A Deeper Look at the Tim Thomas Trade

Greetings fellow hockey fans, and welcome back to another of of Chase's patented commentaries on NHL happenings after they've become old news. Regardless of age, however, today we're afforded a rather interesting and enlightening topic: Tim Thomas and the trade that sent his $5 million cap hit to the New York Islanders. If you'll allow a quick refresher on this deal and its surrounding circumstances, I'm prepared to argue that this is a great move for New York, stemming from reasons outside mere compliance with the salary cap's Lower Limit requirement. Brent noted a few weeks ago how the new CBA is causing teams like the Isles to make smarter roster decisions, and believe it or not, this trade serves as another example of excellent asset management.

Looking back to the afternoon of February 7th, Isles GM Garth Snow gave the mainstream media and twitterverse something to talk about following the acquisition of the two-time Vezina Trophy winner from Boston. Per Bob McKenzie, only a conditional second-round draft pick would be headed the other way, compensating the Bruins only if Thomas reports to Long Island (or another club should New York trade his rights elsewhere) under his current contract.

At first glance, many assumed the trade would purely serve the purpose of helping the Islanders, a team that frequently used performance bonuses to reach the Lower Limit under the 2005 CBA, continue to find roundabout ways to pay less than what equates to (a prorated) $44 million this season. Such a view would be supported on its face, considering bonuses have been removed from the floor equation in the new agreement (a change likely tailored specifically as the 'New York Islanders Rule'). What is more, Thomas signed his current contract after his 35th birthday, meaning the cap hit shall remain on any team's books for the duration of the deal if he retires before its expiration. With all of this in mind, it becomes easy to see why such a justification from the Isles' perspective would make a good bit of sense.

To borrow a catchphrase from Lee Corso: "Not so fast, my friends."

Partly a reason for taking so long to write this article, conducting a bit of research on how the salary cap's Lower Limit is calculated revealed quite the interesting realization. Similar to how teams can add cap hits seemingly larger than their available cap space at the trade deadline, teams can similarly "bank" floor space throughout the year, trading players at the deadline that would appear to put them below that season's floor requirement.

Allow me to illustrate using language from the '05 CBA, translating a bit of lawyer-speak to English. In Article 50, Section 50.5(c)(i) at page 200, the accounting practices for the Lower and Upper Limit are set forth:

Lower Limit. No Club shall, after commencement of the regular season, be permitted to have an Averaged Club Salary that falls below the Lower Limit for that League Year.

Noting the presence of the term "League Year," i.e. that the floor must be met over the course of the year as opposed to each individual day, the only definition left for us to understand is that of "Averaged Club Salary." Removing language about performance bonuses since they cannot be factored into the equation under the new agreement, Averaged Club Salary is defined as:

[T]he entire aggregate amount committed by each Club in a League Year, calculated daily, as Player Salaries . . . in that League Year . . . .

in 50.5 (d)(i) at page 201. The definition also goes on to indicate:

Averaged Club Salary . . . is utilized to determine a Club's Payroll Room.

Keeping in mind that Payroll Room is merely the difference between the Upper Limit and a team's Averaged Club Salary, i.e. how far below the salary cap a team currently is for the season, we're left with the rather ambiguous task of figuring out what this means when inverted and applied to the salary floor.

With all language pertaining to the accounting of the Upper and Lower Limits being Article 50 components, the following example from Bill Daly on page 451 serves to outline the basic idea behind how all of this is calculated:

The Upper Limit is $40 million. A Club has an Averaged Club Salary of $38 million. With $2 million in Payroll Room at the halfway point of the season, the Club may sign or acquire a Player with a one-year SPC that has a $4 million face value. In this circumstance, even though the Upper Limit has not changed, and the face value of the contract would appear to put the Club above the Upper Limit, the passage of time from the start of the season to the midpoint of the season has created Payroll Room for the Club such as to allow the acquisition of a $4 million face value SPC.

