A Deeper Look at the Tim Thomas Trade

Greetings fellow hockey fans, and welcome back to another of of Chase's patented commentaries on NHL happenings after they've become old news. Regardless of age, however, today we're afforded a rather interesting and enlightening topic: Tim Thomas and the trade that sent his $5 million cap hit to the New York Islanders. If you'll allow a quick refresher on this deal and its surrounding circumstances, I'm prepared to argue that this is a great move for New York, stemming from reasons outside mere compliance with the salary cap's Lower Limit requirement. Brent noted a few weeks ago how the new CBA is causing teams like the Isles to make smarter roster decisions, and believe it or not, this trade serves as another example of excellent asset management.

Looking back to the afternoon of February 7th, Isles GM Garth Snow gave the mainstream media and twitterverse something to talk about following the acquisition of the two-time Vezina Trophy winner from Boston. Per Bob McKenzie, only a conditional second-round draft pick would be headed the other way, compensating the Bruins only if Thomas reports to Long Island (or another club should New York trade his rights elsewhere) under his current contract.

At first glance, many assumed the trade would purely serve the purpose of helping the Islanders, a team that frequently used performance bonuses to reach the Lower Limit under the 2005 CBA, continue to find roundabout ways to pay less than what equates to (a prorated) $44 million this season. Such a view would be supported on its face, considering bonuses have been removed from the floor equation in the new agreement (a change likely tailored specifically as the 'New York Islanders Rule'). What is more, Thomas signed his current contract after his 35th birthday, meaning the cap hit shall remain on any team's books for the duration of the deal if he retires before its expiration. With all of this in mind, it becomes easy to see why such a justification from the Isles' perspective would make a good bit of sense.

To borrow a catchphrase from Lee Corso: "Not so fast, my friends."

Partly a reason for taking so long to write this article, conducting a bit of research on how the salary cap's Lower Limit is calculated revealed quite the interesting realization. Similar to how teams can add cap hits seemingly larger than their available cap space at the trade deadline, teams can similarly "bank" floor space throughout the year, trading players at the deadline that would appear to put them below that season's floor requirement.

Allow me to illustrate using language from the '05 CBA, translating a bit of lawyer-speak to English. In Article 50, Section 50.5(c)(i) at page 200, the accounting practices for the Lower and Upper Limit are set forth:

Lower Limit. No Club shall, after commencement of the regular season, be permitted to have an Averaged Club Salary that falls below the Lower Limit for that League Year.

Noting the presence of the term "League Year," i.e. that the floor must be met over the course of the year as opposed to each individual day, the only definition left for us to understand is that of "Averaged Club Salary." Removing language about performance bonuses since they cannot be factored into the equation under the new agreement, Averaged Club Salary is defined as:

[T]he entire aggregate amount committed by each Club in a League Year, calculated daily, as Player Salaries . . . in that League Year . . . .

in 50.5 (d)(i) at page 201. The definition also goes on to indicate:

Averaged Club Salary . . . is utilized to determine a Club's Payroll Room.

Keeping in mind that Payroll Room is merely the difference between the Upper Limit and a team's Averaged Club Salary, i.e. how far below the salary cap a team currently is for the season, we're left with the rather ambiguous task of figuring out what this means when inverted and applied to the salary floor.

With all language pertaining to the accounting of the Upper and Lower Limits being Article 50 components, the following example from Bill Daly on page 451 serves to outline the basic idea behind how all of this is calculated:

The Upper Limit is $40 million. A Club has an Averaged Club Salary of $38 million. With $2 million in Payroll Room at the halfway point of the season, the Club may sign or acquire a Player with a one-year SPC that has a $4 million face value. In this circumstance, even though the Upper Limit has not changed, and the face value of the contract would appear to put the Club above the Upper Limit, the passage of time from the start of the season to the midpoint of the season has created Payroll Room for the Club such as to allow the acquisition of a $4 million face value SPC.

In other words, because Averaged Club Salary is an aggregate sum of the amount paid to each player on the team's roster up to the current season day, a team below the Upper Limit by $2 million for half the season has saved $2 million against the cap, and can add that to the $2 million they are on pace to save for the second half to acquire said player with a $4 million cap hit.

