Outside of Niklas Lidstrom’s playing status next year, no story will dominate the hockey world quite like the fast-growing goalie controversy in Vancouver. The Canucks certainly have an awkward situation on their hands – on one hand they have an elite goalie who has fallen out of favor with the majority of the fanbase, (unfairly) becoming the scapegoat for a team that has come up short on their expectations. On the other hand, they have a younger, cheaper goalie that has shown great promise, winning over the Vancouver fanbase in the process. I make two assumptions here, one is Vancouver will not keep both, the other is that other teams will make offers for Schneider. I do believe Luongo will be the odd man out, but I certainly do not believe that as strongly as others, and I will explain this below.
Ostensibly, Vancouver will begin the process by comparing the value of Luongo’s contract to a range of contracts that they theoretically see themselves giving to Schneider. But there is more – and at this point is where I believe many stop the analysis. The very factors that make Schneider more valuable than Luongo to the Vancouver Canucks also make him more valuable to every other team.
As outsiders, there is no way we can accurately speculate on just how much more valuable they see Schneider. It’s easier (but still more difficult, and still beyond the scope of this article) to identify each player’s relative trade value. What we can do, though, is talk about how the trade value of one impacts the necessary value of the other, and from there, how that relationship impacts Vancouver’s ultimate decision.
We begin with obvious – there is a whole lot of uncertainty in the market for Roberto Luongo. On production alone he is a hot commodity, but his contract precludes many teams (and possibly teams that have been speculated as trade partners) from acquiring him. There are other teams that both need goaltending and can handle the financial burden (Chicago and Edmonton), but it is not clear that Vancouver is willing to trade an elite player to one of their biggest rivals. I believe the decisions of these smaller market teams (Columbus, Florida, Tampa Bay) on whether or not they are willing to take on the burden to be one of the biggest factors in Vancouver’s ultimate decision, because if the market for Luongo becomes liquid, then we can almost guarantee that he’s gone. But if Vancouver finds the offers to be lacking, then the possibility of an offer for Schneider that closes the gap between the value I mentioned earlier becomes more and more likely.
In other words, there is an inflection point in this scenario – some point where Schneider’s advantage over Luongo is mitigated by the value Vancouver could acquire by trading Schneider. What that exact point is can only be known by Vancouver, but assuming that Luongo has played his last game as a Canuck neglects a very important part of this calculus.
Showing posts with label Chicago Blackhawks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chicago Blackhawks. Show all posts
Saturday, May 5, 2012
Thursday, April 12, 2012
Playoff Preview Podcast: Chicago - Phoenix
To cover the Hawks - Yotes series, we got the Chicago side from our own Matt M. Friend of the blog and podcast regular Corey (@shutdownline) from Shut Down Line, with help from Chase and Triumph, gave us the Phoenix side.
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Download (Right-click, save as)
Thursday, November 3, 2011
Splitting Up Duncan Keith and Brent Seabrook
Outside of Patrick Kane's impressive move to the middle, perhaps the biggest story in Chicago's impressive 7-2-2 start has been Joel Quenneville's decision to split up Duncan Keith and Brent Seabrook. The natural reaction to a coaching move so major is curiosity - why would the Blackhawks decide to split up one of the game's best pairs?
Depth
The most obvious explanation is that the move is Joel Quenneville's way of mitigating the loss of Brian Campbell. On a simple level, separating Keith and Seabrook ensures the Blackhawks will play the vast majority of their even strength minutes with at least one of their superstars on the ice, especially given Nick Leddy's relative inexperience in playing top-4 minutes.
Development
It's pretty obvious that the organization is high on Leddy (Scotty Bowman compared Leddy to Phil Housley), and I can't help but think that their confidence in his ability to eventually play top-4 minutes helped to ease the blow of trading Brian Campbell, as evidenced by the team choosing not to sign or trade for any top-4 defensemen (I believe Montador was primarily signed to solidify the bottom pair, though he obviously has shown the ability to do well in a heavier role).
I think the surprise comes not from Leddy's presence in the top-4, but mostly from who is primary defense partner has been.
Strategy/Usage
I'll note from the outset that using QualComp or any variant thereof is useless at this point in the season. There is just too much variance in strength of schedule to draw inferences from those numbers. What I will use instead is PBP data (h/t Jared).