In other words, because Averaged Club Salary is an aggregate sum of the amount paid to each player on the team's roster up to the current season day, a team below the Upper Limit by $2 million for half the season has saved $2 million against the cap, and can add that to the $2 million they are on pace to save for the second half to acquire said player with a $4 million cap hit.

With no language indicating that "floor room," if you will, would be calculated any differently, I was left to assume that teams could similarly build an Averaged Club Salary to a certain point, allowing them to remove players from their roster so long as they reached $44 million in salary paid by the end of the season.

Put another way in the context of Daly's example, say that this year's Islanders have an Averaged Club Salary of $46 million with $2 million in "floor room," or the difference between Averaged Club Salary and the Lower Limit. At the halfway point of the season, the club may trade or remove a player from their roster with a $4 million face value. In that scenario, the Islanders would pay less than the per-day requirement to meet the Lower Limit for the second half of the season (only paying $21M in total instead of $22M), but still reach the minimum of $44 million paid.

Through correspondence with the NHLPA and the League themselves, I was able to confirm that teams may not owe salary commitments that wouldn't reach that season's floor number, and could indeed dip below (what this year equates to $444,444) the prorated salary floor requirement for each season day.

Shifting to how all of this relates to Thomas and the Islanders, my aforementioned assumption on how the Lower Limit was calculated prompted the sending of this tweet on the night of the trade:

Did the math: Excluding Thomas's salary, the Isles will be ~$2.65M above the cap floor if they trade Visnovsky AND Streit on deadline day.

— Driving Play (@DrivingPlay) February 8, 2013

A little while after, McKenzie divulged the following:

Technically, NYI were cap compliant (to meet floor) as soon as Visnovsky came off suspension today but NYI opted to make Thomas deal anyway.

— Bob McKenzie (@TSNBobMcKenzie) February 7, 2013

Further expanding on just how compliant the Islanders were, James Mirtle's aforementioned article reveals that the range between the Upper and Lower Limits is ~$10 million larger than we saw last season. Another source of possible confusion, this year's $44M number is lower than both last season's $48.3M floor, and what would have been a $54.2M Lower Limit had the old CBA run through 2013.

After a short break for a deep breath, we may now gaze upon New York's roster. This year, the NHL season began on January 19 and is set to end on April 27, making it possible for a player to spend a maximum of 99 days on a team's active roster. Before adding Thomas, his contract was on Boston's books for 19 days for a total of $959,596 spent against the Bruin cap*.

Below is recreation of capgeek's daily tracker, as it stood on the night of the trade. One notable distinction about McKenzie's tweet, however, the assumption that players on suspension do not count toward a team's Lower Limit. Reading:

For Players that are suspended, either by a Club or by the League, the Player Salary . . . that [is] not paid to such Players shall not count against a Club's Upper Limit or against the Players' Share for the duration of the suspension, but the Club must have Payroll Room for such Player's Player Salary and Bonuses in order for such Player to be able to return to Play for the Club.

Article 50, Section 50.10 (c) at page 226, there is no language about a suspended player being counted "against," i.e. not being added to, a Club's Lower Limit number. It only speaks to the Upper Limit implications and the accounting that must be done upon a player's return, thus I have included Visnovsky's 19 suspension days toward the Islanders' Lower Limit charts.

Player	Pos	Full	LTIR	35+	Buried	Retained	SOIR	Cap Cost ($)
Active Roster
Tavares, John	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	5,500,000
Visnovsky, Lubomir	D	80	0	0	0	0	0	4,525,253
Streit, Mark	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	4,100,000
Thomas, Tim	G	80	0	0	0	0	0	4,040,404
Moulson, Matt	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	3,133,333
Grabner, Michael	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	3,000,000
Okposo, Kyle	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,800,000
Nabokov, Evgeni	G	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,750,000
Nielsen, Frans	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,750,000
Carkner, Matt	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,500,000
Reasoner, Marty	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,350,000
Bailey, Josh	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,050,000
Boyes, Brad	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,000,000
Martin, Matt	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,000,000
Hamonic, Travis	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	875,000
Cizikas, Casey	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	790,000
Ullstrom, David	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	704,166
McDonald, Colin	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	700,000
Hickey, Thomas	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	700,000
Aucoin, Keith	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	650,000
Strait, Brian	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	605,000
Martinek, Radek	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	600,000
Joensuu, Jesse	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	600,000
MacDonald, Andrew	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	550,000
Boulton, Eric	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	540,000
Finley, Joe	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	525,000
DiPietro, Rick	G	99	0	0	0	0	0	4,500,000
Buyouts
Yashin, Alexei	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,204,000
Suspensions
Visnovsky, Lubomir	D	19	0	0	0	0	0	1,074,747
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	$54,116,903