With no language indicating that "floor room," if you will, would be calculated any differently, I was left to assume that teams could similarly build an Averaged Club Salary to a certain point, allowing them to remove players from their roster so long as they reached $44 million in salary paid by the end of the season.

Put another way in the context of Daly's example, say that this year's Islanders have an Averaged Club Salary of $46 million with $2 million in "floor room," or the difference between Averaged Club Salary and the Lower Limit. At the halfway point of the season, the club may trade or remove a player from their roster with a $4 million face value. In that scenario, the Islanders would pay less than the per-day requirement to meet the Lower Limit for the second half of the season (only paying $21M in total instead of $22M), but still reach the minimum of $44 million paid.

Through correspondence with the NHLPA and the League themselves, I was able to confirm that teams may not owe salary commitments that wouldn't reach that season's floor number, and could indeed dip below (what this year equates to $444,444) the prorated salary floor requirement for each season day.

Shifting to how all of this relates to Thomas and the Islanders, my aforementioned assumption on how the Lower Limit was calculated prompted the sending of this tweet on the night of the trade:

Did the math: Excluding Thomas's salary, the Isles will be ~$2.65M above the cap floor if they trade Visnovsky AND Streit on deadline day.

— Driving Play (@DrivingPlay) February 8, 2013

A little while after, McKenzie divulged the following:

Technically, NYI were cap compliant (to meet floor) as soon as Visnovsky came off suspension today but NYI opted to make Thomas deal anyway.

— Bob McKenzie (@TSNBobMcKenzie) February 7, 2013

Further expanding on just how compliant the Islanders were, James Mirtle's aforementioned article reveals that the range between the Upper and Lower Limits is ~$10 million larger than we saw last season. Another source of possible confusion, this year's $44M number is lower than both last season's $48.3M floor, and what would have been a $54.2M Lower Limit had the old CBA run through 2013.

After a short break for a deep breath, we may now gaze upon New York's roster. This year, the NHL season began on January 19 and is set to end on April 27, making it possible for a player to spend a maximum of 99 days on a team's active roster. Before adding Thomas, his contract was on Boston's books for 19 days for a total of $959,596 spent against the Bruin cap*.

Below is recreation of capgeek's daily tracker, as it stood on the night of the trade. One notable distinction about McKenzie's tweet, however, the assumption that players on suspension do not count toward a team's Lower Limit. Reading:

For Players that are suspended, either by a Club or by the League, the Player Salary . . . that [is] not paid to such Players shall not count against a Club's Upper Limit or against the Players' Share for the duration of the suspension, but the Club must have Payroll Room for such Player's Player Salary and Bonuses in order for such Player to be able to return to Play for the Club.

Article 50, Section 50.10 (c) at page 226, there is no language about a suspended player being counted "against," i.e. not being added to, a Club's Lower Limit number. It only speaks to the Upper Limit implications and the accounting that must be done upon a player's return, thus I have included Visnovsky's 19 suspension days toward the Islanders' Lower Limit charts.

Player	Pos	Full	LTIR	35+	Buried	Retained	SOIR	Cap Cost ($)
Active Roster
Tavares, John	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	5,500,000
Visnovsky, Lubomir	D	80	0	0	0	0	0	4,525,253
Streit, Mark	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	4,100,000
Thomas, Tim	G	80	0	0	0	0	0	4,040,404
Moulson, Matt	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	3,133,333
Grabner, Michael	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	3,000,000
Okposo, Kyle	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,800,000
Nabokov, Evgeni	G	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,750,000
Nielsen, Frans	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,750,000
Carkner, Matt	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,500,000
Reasoner, Marty	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,350,000
Bailey, Josh	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,050,000
Boyes, Brad	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,000,000
Martin, Matt	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,000,000
Hamonic, Travis	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	875,000
Cizikas, Casey	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	790,000
Ullstrom, David	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	704,166
McDonald, Colin	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	700,000
Hickey, Thomas	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	700,000
Aucoin, Keith	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	650,000
Strait, Brian	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	605,000
Martinek, Radek	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	600,000
Joensuu, Jesse	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	600,000
MacDonald, Andrew	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	550,000
Boulton, Eric	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	540,000
Finley, Joe	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	525,000
DiPietro, Rick	G	99	0	0	0	0	0	4,500,000
Buyouts
Yashin, Alexei	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,204,000
Suspensions
Visnovsky, Lubomir	D	19	0	0	0	0	0	1,074,747
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	$54,116,903

Should the Islanders keep his salary until the end of the season, a maximum 80 days, Thomas will have an effective $4,040,404 price tacked on to New York's Averaged Club Salary. On pace to spend $54,116,903 for the year before burying Rick DiPietro and recalling Kevin Poulin, that number stood at $50,076,499 without Thomas and $45,551,246 without the remaining 80 days and $4,525,253 of Visnovsky's contract.

