Showing posts with label Corsi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Corsi. Show all posts

Saturday, April 7, 2012

How Much Do the Kings Miss Jack Johnson?

If you would only listen, you might just realize what you're missing. You're missing me.
- Jack Johnson, Bubble Toes


February 23rd, the L.A. Kings traded Jack Johnson and what turned out to be their 2012 first-round pick for Jeff Carter. While most of us in the analytical community thought it was a steal, some thought Johnson would be a lot to lose. Let's take a look at how things have changed since he left.

Defensemen WOWY

Johnson split his time pretty evenly between Matt Greene, Rob Scuderi and Willie Mitchell. Here are the on-ice Corsi rates and percentages for each of these defensemen with and without Johnson:

Corsi RateWith JJWithout JJ
Greene-0.59814.786
Scuderi-7.268.194
Mitchell-6.92710.883

Corsi %With JJWithout JJ
Greene49.7%57.2%
Scuderi46.7%53.9%
Mitchell46.9%54.8%

I was expecting an increase, but wow(ee)! Johnson's time being split evenly between those three guys makes this even more damning. The strong pattern with all three defensemen effectively eliminates other explanations like zone starts, playing with better forwards or his partner switching to Doughty. Jack Johnson was dragging his teammates down, pure and simple.

Before/After

Let's now look at how the centers and defensemen he didn't play as much with have fared before and after the trade.

Corsi RateBefore TradeAfter Trade
Doughty10.8657.925
Martinez21.69124.28
Voynov11.63817.567
---------------------------------------
Kopitar14.95724.063
Stoll6.71311.484
Richards-6.5248.789
None of Above7.5398.077

Some of these numbers, especially Richards's, have a lot to do with Jeff Carter's play and how he has impacted the team indirectly - by taking tougher minutes and just shifting around the forward slots. No matter what, it's pretty clear that the Kings are doing quite well without Jack Johnson, thank you very much.

Conclusion

Since the deadline, the Kings have been one of the best teams in the NHL. Some of the improvement is what Carter has brought to the table and part of it is everything clicking and everyone playing well. A big reason, perhaps the most important, for their success since the deadline is no longer icing Jack Johnson 23 minutes a game. The Kings miss Jack Johnson as a teenager misses his virginity.

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Scott Gomez Modified Corsi

I recently watched the film Moneyball - in it, the essence of sabermetrics and finding efficiencies in the 2002 baseball market was reduced to three words: Get on base. Baseball has come a long way since then - on-base percentage has come to be correctly valued by the market. I also re-read the book Moneyball has a chapter devoted to the concept of DIPS (Defense Independent Pitching Statistics). Voros McCracken found that aside from home runs, walks, and strikeouts, pitchers have no control over how many hits they give up. However, that's not quite true - some pitchers have a little better control and it manifests itself over a career. It's not worth all that much - maybe a few hits over a season, maybe a run or two a year - but some pitchers give up a few more hits and some a few less hits than we would expect by just assuming that everyone gives up hits at the same rate. I got to thinking about applying this sort of winnowing to hockey - as the years go by, we're accumulating more and more data, now it's time to really look at some of it.

There's been some amazing work done on shaping Corsi/Fenwick into something more intelligible than it is in its raw form; I don't need to list off every blogger in this field. It's not like these concepts are being ignored. So someone may well have done this before, but I'm not consciously stealing their material.

Now, to hockey - I'm a Devils fan, and so I watched Scott Gomez play for 8 years. I didn't really understand shooting percentage when I watched him, but now I do, and I can say unequivocally that Scott Gomez is a horrible shooter. Hockey-reference.com finds only one forward with more than 1000 shots on goal and a career shooting percentage below his - Henri Richard, for whom we only have shot data for the final 8 seasons of his career. Bear in mind that New Jersey, the place where he played the majority of his career, tends to undercount shots - there could be between 25 and 100 saved shots that went uncounted over the course of his career there, driving his shooting percentage even further down.

Yet I see bloggers all over praise Gomez's Corsi and his potential value even as his shooting percentage slides further into the toilet. For me, the reason why Gomez's Corsi has always been high is pretty simple - he loves to shoot the puck from all angles, and many of his shots are extremely low-percentage shots that are merely an attempt to generate a rebound that a teammate can score on. Keep in mind that before I conduct this experiment, I think that Gomez's Corsi will not be affected very much at all - it's still going to be quite good. Still, we have to account for the fact that he is a terrible shooter, and that we finally have enough data to be pretty darn sure that his presence on the ice lowers shooting percentage.

Now unfortunately for ease of data collection (and the fact that behindthenet has been spotty the last couple of days), I am only closely examining data from between 2007-08 to 2009-10. timeonice.com presents the data I wanted in a much easier format for me to compile. I'll spare you the raw data and just present a simple chart: shooting percentage with Gomez on the ice at even strength versus shooting percentage with Gomez on ice with Gomez's shots removed. In all 3 years, his teammates actually shot better than he did while on the ice with him. This doesn't seem that remarkable, but we have to remember that 2 of his teammates are always going to be defensemen, who typically shoot much at a much lower percentage than forwards.

YearS% With GomezS% W/O Gomez Shots
2007-087.388.08
2008-096.166.45
2009-107.878.51
TOTALS7.17.66

Now unfortunately to complete the post, I had planned on getting more shooting data so I could compare Gomez's shooting rate to an average forward both in terms of shots on goal and in shooting percentage at ES, but I can't find that data anywhere. It would be a haphazard look anyway - what I will do instead is look at Gomez's Shots % while on ice with Shots For normalized such that 8% of shots were goals, as that is generally considered to be the NHL average at even strength.

YearShots % ActualShots % Modified
2007-0858.04%56.02%
2008-0956.35%49.86%
2009-1049.40%49.82%
TOTALS53.92%50.92%

Is this 'correct'? No - obviously in 2008-09, Gomez's teammates were just as much of a letdown as Gomez himself, as the shooting percentage doesn't move much with Gomez's shots taken out. It looks like that year he was certainly unlucky, in addition to being a poor shooter.

