to be separated into two categories: teams that could afford to sign their free agents and those that couldn't.
When the UFA age was 31 and there was no salary cap, there were usually only a few teams interested in players in July. Everyone else sat by and let their franchises get picked clean. Rather than sit idly, teams out of the playoff race would deal their UFAs at the trade deadline, and thus was deadline fever born. This year, people thought Ryan Getzlaf and Corey Perry would be deadline bait, but both were signed to 8 year contracts instead; I'm pretty sure the motivation for signing was to ruin all our deadline speculations and fun. Last year, we saw Ales Hemsky stay in Edmonton rather than find his way to a Cup contender like we'd all thought. With the salary floor, it's hard to point to many franchises who straight up cannot afford a certain player.
2: Teams didn't know about or did not care about the value of prospects like they do now
I say this glibly, but some of those deadline deals in the 90s and early 2000s cost teams substantial young players. We seldom see this anymore - most players moved at the deadline go for a draft pick. I've written elsewhere about the difference between a prospect and a draft pick, but prospects are usually worth more because they are closer to being NHLers. This is why the Brenden Morrow trade is such a surprise - Joe Morrow seems like a darn good prospect, and they don't go in these sorts of deals. Teams now hang on to their prospects because the salary cap makes them some of the most valuable commodities.
3: If you want to make a big deal, you want to do it with as much time left in the season as possible
There are still some big names moved before the deadline - trouble for the TSN crew, they move days before. If you are going to give up something significant for a player, you want more games with him to acclimate to your team. If Jarome Iginla is traded, I expect for it to happen well before the deadline - there's no reason to drag it out, his price probably isn't moving much, nor are his suitors getting more desperate.
4: The NHL has more parity than ever
It's hard for teams to pack it in when they're a few points out of a playoff spot, and right now almost the entire NHL is 'a few points out of a playoff spot' if they're not already in one. There are only 4 teams that currently sit more than 5 points out of a playoff berth. With the loser point firmly in place, it makes it much more difficult for teams in 13th place to clamber over all the other clubs to earn a playoff spot, but the standings are deceivingly close. It's a rare franchise that can pass on the chance at postseason play.
2008 seems to have been the acme of Trade Deadline fever - Marian Hossa, Sergei Fedorov, Brad Richards, Brian Campbell, Cristobal Huet, Bryce Salvador, Brad Stuart, and Adam Foote were all traded on Deadline Day. It's time for TSN and the NHL chattering class to scale back the expectations - with fewer teams playing free agency chicken with their big-name players, a greater ability for teams to afford their stars (with 8 year deals instead of 7), and teams realizing that dealing for excellent players at the deadline is not always a panacea, deadline fever will be a thing of the past. Sad for us, but good for the NHL: It's an unhealthy league where excellent players are often on the move for future considerations.
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