Should the Islanders keep his salary until the end of the season, a maximum 80 days, Thomas will have an effective $4,040,404 price tacked on to New York's Averaged Club Salary. On pace to spend $54,116,903 for the year before burying Rick DiPietro and recalling Kevin Poulin, that number stood at $50,076,499 without Thomas and $45,551,246 without the remaining 80 days and $4,525,253 of Visnovsky's contract.

In Layman's terms, the Islanders were on pace to comply with this year's cap requirement by $1,551,246, or 3.53%, before Visnovsky was activated. After, the team was on pace to beat $44,000,000 by a more comfortable $6,076,499, or 13.8%.

Fast-forward to this year's trade deadline, which falls on April 3rd at 3 PM EDT. Salaries are added to a team's Averaged Club Salary each day at 5 PM New York time, meaning that any player traded on deadline day will count against his new team's cap for 25 days. Consistent with the Islanders roster on February 7 (sans Thomas), it would follow that removing both Streit and Visnovsky on deadline day would result with the following:

Player	Pos	Full	LTIR	35+	Buried	Retained	SOIR	Cap Cost ($)
Active Roster
Tavares, John	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	5,500,000
Visnovsky, Lubomir	D	55	0	0	0	0	0	3,111,111
Streit, Mark	D	74	0	0	0	0	0	3,064,646
Moulson, Matt	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	3,133,333
Grabner, Michael	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	3,000,000
Okposo, Kyle	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,800,000
Nabokov, Evgeni	G	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,750,000
Nielsen, Frans	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,750,000
Carkner, Matt	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,500,000
Reasoner, Marty	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,350,000
Bailey, Josh	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,050,000
Boyes, Brad	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,000,000
Martin, Matt	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	1,000,000
Hamonic, Travis	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	875,000
Cizikas, Casey	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	790,000
Ullstrom, David	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	704,166
McDonald, Colin	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	700,000
Hickey, Thomas	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	700,000
Aucoin, Keith	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	650,000
Strait, Brian	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	605,000
Martinek, Radek	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	600,000
Joensuu, Jesse	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	600,000
MacDonald, Andrew	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	550,000
Boulton, Eric	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	540,000
Finley, Joe	D	99	0	0	0	0	0	525,000
DiPietro, Rick	G	99	0	0	0	0	0	4,500,000
Buyouts
Yashin, Alexei	F	99	0	0	0	0	0	2,204,000
Suspensions
Visnovsky, Lubomir	D	19	0	0	0	0	0	1,074,747
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	$47,627,003

This demands the further inquiry: if Garth Snow's intended goal was to circumvent the cap, allowing him to get assets in return for Streit or Visnovsky, why was trading for Thomas a critical component of allowing them to do so? The math simply does not shake out, further muddling why the hell the Islanders made this move.

Thinking through the situation a little deeper, consider this: Thomas's actual salary is set to be $3 million for the final season of his current deal. Were he to hit the free agent market, what would he fetch? Martin Brodeur just got $9 million over 2 years at age 40. Though he's two years older than Thomas, the latter has been the best goalie of similar age since 2007-08. It shouldn't be unreasonable to think Thomas could get a similar deal in a heartbeat, and would assuredly want a contract paying more than the $3M he'll be owed if he decides to return.