The first section of data only focuses on Zone Starts and their Corsi numbers based off of where they started a shift.
From here we can see that the Seabrook/Hjalmarsson line is much more likely to take a defensive zone draw. We can also see that the Seabrook/Hjalmarsson pairing has performed much better territorially, no matter the situation.
As I said above, I am not using QualComp or any variant of QualComp to adjust for the toughness of the minutes. Instead, I'll use forward pairing as a proxy, as the roles in which Chicago forwards are used are pretty rigid. As we can see below, the Keith/Leddy pairing is most often used alongside Jonathan Toews and Patrick Sharp in any situation. As for Seabrook/Hjalmarsson, the forward they play with most often is David Bolland.
As I briefly mentioned above, I believe we can validly infer that the Seabrook/Hjalmarsson pairing has played tougher minutes, mainly because of how much more likely they were to play with David Bolland, whose role for the Blackhawks is well-defined as a shutdown Center. If you guys feel this is an unreasonable assumption, let me know.
Results
Here are the results of the three centers, along with the rest of the ice time, with the Keith/Leddy and Seabrook/Hjalmarsson pairings. As you can see, the Seabrook/Hjalmarsson pairing has gotten better Corsi results with each of the top three lines in the small sample we have.
Depth
The most obvious explanation is that the move is Joel Quenneville's way of mitigating the loss of Brian Campbell. On a simple level, separating Keith and Seabrook ensures the Blackhawks will play the vast majority of their even strength minutes with at least one of their superstars on the ice, especially given Nick Leddy's relative inexperience in playing top-4 minutes.
Development
It's pretty obvious that the organization is high on Leddy (Scotty Bowman compared Leddy to Phil Housley), and I can't help but think that their confidence in his ability to eventually play top-4 minutes helped to ease the blow of trading Brian Campbell, as evidenced by the team choosing not to sign or trade for any top-4 defensemen (I believe Montador was primarily signed to solidify the bottom pair, though he obviously has shown the ability to do well in a heavier role).
I think the surprise comes not from Leddy's presence in the top-4, but mostly from who is primary defense partner has been.
Strategy/Usage
I'll note from the outset that using QualComp or any variant thereof is useless at this point in the season. There is just too much variance in strength of schedule to draw inferences from those numbers. What I will use instead is PBP data (h/t Jared).
The first section of data only focuses on Zone Starts and their Corsi numbers based off of where they started a shift.
| Keith-Leddy | % of TOI | Corsi Rate |
| Ozone Faceoff | 13.6% | 33.277 |
| All neutral | 79% | 3.127 |
| Dzone Faceoff | 7.4% | -38.889 |
| Seabs-Hjalm | % of TOI | Corsi Rate |
| Ozone Faceoff | 13.3% | 47.872 |
| All neutral | 74.6% | 12.54 |
| Dzone Faceoff | 12.1% | -28.18 |
From here we can see that the Seabrook/Hjalmarsson line is much more likely to take a defensive zone draw. We can also see that the Seabrook/Hjalmarsson pairing has performed much better territorially, no matter the situation.
As I said above, I am not using QualComp or any variant of QualComp to adjust for the toughness of the minutes. Instead, I'll use forward pairing as a proxy, as the roles in which Chicago forwards are used are pretty rigid. As we can see below, the Keith/Leddy pairing is most often used alongside Jonathan Toews and Patrick Sharp in any situation. As for Seabrook/Hjalmarsson, the forward they play with most often is David Bolland.
| Ozone | Keith-Leddy | Seabs-Hjalm |
| Toews | 41.8% | 30.6% |
| Kane | 37.9% | 21.9% |
| Sharp | 44.8% | 22.5% |
| Hossa | 31.8% | 12.8% |
| Bolland | 12.6% | 39.4% |
| None of above | 5.5% | 14.1% |
| Neutral | Keith-Leddy | Seabs-Hjalm |
| Toews | 32.7% | 19.6% |
| Kane | 38.2% | 26% |
| Sharp | 33% | 15.3% |
| Hossa | 33.6% | 23.1% |
| Bolland | 14.1% | 44.6% |
| None of above | 16.4% | 8.8% |
| Dzone | Keith-Leddy | Seabs-Hjalm |
| Toews | 33.3% | 10.3% |
| Kane | 32.3% | 21.2% |
| Sharp | 47.1% | 4.6% |
| Hossa | 23.6% | 21.1% |
| Bolland | 21.9% | 62.7% |
| None of above | 9.1% | 6.8% |
As I briefly mentioned above, I believe we can validly infer that the Seabrook/Hjalmarsson pairing has played tougher minutes, mainly because of how much more likely they were to play with David Bolland, whose role for the Blackhawks is well-defined as a shutdown Center. If you guys feel this is an unreasonable assumption, let me know.