In Layman's terms, the Islanders were on pace to comply with this year's cap requirement by $1,551,246, or 3.53%, before Visnovsky was activated. After, the team was on pace to beat $44,000,000 by a more comfortable $6,076,499, or 13.8%.

Fast-forward to this year's trade deadline, which falls on April 3rd at 3 PM EDT. Salaries are added to a team's Averaged Club Salary each day at 5 PM New York time, meaning that any player traded on deadline day will count against his new team's cap for 25 days. Consistent with the Islanders roster on February 7 (sans Thomas), it would follow that removing both Streit and Visnovsky on deadline day would result with the following:

Player	Pos	Full	LTIR	35+	Buried	Retained	SOIR	Cap Cost ($)
Active Roster
Tavares, John	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	5,500,000
Visnovsky, Lubomir	D	55	0	0	0	0	0	3,111,111
Streit, Mark	D	74	0	0	0	0	0	3,064,646
Moulson, Matt	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	3,133,333
Grabner, Michael	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	3,000,000
Okposo, Kyle	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,800,000
Nabokov, Evgeni	G	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,750,000
Nielsen, Frans	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,750,000
Carkner, Matt	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,500,000
Reasoner, Marty	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,350,000
Bailey, Josh	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,050,000
Boyes, Brad	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,000,000
Martin, Matt	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,000,000
Hamonic, Travis	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	875,000
Cizikas, Casey	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	790,000
Ullstrom, David	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	704,166
McDonald, Colin	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	700,000
Hickey, Thomas	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	700,000
Aucoin, Keith	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	650,000
Strait, Brian	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	605,000
Martinek, Radek	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	600,000
Joensuu, Jesse	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	600,000
MacDonald, Andrew	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	550,000
Boulton, Eric	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	540,000
Finley, Joe	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	525,000
DiPietro, Rick	G	99	0	0	0	0	0	4,500,000
Buyouts
Yashin, Alexei	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,204,000
Suspensions
Visnovsky, Lubomir	D	19	0	0	0	0	0	1,074,747
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	$47,627,003

This demands the further inquiry: if Garth Snow's intended goal was to circumvent the cap, allowing him to get assets in return for Streit or Visnovsky, why was trading for Thomas a critical component of allowing them to do so? The math simply does not shake out, further muddling why the hell the Islanders made this move.

Thinking through the situation a little deeper, consider this: Thomas's actual salary is set to be $3 million for the final season of his current deal. Were he to hit the free agent market, what would he fetch? Martin Brodeur just got $9 million over 2 years at age 40. Though he's two years older than Thomas, the latter has been the best goalie of similar age since 2007-08. It shouldn't be unreasonable to think Thomas could get a similar deal in a heartbeat, and would assuredly want a contract paying more than the $3M he'll be owed if he decides to return.

All things considered, it seems that Thomas would have incentive to play for the Islanders, possibly even this year, a concept many have dismissed altogether. If Thomas wanted to maximize his financial gain, he'd probably report before the the end of the season, meaning New York couldn't toll the contract and keep it on their books for next year. The odds seem stacked against this happening, but it's still hard to ignore the money Thomas is giving up by hiding in his bunker.

Furthermore, regardless of whether he plays this season, if Thomas decided to return to the league next year, it stands to reason that the Islanders immediately control a player of at least equal value to the second-round pick they forfeit. Even if Thomas doesn't want to play for New York, the team could easily package him in a trade for another player that could step in right away, adding to an ever-improving young squad. Also, at the beginning of the Evgeni Nabokov saga, it was less than certain he'd ever suit up for the Islanders either. However, when push comes to shove, if Thomas wants to come back to the league and have a shot to make Brodeur money on his next contract, he's going to have to honor the final season of this one.