All things considered, it seems that Thomas would have incentive to play for the Islanders, possibly even this year, a concept many have dismissed altogether. If Thomas wanted to maximize his financial gain, he'd probably report before the the end of the season, meaning New York couldn't toll the contract and keep it on their books for next year. The odds seem stacked against this happening, but it's still hard to ignore the money Thomas is giving up by hiding in his bunker.

Furthermore, regardless of whether he plays this season, if Thomas decided to return to the league next year, it stands to reason that the Islanders immediately control a player of at least equal value to the second-round pick they forfeit. Even if Thomas doesn't want to play for New York, the team could easily package him in a trade for another player that could step in right away, adding to an ever-improving young squad. Also, at the beginning of the Evgeni Nabokov saga, it was less than certain he'd ever suit up for the Islanders either. However, when push comes to shove, if Thomas wants to come back to the league and have a shot to make Brodeur money on his next contract, he's going to have to honor the final season of this one.

If New York truly intends to keep him, the team holds all leverage in such a situation. If Thomas does indeed don an Islanders uniform, he'll again be worth his price tag, even if it's only for one season. What is more, it is important to note that Nabokov has been lackluster in 2013, and an elite goaltender like Thomas would immediately solidify what's been a position of concern for some time now.

While it would be rather ignorant to argue that Tim Thomas doesn't provide Lower Limit benefits for a team like the Islanders, the numbers and mere logic behind his value as an asset show that he's also much more than simply an avenue to circumvent the salary cap.

*Note: I refer to salaries on a larger scale for ease of understanding. The proportion of salary spent against the cap remains the same.

A Thought Experiment about Goaltending, Fenwick, and Lineup Construction

Before I go any further, I must note that this piece is an introduction, and to be honest, I don't quite know exactly where it will go.  I do know that I'd like you, the readers, to give any input in the comments, as this topic will certainly be revisited in the future.

One of my favorite elements of NHL analysis is looking at line-up construction in the context of the salary cap.  My favorite team, the Blackhawks, are like a number of other teams in that they will almost always spend to the externally imposed cap, but frankly, this analysis can extend to every team in the league, as they will almost always be working with internally imposed constraints.  

The question is simple: What is the best way to put together a line-up that can consistently compete to win a championship?

Here is where Fenwick and Goaltending come into play, to illustrate my point, I ask these questions below:

What is the lower bound of goalie performance for a team with legitimate Stanley Cup aspirations?  Is it saving 87% of shots? 88%? 89%?

What about Fenwick (puck possession)? Is it 44%? 46%? 48%?

Spending big money on a goaltender likely comes at the expense of signing better skaters.  What is the optimal solution? Is it the team that has a goalie saving 90.5% of Even Strength shots but has a Fenwick of 55% more likely to win a Cup than the team that has a goalie saving 93% of Even Strength shots but gets crushed territorially, only managing to Fenwick 46%?

While we can safely assume that there is a correlation between salary and ability in goaltenders, we cannot escape the reality that dollars are fixed, and money spent on goaltenders cannot be spent on skaters.  This makes it difficult for teams that spend large chunks of salary on goalies to build teams that dominate at even strength. There are exceptions to this to the first rule, both in terms of mediocre goalies making big money (Cam Ward), elite goalies making back-up money (Tomas Vokoun, though this is only one year), and in terms of teams who have managed to build a team with excellent goaltending and excellent puck possession (Montreal and Vancouver come to mind), but by and large, teams that spend big money on their goaltenders put themselves at a competitive disadvantage when it comes to competing for a Stanley Cup.

My position is that goaltending, like rebounding in basketball, doesn't matter until it matters.  That is to say it is not as important as say, winning at even strength.  I recognize that this is a controversial position, and I hope that this opens up some discussion.  I will come back to this with more data throughout the season, but right now I want to limit this to a philosophical discussion.

Boston showed us last year that a team can be mediocre 5v5 and still win a cup, so long as the goaltending is on point, but there are few who peg them as favorites to repeat, which is pretty telling when we consider that most of their team will return.  People generally recognize, whether it is conscious or not, that relying so heavily on your netminder is not a recipe for success over multi-year timeframes.