Results
Here are the results of the three centers, along with the rest of the ice time, with the Keith/Leddy and Seabrook/Hjalmarsson pairings. As you can see, the Seabrook/Hjalmarsson pairing has gotten better Corsi results with each of the top three lines in the small sample we have.
| Forward | Pairing | Corsi/60 | Time |
| Toews | KL | 6.063 | 49.5 |
| Toews | SH | 21.352 | 28.1 |
| Kane | KL | 7.643 | 55 |
| Kane | SH | 22.222 | 35.1 |
| Bolland | KL | 2.841 | 21.1 |
| Bolland | SH | 10.154 | 65 |
| None | KL | -2.857 | 21 |
| None | SH | -4.604 | 13 |
Conclusions/Recommendations
To be honest there are numerous explanations for why the Keith/Leddy pairing hasn't performed as well as the Seabrook/Hjalmarsson pairing. The first is that Seabrook/Hjalmarsson have played together more (in previous seasons) than Keith/Leddy have and the disparity is largely driven by a lack of familiarity. The second is that Nick Leddy isn't as good (yet) as Keith, Seabrook, or Hjalmarsson - it is possible that Leddy is dragging Keith down a bit. Finally, this could merely be variance.
As for my recommendation, I honestly see no issue with keeping these pairings together. As I noted above, all 4 players are off to solid starts, and while there is no doubting the chemistry and effectiveness in a pairing of Duncan Keith and Brent Seabrook, the fact that the Keith/Leddy pairing has done as well as it has speaks volumes to both of those players. The eye test leads me to believe reason #1 above is the best explanation for why there has been a disparity in their possession totals. I believe that as the Keith/Leddy pair grows and each player becomes more comfortable with each other, the net result for the Hawks will be positive, couple that with the long-term developmental benefit of pairing Keith and Leddy, and I see no issue with continuing this pair.
Wednesday, October 5, 2011
Driving Play Season Preview: Teams 3-1, The Stanley Cup Favorites
3. Washington
Key Statistics:
Fenwick- 50.4%
Even Strength Shooting%- 7%
Even Strength Save%- .928
2010-2011 Review:
Washington's year last year was filled with up and downs. Most notable was their extended losing streak in December that provided some sweet Bruce Boudreau rants on '24/7'. After this lull however, the team played extremely well, finishing first in the Eastern Conference and second overall in total points. Unfortunately for Caps fans, the playoffs brought another early exit, as the Caps were swept in the Eastern Conference Semis, a series which was much closer than a sweep would indicate.
Offseason Changes:
Where do we start? George McPhee was a busy man this offseason, with resigning key players (Brooks Laich, Karl Alzner), fleecing teams in trades (Semyon Varlamov for a 1st round pick), signing elite goalies for a back-up's cap hit (Tomas Vokoun), and filling out the rest of his team with veteran players capable of playing tough minutes. The team added precious forward depth with the additions of Joel Ward, Troy Brouwer, and Jeff Halpern. They also bolstered their blueline with the addition of Roman Hamrlik. George McPhee took a team that was already very good and turned them into Stanley Cup favorites. The Capitals now have it all.
Key Questions for 2011-2012:
Will the Capitals be better territorially this year?
2. Vancouver
Key Statistics:
Fenwick- 50.4%
Even Strength Shooting%- 7%
Even Strength Save%- .928
2010-2011 Review:
Washington's year last year was filled with up and downs. Most notable was their extended losing streak in December that provided some sweet Bruce Boudreau rants on '24/7'. After this lull however, the team played extremely well, finishing first in the Eastern Conference and second overall in total points. Unfortunately for Caps fans, the playoffs brought another early exit, as the Caps were swept in the Eastern Conference Semis, a series which was much closer than a sweep would indicate.