If New York truly intends to keep him, the team holds all leverage in such a situation. If Thomas does indeed don an Islanders uniform, he'll again be worth his price tag, even if it's only for one season. What is more, it is important to note that Nabokov has been lackluster in 2013, and an elite goaltender like Thomas would immediately solidify what's been a position of concern for some time now.

While it would be rather ignorant to argue that Tim Thomas doesn't provide Lower Limit benefits for a team like the Islanders, the numbers and mere logic behind his value as an asset show that he's also much more than simply an avenue to circumvent the salary cap.

*Note: I refer to salaries on a larger scale for ease of understanding. The proportion of salary spent against the cap remains the same.

On the Justification of Matt Cooke Escaping Supplemental Discipline

When Brendan Shanahan succeeded Colin Campbell as the NHL's chief disciplinarian in June of 2011, the change was fueled by widespread criticism of the latter's tenure, culminating with the leak of certain emails he composed in 2006 and 2007. Already under fire for his inconsistency when handing down suspensions, Campbell's emails worked as additional evidence of biases preventing the proper function of the position to be achieved.

Shortly after Campbell stepped down, Shanahan acknowledged that the goal behind supplemental discipline is "player safety," and has since followed through on his pledge for decision-making to be done in a more uniform and transparent manner. More or less, Shahahan wanted to shift away from Campbell's general ambiguity regarding whether or not a play would receive attention from the league, instead making it widely known why or why not certain conduct would be considered and/or deemed suspendable. In the brief period we've known the "Shanaban" to be in existence, whether or not we agree with the final ruling, Shanahan's videos explaining the reasoning behind every decision have certainly worked to create a more uniform understanding of what the league is looking at in each case.

Enter: Matthew David Cooke.

By now, we've all formed an opinion on the controversial play that occurred during the second period of Wednesday night's game between Ottawa and Pittsburgh. Whether or not one believes that Matt Cooke acted with the intent to injure Erik Karlsson, those charged with deciding whether supplemental discipline was warranted ultimately concluded intent to injure was absent in this case.

Confirmed that Matt Cooke won't receive any discipline from the NHL department of safety. They saw no intent. Blast away fans. #Sens

— Bruce Garrioch (@SunGarrioch) February 14, 2013

For many, this was a suitable end to what was commonly deemed a "hockey play." However, a rather curious word appearing in the reasoning from the NHL and others alike is that of "intent." Granted, it is admittedly difficult to establish intent on a play like this because of the general speed of hockey and how fast things happen at ice-level. Nonetheless, is Cooke's intent something we should be worried about here? The following video points out the validity of such a question:



Using the standard format adopted since becoming the Director of NHL Player Safety, Shanahan goes through an analysis of an illegal check by Colin McDonald on Ben Lovejoy. After determining that McDonald was guilty of boarding, Shanahan candidly admits that he accepts McDonald's assertion of no malicious intent. What is more, Shanahan explains that McDonald's intent is immaterial because it is a "reckless and dangerous play." Running through the other factors commonly considered, he notes that there was no apparently injury and that McDonald has no prior history of discipline.

Moving back to the standard of culpability, if intent was immaterial when suspending McDonald because his conduct was "reckless," why is it suddenly required to discipline Cooke? Moreover, if the league is implying that intent, rather than recklessness, must be the standard for a play to be adjudged illegal after the fact (which doesn't seem to be the case), the league's justification for Cooke escaping supplemental discipline is yet another chapter in a library of inconsistent rulings. We can infer that the Department of Player Safety doesn't believe Cooke to be guilty of their first element, e.g. a rules infraction, but the absence of a clear articulation of such a position is rather illogical.

In other words, why speak to Cooke's intent when it should be immaterial? Though intent to injure is difficult to prove here, can the same be said for recklessness? The league must have felt so, noting that the decision for Cooke to escape supplemental discipline also included the absence of a hearing.

In a video that’s gained praise for establishing how common these sorts of plays are, TSN's Aaron Ward cites two examples from the first period of Wednesday's Dallas at Calgary game, where players go for what he calls a "hit and pin," similar to Cooke's check on Karlsson.

However, after watching the video, there was a noticeable difference between Cooke's attempt and the others that were examined. Rather than establish an absence of blame for Cooke's conduct, Ward's examples actually helped explain just how dangerous the check actually was.