We don't have quite enough data included to make any sort of sweeping statement here. We know that the Gomez trend continues - according to behindthenet, Gomez himself shot 3.5% at 5 on 5 in 2010-11, and while he was on the ice, the Canadiens shot 4.7% as a whole. This year, he has 0 goals in 38 5 on 5 shots.

And yes, before I get a deluge of complaints, I am ignoring the effect that additional shots have - an increased chance of drawing a penalty, more offensive zone starts, not being in the defensive zone, and so forth. I'll leave that to someone with more comprehensive data. All I'm saying is that with nearly 5 seasons worth of data, and a close examination of 3 seasons worth of it, we have to account for the fact that Gomez is only a +2 player at even strength despite having 406 more shots than his opponents while on ice, and that much of it has to do with Gomez's horrific shooting percentage. Corsi and its brothers are something, but not everything - we mustn't be completely wedded to such a proxy for what's actually going on.

Sunday, October 16, 2011

Part III: The Aftermath of the Mike Richards and Jeff Carter Deals

Earlier this summer, I wrote extensively on the deals that sent Mike Richards and Jeff Carter from dry island Philadelphia to L. A. and Columbus respectively, promising a trilogy of sorts. After looking at what the Flyers gained in both the trades and free agency, the final step is to evaluate what the Flyers lost in those deals. While this post is certainly long overdue, the aftermath of last night’s 3-2 Kings victory over the Flyers in their only meeting this season seems like the perfect remaining opportunity to bring closure to this saga.

Beginning with my familiar approach, let’s take a look at both Richards and Carter’s average ice time from last season per nhl.com:

PlayerGames PlayedES TOI/GameTeam RankPP TOI/GameTeam RankSH TOI/GameTeam RankTotal TOI/GTeam Rank
Richards8113:4742:5632:08318:522
Carter8014:3922:5640:39618:144

Unsurprisingly, we see that both guys gave the Flyers a good chunk of minutes in all situations. With the exception of Carter’s reduced role on the PK thanks to the emergence of Darroll Powe, Flyers head coach Peter Laviolette was not afraid to send out either player when he felt he needed a boost in any particular area of the ice. In order to give these minutes their proper context, we will begin by looking into where both players stacked up amongst Flyer forwards in point production, once again thanks to nhl.com:

PlayerES G (Team Rank)ES A (Team Rank)ES Pts (Team Rank)PP G (Team Rank)PP A (Team Rank)PP Pts (Team Rank)
Richards15 (T-5)24 (4)39 (6)5 (T-4)16 (1)21 (1)
Carter28 (T-1)21 (5)49 (3)8 (1)9 (T-3)17 (3)

As we can see, both players seemed to match their top-6 ice time with top-6 scoring numbers both at even strength and on the power play. If we take a look at a few more key statistics according to Behind the Net and Time on Ice, it will become quite apparent why Richards and Carter are so good at what they do:

PlayerCorsi ONCorsiRelScore-Tied Fenwick %CorsiRelQoCSF/60Zone Start %Zone Finish %
Richards-1.231.153.60.75230.646.850.1
Carter3.347.850.50.89629.243.851.9

Breaking these numbers down, beginning with Richards, his negative Corsi score is perhaps the first thing that stands about his totals. However, if we judge his performance according to Eric T.’s Balanced Corsi, we see that according to his zone start he is actually around 3 shots better per 60 minutes than we might expect. His balanced zone shift is also a little higher than we might expect, and if we couple this data with his extremely impressive 53.6% Fenwick with the score tied, there is a lot here to suggest that Richards is carrying the water at even strength.

Moving to Carter, his totals are just as impressive. Carter actually was put in tougher defensive spots than Richards, and his Corsi ON score is a little more than 4 shots higher per 60 minutes. His Balanced Corsi is around 7 shots higher than what we might expect from a player put in similar situations, and his BZS is around 3 percent to the good. His Fenwick score, though lower than Richards still suggests that he was also doing a major part driving the play forward for the Flyers considering his zone starts.

What is even more impressive is that the above analysis doesn’t even take into account the elephant in the room: quality of competition. Below is a chart of the toughest CorsiRelQoC scores of every player listed as a Center on Behind the Net last season, minimum 20 games played:

RankPlayerTeamCorsiRelQoC
1BRANDONDUBINSKYNYR1.436
2ARTEMANISIMOVNYR1.412
3HENRIKZETTERBERGDET1.383
4DAVEBOLLANDCHI1.353
5PAVELDATSYUKDET1.175
6BRIANROLSTONN.J1.084
7JORDANSTAALPIT1.037
8PATRICEBERGERONBOS1.026
9OLLIJOKINENCGY1.006
10STEPHENWEISSFLA1.004
11PATRICKMARLEAUS.J0.998
12NATETHOMPSONT.B0.973
13MARCUSJOHANSSONWSH0.953
14BROOKSLAICHWSH0.95
15BRADMARCHANDBOS0.921
16DAVIDBACKESSTL0.907
17JEFFCARTERPHI0.896
18TOMASPLEKANECMTL0.895
19SAKUKOIVUANA0.879
20DARRYLBOYCETOR0.857
21MARTINHANZALPHX0.837
22JERREDSMITHSONNSH0.83
23STEVEOTTDAL0.809
24DAVIDLEGWANDNSH0.805
25PAULSTASTNYCOL0.802
26MIKERIBEIRODAL0.8
27MARTYREASONERFLA0.796
28BRENDANMORRISONCGY0.771
29MIKERICHARDSPHI0.752
30JORDANCARONBOS0.745

Both Richards and Carter show up in the conversation with guys who are playing against some of the toughest players in the league. Though they may not score upwards of 80 points per season, both players are certainly producing at elite levels considering the players that they are expected to face night-in and night-out.