Offseason Changes:
Where do we start? George McPhee was a busy man this offseason, with resigning key players (Brooks Laich, Karl Alzner), fleecing teams in trades (Semyon Varlamov for a 1st round pick), signing elite goalies for a back-up's cap hit (Tomas Vokoun), and filling out the rest of his team with veteran players capable of playing tough minutes. The team added precious forward depth with the additions of Joel Ward, Troy Brouwer, and Jeff Halpern. They also bolstered their blueline with the addition of Roman Hamrlik. George McPhee took a team that was already very good and turned them into Stanley Cup favorites. The Capitals now have it all.
Key Questions for 2011-2012:
Will the Capitals be better territorially this year?
- Last year the Capitals were a middle of the pack team territorially, though some of their signings are players capable of driving the play forward (Joel Ward, Troy Brouwer). It'll be interesting to see if this has any impact, as Ovechkin, Backstrom, and Semin are the only remaining forwards who can be counted on to control play.
Was last year's mediocre Power Play just variance or should it be a cause for concern?
- After spending the last handful of years with one of the league's best power plays, last year's Capitals saw their success with the man advantage dwindle, posting the NHL's 16th best Power Play. Was this bad coaching or bad luck? Either way, if these problems creep back up it could be a problem, as Washington probably has less margin for error here given their relative weakness at even strength.
2. Vancouver
Key Statistics:
Fenwick- 53.9%
Even Strength Shooting%- 8.2%
Even Strength Save%- .939
2010-2011 Review:
Vancouver was the class of the NHL last year, earning 117 points on their way to winning the President's Trophy. Their postseason nearly ended in disaster before Alex Burrows scored an OT winner in Game 7 of the first round, and from there they handled Nashville and San Jose en route to their first Stanley Cup Finals appearance since 1994. The rest, as they say, is history, as Tim Thomas and the Bruins won the final two games of the series as Vancouver began to burn.
Offseason Changes:
Mike Gillis (correctly) resisted the temptation to overreact, as nearly all of their regulars return, with Christian Ehrhoff as the only key piece to leave. Marco Sturm was their most notable endeavor in UFA. Most of the offseason work came with re-signing their own players, as Kevin Bieksa, Max Lapierre, Jannik Hansen, Sami Salo, and Andrew Alberts all re-upped this summer.
Key Questions for 2011-2012:
Is Vancouver deep enough along the blueline?
Fenwick- 53.9%
Even Strength Shooting%- 8.2%
Even Strength Save%- .939
2010-2011 Review:
Vancouver was the class of the NHL last year, earning 117 points on their way to winning the President's Trophy. Their postseason nearly ended in disaster before Alex Burrows scored an OT winner in Game 7 of the first round, and from there they handled Nashville and San Jose en route to their first Stanley Cup Finals appearance since 1994. The rest, as they say, is history, as Tim Thomas and the Bruins won the final two games of the series as Vancouver began to burn.
Offseason Changes:
Mike Gillis (correctly) resisted the temptation to overreact, as nearly all of their regulars return, with Christian Ehrhoff as the only key piece to leave. Marco Sturm was their most notable endeavor in UFA. Most of the offseason work came with re-signing their own players, as Kevin Bieksa, Max Lapierre, Jannik Hansen, Sami Salo, and Andrew Alberts all re-upped this summer.
Key Questions for 2011-2012:
Is Vancouver deep enough along the blueline?
- This is slightly nitty, as Vancouver is clearly an elite team, but one chink in the armor is their depth along the blueline, especially after nothing was done to replace the departure of Christian Ehrhoff. If Vancouver runs into injuries which is a possibility given the history of Sami Salo and (to a lesser extent) Kevin Bieksa, there could be issues, as giving big minutes to players like Andrew Alberts and Aaron Rome is a recipe for disaster. Keith Ballard returning to form is essential.