Consider the following images:



When contact is initiated between Cooke and Karlsson, both players are heading toward the boards as they try to retrieve a loose puck. Karlsson's position includes the gap between his legs necessary to pin a player, seemingly Cooke's intention bearing in mind the position of his left leg.




Before the players make contact with the wall, Cooke's right skate is positioned at the same angle of the first image above, while the gap between Karlsson's legs has narrowed, a result of their battle for position. However, Cooke's left skate has risen from the ice, and his skate blade is noticeably at a much wider angle than before, almost parallel to the boards. A bit of a peculiar line to take rather than establishing a pin by pointing his foot at a 90 degree angle to the boards, situated to the left of Karlsson's right leg. Even so, should the two contact the wall in this position, all of this is likely of little concern.




However, the moment Karlsson reaches the wall is where the issue develops. Cooke's skate still remains at a wide open angle rather than pointed at the "GH" in "Highmark" along the boards, and has actually reached its highest point above ice level. Karlsson's legs have slowly closed prior to impact, the gap required for a pin now removed. Whether it was Cooke's decision or natural reaction to channel his inner Captain Morgan, his skate being parallel to the boards instead of pointed toward them has put Karlsson in a vulnerable position should it contact the unprotected back of his legs.




Unfortunately, that's exactly what happens. There remains a wide disparity between the angles of Cooke's left and right skates, and Cooke's failure to place his left skate between either of Karlsson's results in his blade contacting the back of Karlsson's left Achilles. An unfortunate result to an unfortunate play, but just how common is something like this?


Let us move to Aaron Ward’s breakdown below:



Right away, we see that Ward's first example of a "hit and pin" involving Dillon and Stempniak is markedly dissimilar to when the contact initiated between Cooke and Karlsson. Rather than having both players engaged with one another and gliding into the boards together, Stempniak is already close to the wall as Dillon approaches from a distance. Stempniak also has neither his back turned, nor the unprotected back section of his legs vulnerable to a skate blade.




Stepmniak then plays the puck around the end-wall, while Dillon goes for the "pin," which seems to resemble more of a standard body check. Regardless, notice where Dillon's skates are compared to Cooke's just before impact.




The noted whirling dervish that he is, Stempniak jumps out of the way of the check. It is only after Dillon contacts the wall that his skate rises above the yellow.


Example number two involved Dennis Wideman making a pin attempt as he skates in, also from a distance:



The difference between this hit and Ward's first example is that the Dallas player gets the puck tangled between his legs, meaning the disc wasn't moving prior to contact as with Dillon's missed check.




Once he receives the puck, the gap between his legs necessary for a pin is exhibited.




Again, just prior to contact, both of Wideman's skates remain on the ice. Wideman then moves into position to establish the pin.




It is only once contact is made and the puck battle is established that Wideman's right skate comes above ice level, again nowhere near as high as the skate that injured Karlsson. What is more, his blade is at a 90 degree angle to the wall, ensuring the Dallas player is in no danger of unnecessary injury.


Though it is inarguable that pinning a player along the wall happens during every NHL game, it does not follow that Ward's examples absolve Cooke of wrongdoing. Whether or not Cooke intended to hurt Karlsson, there is an argument to be made that Cooke's reckless positioning of his left leg and skate blade worked to put Karlsson in a vulnerable situation, as opposed to the examples of Dillon or Wideman. Perhaps conduct similar to Cooke's is more common than Ward's illustrations seem to suggest, but players have engaged one another heading into the boards with few similar resulting injuries to-date.

It is true that we don't know whether Matt Cooke intended to hurt Erik Karlsson. However, it is rather evident that the way he approached his check doesn't seem to do Karlsson many favors, while the league's sudden fixture with Cooke's intent ignores a play with the signs of reckless conduct. If the Department of Player Safety doesn't want to suspend Cooke, that's ultimately their call. However, relying on his failure to meet a level of culpability that until now hasn't been required, all the while refusing to grant a hearing when signs of recklessness could be established, Karlsson suffered an injury on the play, and Cooke has a lengthy prior history, is unjustifiable.

Brendan Shanahan was supposed to help rid ambiguity from the NHL's administering of supplemental discipline. However, if the standard of review is constantly in flux, the NHL's "wheel of justice" shall live long and prosper.