What is more, thanks to JaredL we are able to take a look at how the Flyers performed during the past two seasons with and without either Richards or Carter on the ice:

Player On-IceCorsi/60Time (mins)Corsi QoC
Both3.398211.850.646
Richards1.2862053.550.51
Carter4.9531950.4670.386
Neither-2.3223514.417-0.214

Unsurprisingly, these numbers fall in line with everything else we’ve seen – they were able to send the play in the right direction while eating the majority of the team’s tough-minute assignments. Jared was also kind enough to provide data that looks into how some of the Flyers’ other key players performed in situations both with and excluding one of Richards or Carter on the ice during the same time-frame:

Player On-IceWithCorsi/60Time (mins)Corsi QoC
GirouxEither4.6981379.3170.839
GirouxNeither4.204784.9-0.456
BriereEither8.912895.3830.069
BriereNeither-0.7751238.7170.224
HartnellEither2.674987.267-0.576
HartnellNeither-1.2301121.8830.329
van RiemsdykEither2.1941148.4670.528
van RiemsdykNeither4.426704.967-0.169

Once again, we see that no matter the situation, each player was better with one of either Richards or Carter on the ice except for James van Reimsdyk whose data has a noticeable discrepancy in quality of competition. In order for the Flyers to remain one of the premier Stanley Cup contenders in the Eastern Conference, it is looking more and more like the big line of JVR, Claude Giroux and Jaromir Jagr is going to be asked to carry the mail against top-tier competition in the absence of Richards and Carter. These numbers seem to suggest that it is certainly possible, but we will have to wait until each plays an adequate number of contests before we can finally say whether Paul Holmgren’s plan will pay off in the long run. So far, the Flyers are off to an excellent start, but Giroux & Co. will have to keep up their play in the absence of what was one of the league's most formidable one-two punches up front.

Friday, October 14, 2011

Adjusting for Zone Starts: Zone Start Adjusted Corsi

In a previous article I discussed zone starts and introduced a new approach to analyzing the effect of zone starts - breaking up performance by each type of ice time: offensive zone the first shift after the faceoff, offensive zone faceoff after a change, after a neutral-zone start, defensive-zone start after an on-the-fly change and the first shift after a defensive-zone faceoff. In this article, I will introduce a metric that adjusts for zone starts and a simplified metric that provides a good rule-of-thumb for you to use when looking at BTN.

Zone Start Adjusted Corsi

The idea is simple: take a player's ice time and use the league average Corsi for each type of start to determine what an average player's Corsi would be with the same ice time. Subtracting that off will give you how much he is above, or below, what the average player would get with his ice time. To see how this works, let's look at the poster child for zone-start adjustment, Manny Malhotra. Here is a chart summarizing Malhotra's time in each start, along with his Corsi numbers:

Manny MalhotraTime (mins)Corsi / 60
Ozone, first shift55.248.913
Ozone, after change170.8-7.376
Neutral Zone340.3-6.524
Dzone, after change142.3-13.073
Dzone, first shift178.7-31.234
All Time887.2-9.265

Here are the league averages for each type of ice time:

League AverageCorsi / 60
Ozone, first shift40.147
Ozone, after change2.818
Neutral Zone0
Dzone, after change-2.818
Dzone, first shift-40.147

Weighting by Malhotra's ice time gives us -5.496, meaning that if someone performing at the league-average level was given Mr. Malhotra's ice time he would have a Corsi of -5.496. To get Manny's Zone Start Adjusted Corsi we subtract that off, in other words add 5.496, to get -3.769.

A Rule of Thumb: Simplified Zone Start Adjusted Corsi

That's all well and good, but it would be nice to have something a little more portable. Even with all the data, I'd like to be able to just pull up BTN and get an idea how to adjust for a guy's Ozone%. To get something simpler, I recorded the Ozone% according to BTN for all of the players with at least 600 minutes of even-strength-goalies-on ice time and ran a regression to get the average adjustment for a given ozone%. Here is a scatter plot of the 508 players. The numbers on the x-axis represent how far off from 50% Ozone%, the y-axis is the size of the adjustment or the negative of what the average player would get with the same ice time:



As you can see, a simplified formula will come very close to the more complicated version above which forces us to look at the individual data. Any differences are based on how much time a player spends in the relatively neutral situations where he is jumping on the ice after a faceoff at either end. The result of this is a simple formula. To adjust for zone starts, multiply how many percentage points the player's Ozone% is from 50% by 0.18 and add or subtract accordingly. In formula, with Ozone% out of 100:

Simplified Zone Start Adjusted Corsi = Corsi/60 - (Ozone% - 50)*0.18

Another way to think about it is to add or subtract 1.8 for every 10 percentage points. So if you gave a guy with even zone starts 60% Ozone starts then we'd expect his Corsi rate to go up 1.8. If you put him in more defensive spots with just a 30% Ozone% then his Corsi will drop about 3.6.

Results:

I don't want to clutter it with a 900-row table, so I'll make a table with the top 25 and another with a few players of interest with particularly high or low Ozone%. Here is a google spreadsheet with all the Zone Start Adjusted Corsi stats from 2010-2011.

RankPlayerTeamPosZone Start Adjusted CorsiCorsiTime On Ice
1Kyle WellwoodSJSF22.12522.203462.1
2Torrey MitchellSJSF18.50418.336791.9
3Joe PavelskiSJSF17.30415.9391039
4Ryane CloweSJSF16.57116.7151148.7
5Alexandre PicardMTLD16.53817.308634.4
6Mason RaymondVANF16.51517.695922.3
7Ryan KeslerVANF16.50916.5881135.7
8Brian RafalskiDETD15.30516.0831033.4
9Nikolay ZherdevPHIF15.02914.418653.4
10Justin WilliamsLAKF14.84314.7171043.7
11Evgeni MalkinPITF14.77315.509607.4
12Sean BergenheimTBLF14.65213.625916
13Tim JackmanCGYF14.64516.275726.3
14Viktor StalbergCHIF14.21716.208799.6
15Pavel DatsyukDETF14.03913.3848.1
16Logan CoutureSJSF13.74314.0781133.7
17Alexander SteenSTLF13.72214.481081.5
18Jason DemersSJSD13.68513.5911169.9
19Mikael BacklundCGYF13.37614.034761
20Patrik EliasNJDF13.27513.3061082.2
21Mark LetestuPITF13.26214.613759.6
22Tomas HolmstromDETF12.9113.418840.7
23Chris HigginsVANF12.18311.156790.6
24Brian GiontaMTLF12.0812.1511185.1
25Tyler KennedyPITF11.81312.581996.8

People of interest:

PlayerTeamPosZone Start Adjusted CorsiCorsiTime On Ice
Henrik SedinVANF7.18511.8031235.3
Patrick KaneCHIF10.5213.7381139.9
Marian GaborikNYRF-7.194-4.829882.1
J-P DumontNSHF2.4764.62662.4
Ville LeinoPHIF-3.973-2.1871097.6
Manny MalhotraVANF-3.769-9.265887.2
Blair BettsPHIF-15.221-18.412501.9
Steve OttDALF-4.526-8.3461020.9
Jerred SmithsonNSHF-6.98-10.442965.3
Dave BollandCHIF-1.198-3.2806.3


Please Leave Feedback!