1. Chicago
Key Statistics:
Fenwick- 54%
Even Strength Shooting%- 6.5%
Even Strength Save%- .919
2010-2011 Review:
Last season was a disappointment for the Blackhawks. Coming off a Stanley Cup and the ensuing cap hell, Chicago was really hamstrung with last year's lineup, and it showed, as players such as Fernando Pisani, Jack Skille, Jake Dowell, Nick Boynton, and Jassen Cullimore all played substantial minutes at various points throughout the season. The team got better later on after adding Chris Campoli and Michael Frolik, but still needed a lot of luck to even make the playoffs. Chicago ended up losing in 7 games to the eventual Western Conference champions.
Offseason Changes:
The Hawks FO was not shy this summer, as they moved two key cogs from the 09-10 cup run on draft night, sending Troy Brouwer to the Washington Capitals for a 1st round pick. Later that night they moved Brian Campbell to the Florida Panthers for Rostislav Olesz. The money freed from the Campbell deal was quickly put into use, as the Blackhawks then acquired and signed Steve Montador, and on July 1st, signed Andrew Brunette, Jamal Mayers, Daniel Carcillo, and Sean O'Donnell. Sami Lepisto was also signed later in the Summer.
Key Questions for 2011-2012:
Did the Blackhawks do enough to replace Brian Campbell?
- While the Campbell move was a huge win from a cap management perspective, it left the Blackhawks with a huge hole on defense. The Hawks brass continues to insist that Nick Leddy is indeed ready to fill the void, but that obviously remains to be seen. Campbell played a huge role for the Blackhawks, one that was often under appreciated by certain types of Hawks fans. Chicago's possession game is predicated on quick transitions from the defensive zone to the offensive zone. Losing his skating and his offensive skills will be hard to replace. The depth should be better than last year, but the Blackhawks could find themselves in trouble if Leddy doesn't take a step forward.
Driving Play Power Rankings from 30 to 1:
30. Edmonton
29. Colorado
28. Dallas
27. New York Islanders
26. Minnesota
25. Ottawa
24. Toronto
23. Florida
22. Phoenix
21. Winnipeg
20. Anaheim
19. Carolina
18. Calgary
17. St. Louis
16. Nashville
15. New York Rangers
14. Columbus
13. Buffalo
12. Philadelphia
11. Boston
10. Montreal
9. Tampa Bay
8. New Jersey
7. Los Angeles
6. Detroit
5. Pittsburgh
4. San Jose
3. Washington
2. Vancouver
1. Chicago
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
The Best and the Worst of the 2011 NHL Offseason
The 2011 NHL offseason was an interesting one. An unprecedented growth in the salary cap (and floor) meant that GMs had more money to throw around than ever before. Unfortunately for these teams (but not for the UFAs and their agents), there was a dearth of high-end talent which resulted in numerous bad signings and an increased frequency of big-time trades. From the day before the draft when Philadelphia offloaded both Jeff Carter and Mike Richards to the draft day trades where two WC elites cemented their status for years to come, to the surprise swap of Dany Heatley and Martin Havlat, to say this offseason was hectic in terms of trades would be a drastic understatement. The goal then of this post is to address the moves we think were best and the moves we think were worst.
Best
5. Ian White signing - 2 years, $5.75 million
Triumph has already done a great job highlighting this move, so I’ll keep it brief. Frankly, I don’t know which element of this deal is more impressive from Detroit’s perspective, the cap hit or the term. Signing a defenseman with White’s offensive prowess in UFA to a deal paying him less than $3M/year is a real coup. Detroit needed somebody to run the power play with the retirement of Brian Rafalski; thankfully for them they found upgraded the player for about 50% the cost.
4. Jeff Carter trade (Columbus)
Again, this move has been well documented by my colleague, though most of that has been an analysis of Philadelphia’s haul. I want to focus on this from Columbus’ perspective. First and foremost, they get an elite forward who is likely to play Center alongside Rick Nash. The folks at Broad Street Hockey put together some great analysis on Carter. An under appreciated element of this deal is that a trade like this is the only way Columbus could’ve acquired a player of Carter’s caliber without drastically overpaying somebody as a free agent, a mistake we will cover later on in this article.