Winning at even strength is important, but are we in the statistics world overrating its importance?  Is it as important as having a world-beater between the pipes?  How does a rising cap change this picture?

Let us know your thoughts, we believe this is a pretty interesting topic.

A Look at the Shea Weber Arbitration Deal

We teamed up on this article. Chase wrote the first part and JaredL wrote the end, starting at "The Good News and Bad News for Nashville".

When Shea Weber was awarded a 1-year, $7.5 million contract in salary arbitration this past Wednesday, it left me wondering whether or not the Predators’ superstar defenseman was deserving of such a high salary. After all, $7.5 million ties him for the 7th highest cap hit in the league for 2011-2012 and is #1 amongst his fellow blueliners. What is it that Weber continually brings to the table for Nashville? Per nhl.com, let’s take a look at his ice time in all situations last year:

Player	Games Played	ES TOI/Game	Team Rank	PP TOI/Game	Team Rank	SH TOI/Game	Team Rank	Total TOI/Game	Team Rank
Weber	82	19:33	2	3:38	1	2:06	3	25:19	1

As we can see, Nashville relies heavily upon Weber in all situations. Ranking number one among defensemen teammates in total ice time per game, Weber allows coach Barry Trotz to lean on him no matter the pinch that the team may find themselves in.

In an attempt to bestow some context upon these minutes, I wandered over to Behind the Net and ran a query for the CorsiRelQoC score of all NHL defenseman with a minimum of 20 games played last season. The results are below:

RK	NAME	TEAM	Corsi Rel QoC
1	NICKLASLIDSTROM	DET	1.807
2	MARCSTAAL	NYR	1.602
3	DANGIRARDI	NYR	1.583
4	BRADSTUART	DET	1.501
5	NICKLASGROSSMAN	DAL	1.468
6	ROBYNREGEHR	CGY	1.452
7	STEPHANEROBIDAS	DAL	1.422
8	JASONGARRISON	FLA	1.412
9	MIKEWEAVER	FLA	1.381
10	JAYBOUWMEESTER	CGY	1.307
11	WILLIEMITCHELL	L.A	1.3
12	MATTIASOHLUND	T.B	1.275
13	TONILYDMAN	ANA	1.239
14	BARRETJACKMAN	STL	1.12
15	KEITHAULIE	TOR	1.119
16	KARLALZNER	WSH	1.106
17	JOHNCARLSON	WSH	1.088
18	SAMISALO	VAN	1.071
19	ZDENOCHARA	BOS	1.047
20	KIMMOTIMONEN	PHI	1.024
21	BROOKSORPIK	PIT	0.996
22	RYANSUTER	NSH	0.971
23	SHEAWEBER	NSH	0.942
24	BRENTSEABROOK	CHI	0.928
25	JOHNNYBOYCHUK	BOS	0.927
26	LUBOMIRVISNOVSKY	ANA	0.907
27	RYANO'BYRNE	COL	0.888
28	DEREKMORRIS	PHX	0.883
29	BRAYDONCOBURN	PHI	0.88
30	CHRISPHILLIPS	OTT	0.847

Weber sits 23rd, perhaps unsurprisingly attached at the hip to his frequent defensive partner Ryan Suter. Browsing some of the names on this list, we can see that Weber is in elite league-wide company with the toughness of his minutes. Putting Weber’s score in a team context, here is the CorsiRelQoC of all Nashville skaters with the same games played requirement:

RK	NAME	TEAM	Corsi Rel QoC
1	JOELWARD	NSH	1.126
2	RYANSUTER	NSH	0.971
3	MARTINERAT	NSH	0.961
4	SHEAWEBER	NSH	0.942
5	JERREDSMITHSON	NSH	0.83
6	DAVIDLEGWAND	NSH	0.805
7	NICKSPALING	NSH	0.633
8	KEVINKLEIN	NSH	0.621
9	MIKEFISHER	NSH	0.564
10	JONATHONBLUM	NSH	0.522
11	MATTHALISCHUK	NSH	0.51
12	SERGEIKOSTITSYN	NSH	0.436
13	JORDINTOOTOO	NSH	0.306
14	FRANCISBOUILLON	NSH	0.177
15	STEVESULLIVAN	NSH	0.055
16	MARCELGOC	NSH	0.01
17	CALO'REILLY	NSH	-0.02
18	PATRICHORNQVIST	NSH	-0.02
19	COLINWILSON	NSH	-0.035
20	SHANEO'BRIEN	NSH	-0.247
21	JPDUMONT	NSH	-0.487
22	CODYFRANSON	NSH	-0.673
23	BLAKEGEOFFRION	NSH	-1.217