As this is my first effort in coming up with a new statistic, I would love some feedback on this. Does the methodology make sense? Is the Ozone% adjustment of .18 per percentage point pretty close to what you've been doing? Any and all comments appreciated.

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

A Thought Experiment about Goaltending, Fenwick, and Lineup Construction

Before I go any further, I must note that this piece is an introduction, and to be honest, I don't quite know exactly where it will go.  I do know that I'd like you, the readers, to give any input in the comments, as this topic will certainly be revisited in the future.

One of my favorite elements of NHL analysis is looking at line-up construction in the context of the salary cap.  My favorite team, the Blackhawks, are like a number of other teams in that they will almost always spend to the externally imposed cap, but frankly, this analysis can extend to every team in the league, as they will almost always be working with internally imposed constraints.  

The question is simple: What is the best way to put together a line-up that can consistently compete to win a championship?

Here is where Fenwick and Goaltending come into play, to illustrate my point, I ask these questions below:

What is the lower bound of goalie performance for a team with legitimate Stanley Cup aspirations?  Is it saving 87% of shots? 88%? 89%?

What about Fenwick (puck possession)? Is it 44%? 46%? 48%?

Spending big money on a goaltender likely comes at the expense of signing better skaters.  What is the optimal solution? Is it the team that has a goalie saving 90.5% of Even Strength shots but has a Fenwick of 55% more likely to win a Cup than the team that has a goalie saving 93% of Even Strength shots but gets crushed territorially, only managing to Fenwick 46%?

While we can safely assume that there is a correlation between salary and ability in goaltenders, we cannot escape the reality that dollars are fixed, and money spent on goaltenders cannot be spent on skaters.  This makes it difficult for teams that spend large chunks of salary on goalies to build teams that dominate at even strength. There are exceptions to this to the first rule, both in terms of mediocre goalies making big money (Cam Ward), elite goalies making back-up money (Tomas Vokoun, though this is only one year), and in terms of teams who have managed to build a team with excellent goaltending and excellent puck possession (Montreal and Vancouver come to mind), but by and large, teams that spend big money on their goaltenders put themselves at a competitive disadvantage when it comes to competing for a Stanley Cup.

My position is that goaltending, like rebounding in basketball, doesn't matter until it matters.  That is to say it is not as important as say, winning at even strength.  I recognize that this is a controversial position, and I hope that this opens up some discussion.  I will come back to this with more data throughout the season, but right now I want to limit this to a philosophical discussion.

Boston showed us last year that a team can be mediocre 5v5 and still win a cup, so long as the goaltending is on point, but there are few who peg them as favorites to repeat, which is pretty telling when we consider that most of their team will return.  People generally recognize, whether it is conscious or not, that relying so heavily on your netminder is not a recipe for success over multi-year timeframes.

Winning at even strength is important, but are we in the statistics world overrating its importance?  Is it as important as having a world-beater between the pipes?  How does a rising cap change this picture?

Let us know your thoughts, we believe this is a pretty interesting topic.

Thursday, September 8, 2011

On Zone Starts - Team Situational Stats

Here are the team situational stats. For more information see the original article.

Ozone, faceoff shift - the most recent faceoff was in the team's offensive zone. All players that were on the ice for the faceoff remain on the ice.

RankTeamCorsi/60
1PHI54.228
2T.B51.08
3VAN49.815
4BOS48.759
5CGY48.441
6DET46.786
7BUF45.822
8L.A45.387
9NYR44.161
10S.J42.515
11WSH42.389
12COL42.381
13MTL42.069
14PHX41.97
15STL41.963
16CBJ41.268
17PIT40.983
18OTT38.66
19FLA38.103
20CHI36.331
21CAR35.763
22N.J35.138
23TOR33.567
24NSH33.555
25WPG33.431
26NYI33.14
27ANA31.991
28DAL30.702
29MIN28.032
30EDM20.284

Ozone, on-the-fly - the most recent faceoff was in the team's offensive zone. At least one player who was on the ice for that faceoff has left.

RankTeamCorsi/60
1STL13.715
2DET11.981
3CHI11.927
4S.J11.322
5VAN9.631
6N.J7.863
7WPG7.033
8BOS6.542
9T.B5.909
10PIT4.99
11BUF4.653
12CGY4.295
13PHX4.086
14L.A4.053
15CAR2.664
16OTT2.457
17MTL2.193
18FLA2.062
19NSH1.123
20WSH1.062
21TOR0.147
22CBJ-0.606
23EDM-1.617
24DAL-2.016
25COL-2.887
26PHI-3.068
27NYR-3.263
28MIN-7.285
29NYI-8.869
30ANA-12.004

Neutral Zone - the most recent faceoff took place in the neutral zone.

RankTeamCorsi/60
1DET8.91
2S.J8.122
3PIT6.662
4CGY6.402
5CHI5.329
6WSH5.32
7MTL4.566
8T.B3.503
9FLA2.949
10VAN2.817
11N.J2.453
12PHX1.373
13L.A1.234
14BUF0.774
15CBJ0.545
16BOS0.038
17STL-1.229
18WPG-1.438
19CAR-1.656
20NYR-1.69
21NSH-1.703
22PHI-3.096
23DAL-3.323
24OTT-3.735
25MIN-5.621
26EDM-5.945
27TOR-5.955
28NYI-6.438
29ANA-8.643
30COL-9.949


Dzone, on-the-fly - the most recent faceoff was in the team's defensive zone. At least one player who was on the ice for that faceoff has left.