On Using A Non-Sliding ELC To Your Advantage

I don't blame NHL fans, even very passionate and well-informed ones, for getting the off-ice rules wrong from time to time.  I do blame them for not knowing that a two-way contract has nothing to do with waivers, but that is here nor there.  Still, the rules that guide NHL general managers in their dealings are more complicated than ever, and the document which guides these complications is stunningly opaque.  GMs constantly get the fine points wrong, so why should I expect more out of fans?

The Devils recently used 2012 draft pick Stefan Matteau in his 6th game of the season, meaning that his contract stops sliding - he'll now be a restricted free agent in July 2015.  Matteau was drafted 29th overall, which is about where he was expected to go.  He put up unremarkable numbers in the QMJHL during the lockout.  In the NHL, he's been getting about ten minutes a game, almost all of it at even strength, and has recorded zero points.  In short, it seems very stupid to start an ELC for a player like this - Matteau's not that good now, he'll now be restricted in 2015, and he's going to be an unrestricted free agent in 2019, two years earlier than his age suggests.  Or is he?

Unrestricted free agency is governed by two things.  First, a player's age - if he's 27 or older when his contract expires, he's an unrestricted free agent.  The other thing is accrued seasons - if a player has 7 or more accrued seasons, at the conclusion of his contract, he is an unrestricted free agent.  The key here is the words 'accrued season', which means something very specific - an accrued season happens when a player is on the roster for 40 or more NHL games in a season.  He doesn't have to play those games, just be on the roster.  I don't know what counts as an 'accrued season' in a 48 game schedule, but I'm guessing it's in the same proportion as X is to 48 as 40 is 82  (which is around 23).  Now the Devils can still send Matteau back to junior even though his ELC has begun - it's just that teams don't frequently do this because ELCs on 18 year olds capable of playing in the NHL usually represent tremendous value - that player is likely a future star.  It doesn't make sense to use a year off that contract unless you're going to use the entire year.  However, Matteau is not a likely star, and his contract this year is for $925,000, and the Devils are not close to being a cap team, either now or in the future.  If that's the case, while Matteau's second contract will probably be for something between $1 million and $1.5 million per season, his making a few extra hundred thousand dollars on his second contract is largely immaterial.  Furthermore, Matteau having not played in junior hockey in 2011-12, is eligible for the AHL next year - the Devils could keep him there and use him in the NHL as an injury replacement, making sure that he only goes over the 40 game limit in an emergency (or if he gets injured).  Conceivably, the Devils could get 57 games out of Matteau before his free agency clock starts ticking, giving him NHL experience while not sabotaging the far future.

The Ottawa Senators Deserve Your Respect

Through the course of two twitter conversations today, I have again noticed a sentiment that seems to underrate the Ottawa Senators:

@chasew12 @draglikepull @drivingplay According to that data OTT is a good possession team. I think they were OK last year too.

— 67Sound (@67sound) February 1, 2013

@drivingplay Hmm. I didn't know they were that good post trade-deadline last year.

— Dr. Aglikepull (@draglikepull) February 1, 2013

@draglikepull @drivingplay mounting evidence? that's like saying there's mounting evidence the #Leafs are above average after going 4-3.

— Stephen Burtch (@SteveBurtch) February 1, 2013

This could merely be my own confirmation bias at play, but I get the feeling that the majority of NHL fans that watch the games, let alone those of us refusing to leave our mother's basement, would say that the Senators have no place near the top of the standings and are playing above their heads. Cue the reason that you've been linked to this post: the numbers.

Lest we forget, Ottawa made a trade last December, sending Derek Rundblad and a 2nd round draft pick to Phoenix in exchange for the services of Kyle Turris. Turris was dubbed 'selfish,' a 'flake,' or [insert non-Good Ol' Canadian Boy stereotype here] as a result of his contract holdout at the start of the season, seemingly the prime candidate for the old 'a change of scenery could be what he needs' narrative after a mediocre boxcar-stats start to his career.

At the time of the trade, Ottawa was just a .491 Fenwick team with the score tied, and a .498 team with the score close. Over the next 49 games with Turris in the lineup, the team improved to .502 and .512, respectively. They would finish 13th and 12th overall, but their latter score would have ranked them 9th (behind Vancouver) had they maintained such a level for the entire season. In a 49 game sample, I'm inclined to give greater weight to the category that provides us with about 60% more data to work with on average.