3. Brian Campbell trade (Chicago)
The reaction that most had to this trade tells us all that needs to be said. Most hockey folks were in utter disbelief that the Blackhawks could actually move Brian Campbell’s deal. 5 years left at a cap hit north of $7m for an above-average (but not elite) defenseman. Fortunately for Blackhawks fans, Brian Campbell’s biggest fan had found himself a new job in Sunrise, Florida. The newly found cap space allowed Stan Bowman to add some precious depth to an already impressive core, and if necessary, gives the Blackhawks freedom to tweak their roster before the trade deadline. While Chicago is assured to miss Campbell, they are still a Stanley Cup contender and #1 on Driving Play’s forthcoming pre-season power ranking. Looking to the future, this move will also pay-off next year and the years thereafter. Having all core players locked up for at least 3 years plus an added $7.5m in cap space puts Chicago in the discussion of the NHL’s most dangerous teams going forward. None of this would’ve been possible with Brian Campbell’s contract still on the books.
2. Semyon Varlamov trade (Washington)
This one is pretty simple. Semyon Varlamov, while a nice player, is by no means an elite goaltender. He was also on his way out of Washington, likely to the KHL. George McPhee deserves a medal for moving a player his team was unlikely to sign for what has the potential to be the first overall pick. Washington already has an impressive core, and Michal Neuvirth’s play last year made Varlamov expendable. Adding a high first round pick to that mix is extremely impressive. To be less politically correct, I’d set the over/under on 15 seconds for George McPhee holding off laughter once the trade call was finalized.
1. Tomas Vokoun signing - 1 year, $1.5 million
We believe the best move of the offseason belongs to Washington for their signing of Tomas Vokoun. While the benefactor of one of the league’s most aggressive shotcounter, there is no doubting Vokoun’s status as an elite goaltender. Adding one of the NHL’s best netminders to one of its best teams makes for a scary proposition for the rest of the league. What makes this deal all the more impressive is the low term and the low cap hit. It is unlikely Vokoun will play in Washington in 2012-13, but that doesn’t matter. What does matter is they made an appreciable improvement to their 2012 Cup equity for the absurdly low price of $1.5m. One side note - if the rumors about Colorado's interest in Vokoun are true, then they really got played this offseason, what with losing out on Vokoun, overpaying for Washington's goalie leftovers, and then seeing Vokoun sign a 1-year deal in Washington.
Worst
Honorable Mention: Florida's Offseason
Dale Tallon has always had the reputation of somebody who can spend like a drunken sailor, so news of a rising cap (more importantly, a rising cap floor) must have been well received on his end. He responded first by trading for Brian Campbell, who’s large cap hit made a nice initial dent into the amount of money they’d need to spend to reach the floor. July 1st is when the fun really started, and when it was over he gave a collection of average 2nd and 3rd liners (Tomas Fleischmann, Scottie Upshall, Tomas Kopecky, Sean Bergeinheim, and Marcel Goc) a total of $15,450,000 for next year. None of this is nearly as bad as giving Ed Jovanovski $4,125,000 a year for 4 years on a 35+ contract. Where some teams made the most of a rising cap (Washington), other teams shot themselves in the foot (Florida).
5. Philadelphia's Trades + the Ilya Bryzgalov signing - 9 years, $51 million
Again, the two trades have been covered at great length by my colleague Chase, so the plan here is to take a little bit of a different approach. I first want to address the timing of these moves. Philadelphia did about as well as they could from a return standpoint. This in specific has been covered by Chase, so I’ll merely direct you to that analysis if you have not seen it before. My issue with the trades is timing. There seems to be a pretty big disconnect between the ages of Philly’s core pieces. On one hand you re-tool for the future, with the idea that the haul of Voracek, Couturier, Simmonds, and Schenn can come close to duplicating the performance of Carter and Richards. There are two problems here: first, there is a good chance this doesn’t happen, for reasons that should be pretty obvious. Second, if it does happen, it’s unlikely to occur soon, which is important considering their best player is 36 years old and coming off of knee surgery. If Pronger stays healthy, the Flyers probably win the East and Sergei Bobrovsky is probably still their starting goaltender. That ought to tell you all you need to know about the Bryzgalov signing. It’s an overreaction and it was completely unnecessary.