We see just how important Weber is to his team. He and Suter face competition in the conversation with the league’s elite, and Nashville would certainly struggle to replace his minutes if they were to lose his services. With tough-minutes eater Joel Ward leaving for Washington in the offseason, it will only make Weber all the more important to Nashville’s success in 2011-2012. Having noted the context of Weber’s minutes, just how well is he doing with his given role?

	ES Goals	ES Assists	ES Points	PP Goals	PP Assists	PP Points
Stat	9	21	30	6	11	17
Team Rank	1	1	1	1	2	T-1
NHL Rank	T-3	T-11	7	T-9	T-29	T-23

Corsi ON	CorsiRel	Fenwick %	CorsiRelQoC	Zone Start %	Zone Finish %
2.69	7.2	53.4	0.942	45.3	48.4

The table should be fairly self-explanatory: Weber is the best offensive producer amongst the defenseman on his team and ranks in the top-30 league-wide in every category. What is more, despite a 45% zone start and a hefty CorsiRelQoC number, the majority of the shots while he is on the ice are being directed at the opponent’s net. Weber is certainly handling his minutes in the manner of an elite NHL defenseman, and without him Nashville would be in a pinch for tough-minutes help in all situations and production from their back-end. On one hand, the numbers don’t indicate that he’s the best defenseman in the league, though he appears to be among them, so it seems the ruling overpays him. On the other it doesn’t seem like the contract will keep Nashville from signing anyone given their cap situation and the timing. Perhaps they are less likely to make a trade that takes on more salary for this season due to an internal cap. I would have to conclude that Shea Weber’s new 1-year contract is a win-win for all parties involved. What he signs next year will be more interesting.

The Good News and Bad News for Nashville

How important is Weber to the Predators? This question doesn't quite equate to value but is certainly a big part of how their fans and front office will view the extension. To speculate, it seems likely that Nashville GM David Poile chose arbitration because he thinks Shea Weber is very important to the Predators - he didn't want to risk losing him due to another team tabling an unmatchable offer sheet, despite compensation the Preds would get if that happened.

On that front, there is good news and potentially some bad news for Nashville. I'll start with the good news. Using play-by-play data from the last two seasons, WOWY stats indicate that the Predators were far better off with Weber on the ice in every situation. Let's break this down.

Here are the overall even-strength numbers with both goalies in net:

ES	Corsi	Minutes	Corsi/60	Corsi QoC
Weber On	+204	2,965.4	4.128	1.155
Weber Off	-153	5,112.7	-1.796	0.425

Weber is facing tough competition and Nashville does far better with him on; their Corsi rate goes up by 5.92 shots per 60 when he jumps onto the ice. Let's go ahead and break this down further. What about when facing tough or weak competition? To look at that, we've broken down the ice time into situations where the average Corsi of the opposing players, according to BTN, is positive and those where it is negative. Here is the breakdown:

ES	Corsi	Minutes	Corsi/60	Corsi QoC
Tough, Weber On	-136	1,714.2	-4.760	6.037
Tough, Weber Off	-440	2,689.4	-9.816	5.794
Easy, Weber On	+340	1,251.2	16.304	-5.533
Easy, Weber Off	+287	2,423.3	7.106	-5.533

Looking at the overall picture, Weber has had success despite having a really high qualcomp. While he is obviously doing well against the above-average players, to the tune of increasing his team's Corsi rate by 5.1 per 60, a much larger WOWY difference comes against weaker competition - his presence on the ice increased Nashville's Corsi against below average players by 9.2 per. Given his offensive skills, this is perhaps not too surprising.