RankTeamCorsi/60
1STL6.676
2S.J5.267
3CHI5.073
4PIT3.967
5L.A1.756
6T.B1.725
7VAN1.537
8WSH0.711
9N.J0.564
10DET0.326
11OTT-0.234
12CBJ-0.746
13NSH-1.143
14WPG-1.893
15TOR-2.502
16CGY-2.646
17PHI-3.433
18MTL-3.687
19BOS-4.026
20FLA-4.537
21PHX-4.809
22BUF-5.957
23COL-5.962
24NYR-6.533
25DAL-6.778
26CAR-6.989
27EDM-8.336
28NYI-8.625
29MIN-14.866
30ANA-17.406


Dzone, faceoff shift - the most recent faceoff was in the team's defensive zone. All players that were on the ice for the faceoff remain there.

RankTeamCorsi/60
1N.J-24.725
2CBJ-28.026
3PIT-28.448
4MTL-29.541
5S.J-29.619
6L.A-30.262
7DET-32.495
8BOS-34.246
9FLA-35.538
10PHX-35.628
11VAN-35.931
12STL-36.241
13OTT-37.688
14T.B-38.08
15CHI-39.613
16WSH-40.122
17COL-42.147
18PHI-42.258
19CAR-42.514
20BUF-42.67
21DAL-44.144
22MIN-44.151
23NSH-44.536
24NYR-46.649
25TOR-49.143
26CGY-49.905
27NYI-50.559
28EDM-51.105
29ANA-56.561
30WPG-60.533


Here is a table giving the rankings for each team in the 5 categories:

TeamO-firstO-flyNeutralD-flyD-first
ANA2730293029
BOS4816198
BUF711142220
CAR2115192619
CBJ162215122
CGY51241626
CHI2035315
COL1225302317
DAL2824232521
DET621107
EDM3023262728
FLA19189209
L.A8141356
MIN2928252922
MTL13177184
N.J2261191
NSH2419211323
NYI2629282827
NYR927202424
OTT1816241113
PHI126221718
PHX1413122110
PIT1710343
S.J104225
STL15117112
T.B298614
TOR2321271525
VAN3510711
WPG257181430
WSH11206816

On Zone Starts

How valuable are offensive-zone faceoffs? How much should we adjust the Sedins' stats to take into account that they take three faceoffs in the offensive zone for every one at the other end? Are coaches using their guys effectively, or should they almost turn them into specialists like Vigneault does in Vancouver? Is it better for a coach to focus on zone starts, matchups or just roll lines to keep his guys fresh and the best playing the most?

These are just a few of the many, many questions that relate to zone starts that come up in hockey analysis. We'll put off dealing with most of those until later, this article will be more of a broad discussion and introduction to what I feel is a novel approach that we'll be using a lot.

The Data

I'm going to start with team stats. This is pretty strange because zone starts aren't a team issue. A team that has more offensive-zone starts than defensive has earned them; good zone starts aren't just handed down to the team by some suit. In contrast, a player only reaps what he sows, as it were, if he or a teammate ices the puck or possibly after a very short shift. Most faceoffs are taken with fresh players that were on the bench when the stoppage occurred. Despite that, using team stats is a good place to start because we can get a pretty good idea how the location of the most recent faceoff affects results.

The data come from a common source: NHL play-by-play and roster reports. In this case, I am using every game available for the 2010-2011 regular season. As usual, it's even strength with both goalies on the ice. Using the roster reports, which say when each player was on the ice during the game, I isolated these 5 situations:

Ozone, first shift - the most recent faceoff was in the team's offensive zone. All players that were on the ice for the faceoff remain on the ice.

Ozone, on-the-fly - the most recent faceoff was in the team's offensive zone. At least one player who was on the ice for that faceoff has left.

Neutral Zone - the most recent faceoff took place in the neutral zone.

Dzone, on-the-fly - the most recent faceoff was in the team's defensive zone. At least one player who was on the ice for that faceoff has left.

Dzone, first shift - the most recent faceoff was in the team's defensive zone. All players that were on the ice for the faceoff remain there.

To clarify, once any of the original faceoff guys have left the ice the rest of the time before the next stoppage is in the on-the-fly category. So the faceoff shift is only that first shift, even if later it so happens that the 10 skaters that were on the ice are out there together.

Note: I have separated out the team results to keep this post about the general concepts. If you want to see how good your team is in each situation, you can find that here.

Ice Time and Goals

Let's take a look at how much time was spent and how many goals were scored on average in each situation. This will give us a very rough idea how important faceoffs are in the offensive or defensive zone.

SituationIce Time%Goals%
Ozone, first shift452.511.4%21.213.8%
Ozone, on-the-fly765.119.3%32.321.0%
Neutral1538.938.7%5435.1%
Dzone, on-the-fly765.119.3%34.822.7%
Dzone, first shift452.511.4%11.47.4%
Total3974.1100%153.6100%

The first thing I noticed is that the first shift only accounts for about 37% of the ice time following a faceoff at either end. Part of that is that I'm being very strict defining the first shift; it would increase if I allowed for one guy to leave the ice, for example. In any case, you might wonder why we focus so much on who is on the ice for a faceoff when so much of a player's ice time after an ozone/dzone faceoff started with him jumping onto the ice.

The goals columns give you a pretty strong hint. Look at the second and fourth rows. Following a faceoff outside the neutral zone, once a change was made more goals were scored by the team that took the faceoff in their defensive zone! We'll later see that this is likely just due to random chance, but it seems clear that if you come on in an on-the-fly change it's more like a neutral-zone start than being on for a faceoff at either end.

Corsi

Let's look at the average team Corsi rate for each situation. I use the average team rate for each situation so we don't have the endogeneity effect I wrote poorly about a couple months ago. In other words, if we simply averaged out all the ice time we'd overestimate how important it is to be in the offensive zone because good teams tend to get more faceoffs in the offensive zone than bad teams so we'd be lumping in team quality with ozone-faceoff value.

SituationCorsi/60
Ozone, first shift39.957
Ozone, on-the-fly2.603
Neutral0.019
Dzone, on-the-fly-2.784
Dzone, first shift-40.103

Here you can see how much having a faceoff in the good zone helps your team out territorially. I'm sure that there is an effect didn't surprise you, but suspect how large it is might have. It's also interesting to note that this almost completely goes away once the first change happens. This shouldn't be a surprise either, teams don't change without the puck leaving the zone, but one might have expected more of a ripple effect. The most common way to change lines is to dump the puck and give the other team possession, albeit starting behind their own net. It does not appear that being able to breakout the Flying V gives you much of an edge.