4. Brad Richards signing - 9 years, $60 million
Yes, Brad Richards put up some pretty numbers the last two years, but no, he’s not as good as those numbers appear and he’s certainly not 9 years/$60 million good. For one, Richards doesn’t do much in the way of puck possession. Dallas has been outshot when Richards was on the ice for three of the last four years, and while Richards has generally played against relatively tough competition over that stretch, he has not shown the ability to drive the play forward, an asset we believe to be an important element of player evaluation. And while there is no doubting Richards is one of the league’s best playmakers, it does not make him one of the league’s best players. This overpayment, coupled with Richards’ general injury history and his non-elite even strength play, makes the signing of the star of the 2011 UFA class a bad one.
3. Ville Leino signing - 6 years, $27 million
Where the Richards deal was more the case of a very good player being paid like an elite one, the Leino deal is a case where a slightly above average player is being paid like a very good one. After struggling to get solid ice time on a stacked Detroit roster, Leino parlayed a good 2010 playoffs and a nice 2010-11 regular season into a 6 year, $27 million dollar deal. The talent is there, but our issue with the deal is that Buffalo likely failed to delve deeper into Leino’s numbers. See, Leino’s numbers had a few things going for them that made them appear to be better than they actually were. First, he played for one of the league’s best teams. This had an impact on the quality of his minutes. Philadelphia had the fortune of having two elite centers to play against the opposing teams’ best players, allowing Leino and his principal linemates, Danny Briere and Scott Hartnell, to reap the benefit of soft minutes. Leino - Briere - Hartnell as a unit also took a disproportionate amount of faceoffs in the offensive zone (Leino’s OZone% was 62.3%). Even under this perfect storm of good teammates and soft minutes, Leino only managed to put up 53 points. Now, his raw point total may rise because of an increase in ice time and power play time, but as we know, a player’s point total is misleading without context, and as of now, it looks like Buffalo mistook a player who took advantage of a very favorable circumstance for a very good player.
2. James Wisniewski signing - 6 years, $33 million
Part of the reason the Jeff Carter trade was so great for Columbus is because it allowed them to acquire an elite player without having to overpay in terms of cap hit. While Wisniewski is not an elite player, he is still quite solid, but nevertheless, we saw the phenomena that afflicts Columbus and similarly sized and located markets take full effect, as the Jackets drastically overpaid to acquire the services of Wiz. The problem is that almost all of Wisniewski’s offensive value comes from his ability on the power play, as 60% of his points came with a man advantage. There is obviously value here, but as power plays occur less frequently, the value of power play specialists fall. Wiz is solid at even strength; he’s not much of a play driver, but in the past he’s shown the ability to play tough minutes. However, all of this doesn’t really add up to a player worth $5.5 million per year. Teams like Columbus generally have internal caps that are pretty rigid, and dedicating such a large proportion of that space to good but not great players is a recipe for sustained mediocrity.
1. Semyon Varlamov trade (Colorado)
To be honest, the first thing I did when I heard about this move was laugh. I didn’t laugh because of Semyon Varlamov, I laughed because a team that is in the middle of rebuilding just moved what will almost assuredly be a top 5 pick for an average (at best) starting goalie. Yes, Varlamov is young and now under team control for three years, no, that is not as valuable as a high first round pick. Where this move is worse than any of the signings (or the other trade) is while this move might make Colorado marginally better this year (but still nowhere near good enough to be a playoff team), it almost assuredly makes Colorado much worse in the future. The recent success of teams like the Blackhawks and Penguins show that rebuilds can happen quick with good drafting, especially in the early rounds. Colorado just traded away what used to be a top organizational asset for a player who will have no appreciable impact on their ability to contend in the future.
5. Ian White signing - 2 years, $5.75 million
Triumph has already done a great job highlighting this move, so I’ll keep it brief. Frankly, I don’t know which element of this deal is more impressive from Detroit’s perspective, the cap hit or the term. Signing a defenseman with White’s offensive prowess in UFA to a deal paying him less than $3M/year is a real coup. Detroit needed somebody to run the power play with the retirement of Brian Rafalski; thankfully for them they found upgraded the player for about 50% the cost.
4. Jeff Carter trade (Columbus)
Again, this move has been well documented by my colleague, though most of that has been an analysis of Philadelphia’s haul. I want to focus on this from Columbus’ perspective. First and foremost, they get an elite forward who is likely to play Center alongside Rick Nash. The folks at Broad Street Hockey put together some great analysis on Carter. An under appreciated element of this deal is that a trade like this is the only way Columbus could’ve acquired a player of Carter’s caliber without drastically overpaying somebody as a free agent, a mistake we will cover later on in this article.
