The State Of Contracts In The NHL Today, Part 1

It's been ripping good fun watching teams ink their best players for periods of time that I hadn't even considered possible. By the time Ilya Kovalchuk's contract ends, people will be riding on Hoverboards, but not for leisure, as they will be using them in the fight against the deadly invasion of space aliens. Remember that you read this on Driving Play first; perhaps that will be your last thought as you enter the terrible tentacled maw of an interstellar conqueror.

I seem to have gotten off track here, but it's going to be fascinating watching teams maneuver with these contracts on board over the next 5-8 years. Some of them are time bombs, waiting to explode in a team's face. We can't say which. Others will provide the foundation for a Stanley Cup championship. And while I expect this trend to be reversed under the next CBA - even as many teams have one of these contracts on their books, they no doubt realize the enormous advantage conveyed upon teams that have multiple ultra-long-term contracts, and are going to work to remove the possibility of such a contract under the next CBA - the cat is out of the bag. Let's look at when these big contracts end.

2018: 9
2019: 4
2020: 6
2021: 5
2022: 2
2023: 1
2024: 0
2025: 1
That's a total of 28 contracts that end more than 6 years from now, and that number will no doubt increase when Ryan Suter, Zach Parise, and Shea Weber are re-signed this offseason, among others. 17 NHL teams have a contract that ends in 2018 or later.

Most of these contracts are at 'discount prices.' For instance, Marian Hossa and Ilya Kovalchuk are signed to deals that have a 5.2M and 6.6M cap hit, respectively, and that end roughly when your life's course will be fully determined and there's no extricating yourself from your fate. Their cap hits on contracts both signed after the end of the lockout, when the salary cap was 39M? 6M and 6.3M, respectively. Their cap hits have barely moved even as the salary cap itself has nearly doubled, and this was for players who were RFA when they signed their post-lockout deals, and UFA when they signed their lifetime contracts.

I decided to look at the top 20 largest cap hits in the league in 2008-09 and the biggest cap hits in the league in 2011-12. The summer of 2008 was when teams seemingly decided that the cap would never go anything but outrageously upwards - the economy was robust, NHL fans had forgotten about the lockout, and Glen Sather knew that the surge of Wade Redden jersey purchases would pay for that contract by themselves.

Year	Total Top 20 Salary	Salary Cap	% Of Total Cap Space
2008-09	$148.248M	$56.7M	8.72%
2011-12	$151.047M	$64.3M	7.83%

The 'Total Top 20 Salary' column refers to the summed amount of the top 20 biggest cap hits in the league. As we can see, it's barely moved despite the fact that the cap has grown by more than $7M. The '% Of Total Cap Space' refers to the top 20 salaries' total being divided by the salary cap amount times 30, for the 30 teams in the NHL. We can see that the percentage has gone down by nearly a full percent. That doesn't sound like very much, but we're talking about nearly 1% of 1.7 billion dollars. That means that cap-hit wise, the top 20 contracts are down by nearly an average of $766K relative to the cap. In total dollars, as we can see, things have remained relatively stagnant.

The deals that are super-long term don't really fit into this mold either, as only 5 contracts in the current top 20 biggest cap hits end in 2018 or after. That means these players whose big contracts end earlier will almost certainly face pressure to sign for a lower cap hit - odds are they will be out of their prime when their current deal ends.

In Part 2, I will examine RFA forwards to see if this trend also holds true among lower paid players, and in Part 3, I will give some reasons why the NHL is evolving in this way.

With Or Without You: Patrick Sharp

            The usage of Patrick Sharp has been a hot topic in Hawkland for the better part of two years now.  Sharp was used primarily as the 2^nd line Center during Chicago’s cup run, and placing him on the wing of Kane and Toews confused many Hawks fans last year, especially down the stretch, when David Bolland was injured.  Loading up the top line then meant that Michael Frolik or Tomas Kopecky would play Center alongside Marian Hossa.  Center depth is still somewhat a concern for the Hawks, and this same conversation about where to put Sharp in the line-up lingers on.  Our goal is to use possession numbers to identify whether loading things up by playing Sharp with Kane and Toews actually resulted in an appreciable difference in the team’s ability to drive the play. 