Now let's move on to zone starts. Using faceoff information, we can look only at times where there was a faceoff in the offensive/defensive zone within the last minute. That should serve as a pretty good indicator of how good he is in each zone. We also include all situations where either the most recent faceoff was more than a minute before or was in the neutral zone.

Off Zone	Corsi	Minutes	Corsi/60	Corsi QoC
Weber On	+295	539.9	32.782	1.283
Weber Off	+406	945.5	25.765	0.357

Def Zone	Corsi	Minutes	Corsi/60	Corsi QoC
Weber On	-219	665.6	-19.741	1.574
Weber Off	-494	1,014.0	-29.230	0.782

Neutral	Corsi	Minutes	Corsi/60	Corsi QoC
Weber On	+62	922.7	4.032	1.283
Weber Off	-84	1,513.6	-3.330	0.429

Again, we see the same pattern with Nashville having much more success with Weber on the ice in all three zones. Somewhat surprisingly, the biggest difference is in the defensive zone.

Now let's look at special teams. Here are the PP numbers, first Corsi then goals, with shorthanded goals conceded subtracted:

Power Play	Corsi	Minutes	Corsi/60
Weber On	+823	567.1	87.082
Weber Off	+439	341.8	77.074

Power Play	Goals	Minutes	Goals/60
Weber On	63	567.1	6.666
Weber Off	19	341.8	3.336

Here are the penalty-kill numbers:

Penalty Kill	Corsi	Minutes	Corsi/60
Weber On	-333	267.2	-74.785
Weber Off	-794	581.3	-81.957

Penalty Kill	Goals	Minutes	Goals/60
Weber On	-28	267.2	-6.288
Weber Off	-64	581.3	-6.606

There are a couple things worth noting here. A guy has to rest sometime, but these numbers indicate that Weber is an above-average penalty killer for the Preds and should probably get more time. The previous set of charts indicating that he was good in the defensive end is further evidence. On that note, it's interesting that there was a larger difference in his defensive-zone WOWY than for the offensive zone, but that was flipped for special teams. This is pretty likely just due to random variance. You shouldn't put too much stock into the exact numbers, but note the very strong pattern that has emerged. In every situation, Nashville was better with Weber on the ice than off it, in most cases substantially. This despite him facing tougher competition than the average Predator in all 5-on-5 scenarios and most likely on the power play.

Potential "Bad" News: Is Suter Actually Driving Play?
I put bad in quotation marks because it's not really bad news for Nashville, except that it would indicate seriously overpaying for Weber no matter how you look at it. I say potential because evidence is scarce. The reason for this is that Shea Weber and Ryan Suter have spent almost all of their ice time together over the last three years. That makes it very difficult to separate. Going back four seasons, Suter had better numbers but he also had a much better partner. Weber spent most of his time alongside Greg Zanon while Suter was paired with Marek Zidlicky.

While the sample sizes reduce this from a blow-your-mind revelation to an anecdote worth considering, you may be surprised to learn that when they've been apart Suter has had more success, or perhaps less failure would be a better way to put it. He's also faced tougher competition. Here's a chart going over their time together and apart in the last two years.

Even Strength	Corsi	Minutes	Corsi/60	Corsi QoC
Both On	+228	2,487.7	5.499	1.068
Weber Only	-24	477.7	-3.015	1.605
Suter Only	-1	368.5	-0.163	2.110
Neither	-152	4,744.2	-1.922	0.295

Overall it is certain that at the very least the Weber-Suter pairing is very important to the Predators' success. In every situation, Weber's presence on the ice improved his team's numbers. This is muddied by Suter's stats looking very similar, for obvious reasons, and actually being better against tougher competition in the rare cases when they were apart. Given that they are both free agents next summer, it's going to be very important to figure out if they are both carrying the water or if only one is.

We'd love to hear from Nashville fans. Which of the two do you think is Driving Play? What do you think Weber should get if he re-signs long term?