What is more, post trade deadline, the Senators were ranked 6th in the league in Score-Adjusted Fenwick, and promptly beat the Rangers both territorially and in scoring chances. Since then, the team traded Nick Foligno to the Blue Jackets for Mark Methot, signed Guillaume Latendresse, and began to utilize a slew of young talent in their system growing closer to NHL contribution every day. After seven games this season, Ottawa has picked up right where they left off and currently sit third in both FenTied and FenClose with a 5-1-1 record.

It remains to be seen whether natural progression leaps from heavily relied on players such as Turris and Karlsson will be enough to sustain company among the league's elite, but it shouldn't come as a surprise that Ottawa is performing this well; the writing has been on the wall for some time now.

Kudos to the New York Rangers for catching on before the rest of us; had I realized how good Ottawa was at the time, I too would have showered fans with confetti after squeaking by the conference's 8th seed.

P.K. Subban, Montreal, And The Cost Of Doing Business

I'm seeing a lot of silly things being written or said on Twitter regarding Montreal's inability to get P.K. Subban to sign on the line which is dotted.  Today, Renaud Lavoie of RDS leaked the amount which Montreal is offering Subban - $2.2M (pro-rated) this year, $2.9M next year.  We all know that this cannot possibly be Subban's true value, even in Montreal's eyes.  So why would they continue to hold the line on salary here?

I'm probably suggesting that Montreal is much smarter than they actually are here, but Montreal should be holding the line on RFA salaries for a simple reason:  they can.  It's one place where they actually have leverage.  One of the worst-kept financial secrets around the NHL is that playing in Montreal is a costly affair - according to this graphic, Montreal has the highest tax rate of any NHL city.  Players and agents seem to know this, and it's commented on every year how much Montreal overpays players, but in short, absent other options, they have to.  A player making $2M makes $200k less in actual dollars in Montreal than he does in Florida.  That's going to be an impediment towards building a winning team - it's hard to compete when you've got to pay that much more to retain your talent.  But what if you sat on your restricted free agents and tried to force them into sign-or-else contracts?  What if you paid 25% less for your RFA players than everyone else?  You'd at least be on a more level playing field.  If they leave when they go UFA, so what, it's hard to get 100% of the value of a UFA contract anyway.  If they go to arbitration when they are eligible, let them!  They should still end up with less in actual dollars than they should get, relative to the Montreal tax rate.

I don't know if Habs GM Marc Bergevin is doing this and indeed, by his signings of Pacioretty and Price to large deals, he may not be doing that at all.  But it's still something to consider, and much better than the 'They should pay P.K. his market price' type talk, as if market prices are something to aspire to pay.

How The New CBA Helps Teams Be Smarter, Maybe?

I pointed out several posts ago (don't need a link 'cause honestly were you really going to read it?) how I felt the NHL's bonus system vis a vis the salary cap floor was silly, and that teams shouldn't be able to load up on contracts with bonus money that will never be paid in order to reach the floor.  The NHL powers that be felt the same way and in the new CBA, bonuses are no longer counted towards a team's Lower Limit.  The Islanders, having used phony bonuses for many years, are the intended target, and they've struck back.  Nino Niederreiter supposedly demanded a trade today - Niederreiter of the 1 goal in 55 games last season is currently tearing up the AHL to the tune of nearly a goal every other game, but was not invited to the Islanders' shortened training camp.  Ryan Strome, 5th overall pick 2 years ago, did not make the Islanders despite a very strong junior season.  Defenseman prospect Griffin Reinhart also did not make the team, although the Islanders currently are using 2 players who were on waivers last week and a guy they signed off the street.  I haven't mentioned Brock Nelson, who is also tearing up the AHL, but whose contract is not eligible to slide.