            The results show that Chicago’s pure possession numbers take a slight hit when Sharp plays with Kane and Toews compared with when somebody else plays with the pair.  Sharp – Toews – Kane were together for 427 Even Strength minutes last year.  When those three were on the ice, the Hawks’ Corsi/60 was 15.155 against a Quality of Competition of -0.734.  Kane and Toews as a pair played 930 minutes with any other teammate not named Patrick Sharp, their Corsi/60 and Corsi Quality of Competition were 19.4 and 0.458, respectively.   What makes the decision to load up even more questionable is the impact on Marian Hossa.  Mr. Hossa has played 618 even strength minutes with none of Kane, Toews, or Sharp.  The Hawks still had a positive Corsi in that sample, though it was much lower, coming in at a Corsi/60 of 4.7. 

Now that we’ve established that splitting the pair up makes the most sense, the question becomes how to split them up.  The two primary options are either:

·      Other – Toews – Hossa / Other – Sharp – Kane

OR

·      Other – Toews – Kane / Other – Sharp – Hossa

Toews was paired with Hossa and somebody not named Patrick Sharp or Patrick Kane for 259 EV minutes.  The pair did well for themselves, putting up a Corsi/60 of 13.7.  This is all the more impressive when realizing this pair was generally out against the opponent’s toughest competition.  The Quality of Competition rating was 1.76. In other words, Toews and Hossa took on tough competition and still dominated possession.  Sharp and Kane were also impressive, with a Corsi/60 of 20.8.  The pair generally faced weaker competition.

The other alternative is pairing Toews with Kane and then Sharp with Hossa.  Toews and Kane (and no Sharp/Hossa) put up a Corsi/60 of 19.4 in 929 EV minutes.  The pair faced tough competition, though it was not nearly as tough as the minutes that Toews and Hossa played.  Sharp and Hossa have been together for 570 minutes, putting up a Corsi/60 of 15.5.  It is interesting to note the drop in the quality of Marian Hossa’s opponents when he plays with Toews compared with Sharp.  The Quality of Competition rating of Toews – Hossa is 1.76 compared to -0.7 when the Slovak winger is paired with Sharp. 

            The numbers ultimately bear out that splitting up Sharp and Toews is the optimal solution given Chicago’s current line-up.  From there, decisions on personnel get a bit murky, though there are some important implications.  First, is that none of Sharp’s minutes at Center can be considered tough.  This is interesting, as the defensive reputations of his two potential right wingers are quite different, yet the quality of opposition has not impacted who plays the right side on Sharp’s line.  We do, however, see a big drop in the quality of opposition when we compare Toews’ minutes with Kane to Toews’ minutes with Hossa.  The captain faced tough minutes regardless, though the 0.458 quality of competition when playing with Kane was a relative cake walk compared to the quality of competition he faced when paired with Hossa. 

            My personal belief is that the Blackhawks should pair Sharp with Kane and Toews with Hossa.  We can see that any line that Sharp centers will generally get softer minutes; given this, why not load up in both directions?  A line based Toews and Hossa features two elite two-way forwards who have shown the ability to crush territorially despite playing absurdly tough minutes; Sharp and Kane would reap the benefits of the other pair’s tough minutes.  It is also important to note that a Sharp – Kane pairing is considerably better than a Sharp – Hossa pairing in terms of puck possession even though the quality of minutes are effectively the same.

            In the end, this, to quote The Wire’s Marlo Stanfield, ‘sounds like one of them good problems’.  As a team that likes to play with the puck (and does so better than everybody else), the Blackhawks have an embarrassment of riches in top end talent.  The only thing that can undermine that would be playing Patrick Sharp on the left wing.