This is a nice segue back to why we should care so much more about who is actually on for the faceoff and not just ice time afterward. Let's exaggerate and suppose that Henrik Sedin and Manny Malhotra spend the same amount of post-offensive-zone-faceoff time on the ice but Hank's is all first-shift time while Manny doesn't take a single offensive-zone faceoff. Sedin's ozone time will be extremely favorable, and Malhotra's only slightly so. In this extreme scenario we would need to adjust Sedin's stats a lot to take his type of ice time accurately into account. Being out there on the faceoff in front of their goalie is over 15 times as favorable as jumping on the ice after.

Conclusion: More To Come

When I thought of this method of separating out the ice time, I did a little fist pump. While I don't think this, or really any metric, will blow everything else away it seems like a good way to analyze zone starts and give us better insight into player value and coaching decisions. We will be using this and related methods a lot in the future, especially the coming weeks leading up to the season. Coming down the pipe is a new player metric to adjust for zone starts. We'll also do in-depth analysis on zone starts for the two teams that focus the most on them: the recently rivalrous Vancouver Canucks and Chicago Blackhawks. Are Vigneault and Quenneville outsmarting the rest of the league or is it a case of fancy coaching syndrome? If you ask nicely, we could probably do something similar for your favorite team, or even your favourite team.

Here is a link to the team data.

Friday, August 19, 2011

On Luck, Skill and Sample Size in Shooting Percentage

The roles of skill and luck in shooting are an important and often misunderstood part of hockey analysis. This is particularly true when analytical and traditional fans get together. A typical discussion might go something like:

A: Steven Stamkos got 91 points with 45 goals at the age of 21. He's definitely getting 100 points next year, and could easily score 50 goals a season as he improves.
B: Yeah, but he was lucky to make 16.5% of his shots. That's not sustainable and his numbers will probably go down next year, even if he does actually improve.
A: So shooting is all luck? You clearly know nothing about hockey and should actually watch some games instead of just sitting at your computer all day coming up with fancy stats that don't mean anything.

Turns out both guys have a point. Stamkos should probably expect his stats to drop next season because, in addition to goal numbers trending downward for the league as a whole, he's probably not burying 16.5% of his shots. On the other hand, I person B probably should watch more hockey, it is a great game.

A lot of the confusion comes from incorrect either/or thinking. Scoring on a high percentage of your shots is a result of both luck and skill. I'm not just putting down the traditional fans here. Those of us in the analytical community, myself included, are prone to bad thinking as well. While most people ignore or underrate the importance of luck in hockey in general and shooting in particular, we tend to go too far the other way, chalking everything up to luck and ignoring the skill aspect.

Shooting for a high percentage is skill based. Two of our favorite writers, JLikens of objectivenhl fame and Gabe Desjardins from BTN and arcticicehockey have written several articles on the subject.

In case their articles are not convincing enough, let's consider two of the best players in the game: Henrik Sedin and Sidney Crosby. While not necessarily known as snipers, these players have all the skills that one might think lead to their team putting a high percentage of shots in the net. Both have elite vision, passing ability, hands, positioning and, in one case, telepathy. We would all expect their teams to have better shooting percentages when they are on the ice than when they are sitting on the bench or worse. The numbers bear this out. Here is a chart with their teams' performances at even strength with both goalies in net from the last four seasons combined. The stats are courtesy of noted Driving Play reader Vic Ferrari's timeonice scripts, which you can find information on how to use here.

TeamGoalsShots On GoalShooting %
Penguins, Crosby on Ice236216010.9%
Penguins, Crosby off Ice41453477.7%
Canucks, Henrik on Ice273262410.4%
Canucks, Henrik off Ice35947097.6%

As you can see, the Pens with Crosby shot 3.2 percentage points higher than they did without him. While some of it may be variance, with the number of shots they took with him on, that's a difference of 69 goals or more than 17 goals per season due to better shooting. The Canucks shot 2.8 points higher with Henrik on the ice, a difference of over 73 goals, more than 18 per season, when you consider how many shots they took with him on. For the statistically minded, these shooting-percentage differences are very very very significant. To give you an idea, it varies field to field but the most common benchmark is for there to be less than a 5% chance of results this extreme, or more so, due to variance alone. That's a 1-in-20 chance. For Crosby, there is a 0.00045% chance, or less than 1 in 222,000. For Hank there is a 0.00235% chance of results that extreme due to randomness alone - less likely than 1 in 42,000. Again, 1 in 20 is the usual mark. The data confirm what anyone would guess from watching a few games - Henrik Sedin and Sidney Crosby help their teams shoot better. (Note: if you are a hater and/or think that it's the likes of Alex Burrows and Pascal Dupuis who are driving these results, feel free to be wrong. The point of this is to provide evidence of shooting skill and clearly someone has it when these two are on the ice.)

Let's now look at the role of luck on shooting percentage. To do this, I will run simulations comparing the results of a typical team that shoots well and one that does poorly. In this article on objectivenhl, which is worthy of being linked again, JLikens finds that the average team shoots at an 8.1% clip 5-on-5, with a standard deviation of 0.48%. Going by this, a team that is good at shooting, let's say 7th or 8th best in the league, would have a true 5-on-5 shooting percentage of something like 8.42%. On the other hand, a team that is bad at shooting, say 7th or 8th worst in the league, would be expected to score on about 7.78% of their shots.

Let's see how things shake out. Below is a chart giving the results of 10,000 simulations for various numbers of shots where team A has a true shooting percentage of 8.42% and team B shoots at 7.78%. The first two columns tell you the given time period and number of shots for each team. The next three columns tell you how often the team good at shooting outshot the bad (column 3), the bad team outshot the good (4) and how often they had an equal shooting percentage (5). The last two columns give what percent of the time someone looking at the data, and not knowing the underlying percentages, would get statistical signficance at the 5% level. Notice that in the last column, the statistical test would reveal that B is significantly better at shooting than A despite their shooting skill actually being over half a percentage point worse.