It's hard to look at these actions and not see the pattern - instead of using bonus-laden years to buoy themselves up to the salary floor, the Islanders are now saving Entry-Level years on contracts.  Strome's contract still has another slide year - he'll now be UFA in 2020 instead of 2019.  Niederreiter's contract can't be saved, but they sure can sit on him to make sure he has no leverage at all on his second contract.  And who needs Reinhart eating up minutes and contract time in the NHL when you can get Brian Strait off the street to do much the same thing?  In short, the Islanders seem to be doing exactly what blogger types have always demanded of organizations who have a bunch of high draft picks and aren't very good now - sit on them.  Don't waste their entry level years if they're not great, and even if you can't undo damage, as in Niederreiter, just let him slave away in the AHL for as long as possible, and don't give him critical minutes when he comes up.  All those saved dollars can go towards signing veteran players that just might give the Islanders a fighting chance when they're heading to their new home in Brooklyn.

Likes And Dislikes In The New CBA

The CBA hasn't been ratified, but when it has been, agents and general managers will pore over it to find unscoured ground, in hopes of seeing loopholes.  The league office was none too pleased at the loopholes found in the previous agreement and sought to rectify these.  Let's go over what I liked and disliked - things I think will be good for BOTH the league and players.

Let's start with dislikes first:

35+ Rule Stays:  In fairness, I have followed a team that has had a 35+ contract on its books for all but two years of the previous CBA.  Lou Lamoriello either didn't notice this rule or didn't care about it, and he had to trade away a first round pick and buyout Trent Hunter to rid himself of the onerous contracts he had as a result, in addition to the total lack of value each deal provided.  The 35+ Rule is designed to prevent teams from signing players to long contracts which they have no intention of fulfilling.  However, with the new contract variance rules in place (a contract can't decrease by more than 35% year to year and any given year can't be less than 50% of the first year), the incentives for loading up deals to aging players isn't there.  I don't see why this rule would stay in place - it prevents players from getting the security in a longer deal that they might want, and makes it more difficult for teams to trade players on one of these contracts.

Minimum Salary Increases:  While I recognize that the NHL minimum salary should rise from its current $525,000 figure, I think its rising to $750,000 by 2021-22 is bad for teams.  Although as we'll see later, the differences between two-way and one-way contracts have essentially been obliterated by this CBA, I just don't think 4th liners contribute enough to their team winning to have their contract go up by 50% over the course of 10 years, and that this is money being taken out of the pockets of players who contribute more to their teams.  Are the NHL and NHLPA anticipating an equal rise in the salary cap?

Opt out After Year 8:  I understand why this is in place, but it makes the CBA an 8 year deal, in effect.  It's hard to imagine under what circumstances the owners won't lock the players out.

Rules I Like:

- Re-entry waivers gone:  Fringe NHLers who crush the AHL had a troubling calculus to make each season.  If they signed a one-way contract and didn't make the team out of camp, they could be stuck in the minor leagues all year.  If they signed a two-way contract to make half their NHL salary at the AHL level, the same thing could happen.  The only way they could guarantee an equal shot at being a callup was to lower their salary to $105,000 - I mean, that's certainly a fine amount of money, but hockey careers are short.  The NHL was probably tired of losing these types of players to European leagues who were willing to pay more - it will be interesting to see who comes back to the NHL next year with this rule in place.

- All contracts count on the cap that are in excess of $375,000 more than the minimum salary, counting for the amount they are in excess, whether the player on that contract is playing in Europe or wherever:  Certainly Wade Redden is enjoying his $6.5 million he's been receiving these last few years toiling for the Connecticut Whale.  Still, it's hard to imagine that such a player wouldn't trade some guaranteed money for another chance at the NHL.  Under the new system, the Rangers would be forced to buy Redden out.  One might think this is awful for the Rangers, but they get a benefit:  they can stash players making $1M in the minor leagues for only $100,000 on the cap.  That player would be eligible for waivers (presumably), but without re-entry waivers, if the market considers that player overpriced, it will leave him alone.  Big market teams still get an advantage wrt signing players here, it's just that it's at the NHL's fringe.

- Jeff Carter rule - No-trade clauses can come into effect when a player signs a new contract, not when he starts to play under that contract:  This one feels pretty self-explanatory - the Flyers signing Jeff Carter to an 11 year contract and trading him is a massively bad faith move.  The Flyers repeated this by trading James Van Riemsdyk after signing a 7 year contract.  JVR would likely not have been protected by this rule, but still - it's awfully low to sign a player to a contract, thereby increasing his value, then fobbing him off on another team.

All in all, I think the NHL shored up a lot of loopholes in the previous agreement, but the players made some gains here, gains which are good both for players and for the league.