Time periodNumber of ShotsA scores moreB scores moreGoals scored equalA > B SignificantB > A significant
One Period831.9%28.7%39.4%1.3%1.1%
One Game2442.6%36%21.4%6%4.5%
1/4 Season50062.3%33.2%4.5%10.5%2.2%
1/2 Season1,00068.6%28.5%2.8%13.4%1.4%
1 Season2,00076.4%21.7%1.9%17.9%0.8%
2 Seasons4,00085%14%1%27.8%0.2%
3 Seasons6,00090.1%9.3%0.6%36.1%0.1%
4 Seasons8,00093.6%6%0.4%43.7%0.1%
5 Seasons10,00095.6%4.1%0.3%50.3%0%

You probably didn't find the results surprising for that first row, representing a period of play. The most common outcome, happening about 40% of the time, is that the two teams remain tied, most often at 0. The team that shoots better due to getting higher-quality shots, hitting the corners better and so on is only slightly more likely to be the one that is ahead if you know that one of them is. Less than 32% of the time will the better team find themselves ahead after a period in which both get the league average 8 shots, whereas they'll be behind almost 29% of the time.

Lower on the chart it gets more troubling, especially for us bloggers. The most common sample point for analysis is half a season. Generally the best way to study the persistence of something is to split the season in half, typically first half vs second half or even-and-odd numbered games, and compare the two samples. This works well because teams should be the same or very similar. If you study something over multiple seasons you aren't getting the same teams every year due to player and coaching changes. In half a season, the team near the top in shooting skill has only about a 2 in 3 chance of outscoring the team near the bottom with the same number of shots. There is also little chance, roughly 13%, of finding that the better team is significantly better at shooting if you were looking at the data. Even over a whole season of shooting data, there is a 1 in 4 chance that the worse team will get better results. It isn't until we get several years worth of shooting results that it tilts heavily in favor of the better shooting team and that's not realistic because teams change so much each offseason and the simulations assumed the same percentage each season.

As you can see, luck plays a huge role for all reasonable sample sizes. This is the fundamental reason why shooting stats are better than goals. Luck is less of a factor for number of shots taken than number of shots made, so they are more reliable indicators of skill over samples of a season or less. If over a season there is a 1 in 4 chance that a good-shooting team is outshot by a bad-shooting team then it's tough to say that a team's results are due to skill and not just random luck.

In a future installment I will look at how persistence is affected by sample size.

Sunday, August 14, 2011

Part I.V: The Aftermath... Jakub Voracek and Rick Nash WOWY Analysis

Chase asked me to do some number crunching on Voracek. To be honest, I found the results surprising. The numbers indicate that Voracek is highly underrated and was a great pickup. It appears that he, not Rick Nash, was Driving Play at even strength in Columbus.

Here is how Columbus did at even strength with both goalies in net with both Nash and Voracek on the ice, one of them on and neither of them:

2010-2011 ESCorsiTime (mins)Corsi/60OppCorsi
Both67690.25.8240.499
Nash only-6405.1-0.889-0.136
Voracek only71414.310.2830.399
Neither-112453.9-0.2690.214

It surprised me that in the 20 periods worth of ice time he was without Voracek, the guy with the sixth most shots taken in the league (including PP) was negative, albeit slightly. It's too small of a sample to take the exact numbers seriously, but it's interesting to note that when Voracek was off the ice not only was Nash a negative-Corsi player but Columbus actually did better without him than with him. Voracek, on the other hand, did quite well without Nash. He did so against tougher competition.

This pattern also held if you look only at situations where the score was tied:

2010-2011 tiedCorsiTimeCorsi/60OppCorsi
Both55256.912.8440.192
Nash-13155.3-5.0230.002
Voracek15140.56.4080.66
Neither-52946.9-3.2950.021

Let's expand the sample by throwing in 2009-2010, when they spent more time apart. Here's all 5-on-5 minutes:

2009-2011CorsiTime (mins)Corsi/60OppCorsi
Both59713.24.9630.528
Nash only-611507.2-2.4281.325
Voracek only651421.12.7440.773
Neither-2534184.4-3.6280.497

and when the score was tied:

2009-2011 TiedCorsiTime (mins)Corsi/60OppCorsi
Both55262.812.5590.265
Nash-20584-2.0551.439
Voracek34508.94.0090.646
Neither-1641585.8-6.2050.468

Nash had tougher competition in his time without Voracek than vice versa, but Voracek's numbers are far better. I'll write a lot more on quality of competition later and come up with something more precise, but according to my rough calculations it looks like Voracek was somewhere between 4 and 4.5 Corsi shots better per 60 when you take the tougher opposition into account. Maybe a little higher if you only look at tied-score minutes.

Before the flood of angry emails from Jackets' fans comes in, I'd like to point out that this is all for 5-on-5 play. It appears that Nash was carrying the water on the Power Play, maybe the fans yelling "SHOOT" for the entire damn power play are smarter than we think, and he also played about 19% of Columbus' PK time. In both cases, the Jackets had better Corsi numbers when he was on the ice than off.

Expect Voracek to play a big role for the Flyers at 5-on-5 this season.

Wednesday, July 20, 2011

Part I: The Aftermath of the Mike Richards and Jeff Carter Deals

On June 23rd, 2011, Flyers General Manager Paul Holmgren sent shockwaves through the hockey world when he dealt arguably the two most notable faces of the franchise – Mike Richards and Jeff Carter – to Los Angeles and Columbus respectively. Since then, much has been (and will continue to be) written about possible motives behind what he and team owner Ed Snider were pondering to make such bold moves. So far, speculation has included both off-ice issues as well as the need to create salary cap space for newly signed goaltender Ilya Bryzgalov. Starting with the former, Richards’ tumultuous relationship with members of the Philadelphia media is no secret. For the last few seasons, there have been accusations that he (and Carter) enjoyed a lifestyle where partying was the main focus, leaving hockey on the back burner. Richards’ leadership inside the locker room hasn’t been looked upon any more favorably. It has been rumored that a longstanding rift between the team’s young stars and seasoned veterans – most notably Chris Pronger – could also have played a factor in the stars’ departure from the team. Whether or not these accusations have merit, it is certain that the moves will accomplish one of the team’s likely intended goals: a culture change inside the dressing room.


In the aftershock of what happened almost four weeks ago, another highly-debated question has naturally emerged: are the Flyers still one of the premier Stanley Cup contenders in the Eastern Conference? In order to answer such a question, I am going to break my study into three parts. Part one will look into the deals for Richards and Carter themselves, evaluating what it was that the Flyers added to their lineup. Part two will evaluate Philadelphia’s signings on July 1 and speak to where Jaromir Jagr, Maxime Talbot, and Andreas Lilja fit into the equation. Finally, part three will decipher what the Flyers lost when they made the decision to deal their captain and his swift sidekick.


Of course, trying to answer our question is a bit of a double-edged sword – only time will tell if Holmgren’s return of Wayne Simmonds, Brayden Schenn, a 2012 second round pick, Jakub Voracek, the 8th overall selection in this year’s draft (Sean Couturier), and a third round selection in this year’s draft (Nick Cousins) were an adequate return for both superstars. Fortunately, we can still attempt to decipher what the numbers tell us about these players (and even draft picks). In order to do this, I like to start by looking at players’ average ice time per game. This tells us 1) what situations the players are being used in, and 2) how often they are being used. Per nhl.com, here are the numbers for Simmonds and Voracek, the two players coming to Philadelphia who saw significant ice time at the NHL level last season:



From these numbers, we can conclude that Simmonds played a bottom-six checking role in Los Angeles, the same role that he will most likely see in Philadelphia. Voracek, on the other hand, was one of the Jackets’ top forwards, ranking in the top 5 on his team at even strength and on the PP. This is good news for the Flyers – they will need him to replace any and all minutes in both situations without Richards and Carter in the fold.
With our ice-time analysis complete, we can now attempt to give this raw data its proper context.

 

What do these numbers tell us? Starting with Simmonds, he was asked to play a moderately defensive role against the toughest competition of any forward on the team (min. 20 games played). However, his zone start percentage should probably see an expected Corsi score of zero or slightly worse (see chart), and instead Simmonds sits at -4.02 . DobberHockey tells us that he most often played with Michal Handzus and Alex Ponikarovsky (21.25%), and Handzus and Kyle Clifford (15.33%). Of these forwards, Handzus and Ponikarovsky both have Corsi scores around what we would expect for someone given their roles, but no player seems to be “carrying the water” as we like to say. Unfortunately for the Flyers, Simmonds is no exception and his low scores in just about every category show that he cannot send the play in the right direction on his own against the opponent’s best players.


Voracek, on the other hand, is an interesting case in and of himself. Once again using the expected Corsi graph linked, Voracek actually slightly over-performs what we might expect from somebody given his zone start percentage. However, his impressive Corsi scores and Fenwick percentage are perhaps correlated with a few points of interest. First, his aforementioned high zone start percentage gave him an immediate advantage in generating shots towards the opponent’s net as he quite often started his shifts in prime scoring position. Second, his competition was anything but impressive, actually averaging a negative relative Corsi score. Finally, DobberHockey shows us that among his three most common line combinations, Rick Nash was on the ice a healthy 57.81% of the time. I hardly think explaining why playing with Nash would be beneficial to Voracek, but it is worth noting that Nash was among the league’s leaders in shots last season – his total of 305 ranked 6th in the entire NHL. Though Nash’s Corsi score of 4.49 may be lower than expected considering his own 57.1% zone start, taking into consideration how often he shoots it is easy to see how Voracek’s own score was undoubtedly affected for the better. It will be most interesting to see if Voracek can repeat such gaudy scores without a line-mate sporting the credentials of Mr. Nash.


We have already noted Voracek’s 2:57 of average PP time per game in ’10-11 which will be immensely valuable to Philadelphia in the absence of Richards and Carter. Though he ranked amongst the team’s leaders in said category, however, he only registered 8 total points for his efforts on the man advantage. Perhaps it is unsurprising that Columbus’ Power Play ranked 8th in the league in shots for/60 minutes with Nash in the fold (remember: shots are a better indicator than goals), but for a team that saw success in generating pressure on the opponent, Voracek’s totals still seem low. However, some of this effect can be explained when we realize that Columbus’ opponents saved 91.1% of all shots while on the PK according to Behind The Net. Thanks to mc79hockey, we know that the historic average is around 86.6%, a full 4.5% disparity. Had Columbus’ opponents not been so lucky, both the team and Voracek most likely would have sported slightly higher power play production.


Moving on to the relative unknowns of what the Flyers got back in the deal, on the surface Brayden Schenn and three draft picks may seem like an appetizing return. However, Derek Zona’s study on draft picks and their value tells us something slightly different. Putting Schenn aside for a moment, what can we realistically expect from the first, second, and third round picks that the Flyers gained? Zona’s study is particularly excellent because it shows the historical chance of drafting a “top” player with a certain selection. He notes to “...consider the 'Top Players' to be top five forwards and top three defenseman [on their team].” Knowing what we know about Richards and Carter, I don’t think anybody would argue that the Flyers subtracted two established “top 5” forwards from their lineup. However, the article also notes that the odds of drafting such a player with the number 8-13 selections (they selected Couturier 8th overall) is a mere 41.2%. Looking at the other two picks, the 68th overall selection this season which turned into Nick Cousins has a 7.4% chance of turning into a Richards or Carter-esque player. Considering the Kings figure to be among the top western conference contenders next season in the wake of their offseason, I would most likely expect the 2012 second round pick to fall within this same range. The fact that the Flyers didn’t receive higher than a 50% chance to replenish their lineup with two established stars puts a bit of a hindrance on their returns.


Adding this to the fact that both Richards and Carter were on long-term, cap-friendly deals, and I’m not sure that there is a net positive to be found here. Perhaps Sean Couturier or one of the other selections will make a difference, saving the Flyers money in the short-term should they produce while on an entry level contract. So far, all indications are that Brayden Schenn will be given every possible opportunity to make the final roster, but much like Couturier, there are still question marks surrounding his development. Unfortunately, prospects are called prospects for a reason – there is no guarantee that they will meet development expectations. Considering what the Flyers gave up in these deals, while the return could most certainly prove lucrative, the odds simply do not stack up in their favor.