3. Brian Campbell trade (Chicago)
The reaction that most had to this trade tells us all that needs to be said. Most hockey folks were in utter disbelief that the Blackhawks could actually move Brian Campbell’s deal. 5 years left at a cap hit north of $7m for an above-average (but not elite) defenseman. Fortunately for Blackhawks fans, Brian Campbell’s biggest fan had found himself a new job in Sunrise, Florida. The newly found cap space allowed Stan Bowman to add some precious depth to an already impressive core, and if necessary, gives the Blackhawks freedom to tweak their roster before the trade deadline. While Chicago is assured to miss Campbell, they are still a Stanley Cup contender and #1 on Driving Play’s forthcoming pre-season power ranking. Looking to the future, this move will also pay-off next year and the years thereafter. Having all core players locked up for at least 3 years plus an added $7.5m in cap space puts Chicago in the discussion of the NHL’s most dangerous teams going forward. None of this would’ve been possible with Brian Campbell’s contract still on the books.
2. Semyon Varlamov trade (Washington)
This one is pretty simple. Semyon Varlamov, while a nice player, is by no means an elite goaltender. He was also on his way out of Washington, likely to the KHL. George McPhee deserves a medal for moving a player his team was unlikely to sign for what has the potential to be the first overall pick. Washington already has an impressive core, and Michal Neuvirth’s play last year made Varlamov expendable. Adding a high first round pick to that mix is extremely impressive. To be less politically correct, I’d set the over/under on 15 seconds for George McPhee holding off laughter once the trade call was finalized.
1. Tomas Vokoun signing - 1 year, $1.5 million
We believe the best move of the offseason belongs to Washington for their signing of Tomas Vokoun. While the benefactor of one of the league’s most aggressive shotcounter, there is no doubting Vokoun’s status as an elite goaltender. Adding one of the NHL’s best netminders to one of its best teams makes for a scary proposition for the rest of the league. What makes this deal all the more impressive is the low term and the low cap hit. It is unlikely Vokoun will play in Washington in 2012-13, but that doesn’t matter. What does matter is they made an appreciable improvement to their 2012 Cup equity for the absurdly low price of $1.5m. One side note - if the rumors about Colorado's interest in Vokoun are true, then they really got played this offseason, what with losing out on Vokoun, overpaying for Washington's goalie leftovers, and then seeing Vokoun sign a 1-year deal in Washington.
Honorable Mention: Florida's Offseason
Dale Tallon has always had the reputation of somebody who can spend like a drunken sailor, so news of a rising cap (more importantly, a rising cap floor) must have been well received on his end. He responded first by trading for Brian Campbell, who’s large cap hit made a nice initial dent into the amount of money they’d need to spend to reach the floor. July 1st is when the fun really started, and when it was over he gave a collection of average 2nd and 3rd liners (Tomas Fleischmann, Scottie Upshall, Tomas Kopecky, Sean Bergeinheim, and Marcel Goc) a total of $15,450,000 for next year. None of this is nearly as bad as giving Ed Jovanovski $4,125,000 a year for 4 years on a 35+ contract. Where some teams made the most of a rising cap (Washington), other teams shot themselves in the foot (Florida).
5. Philadelphia's Trades + the Ilya Bryzgalov signing - 9 years, $51 million
Again, the two trades have been covered at great length by my colleague Chase, so the plan here is to take a little bit of a different approach. I first want to address the timing of these moves. Philadelphia did about as well as they could from a return standpoint. This in specific has been covered by Chase, so I’ll merely direct you to that analysis if you have not seen it before. My issue with the trades is timing. There seems to be a pretty big disconnect between the ages of Philly’s core pieces. On one hand you re-tool for the future, with the idea that the haul of Voracek, Couturier, Simmonds, and Schenn can come close to duplicating the performance of Carter and Richards. There are two problems here: first, there is a good chance this doesn’t happen, for reasons that should be pretty obvious. Second, if it does happen, it’s unlikely to occur soon, which is important considering their best player is 36 years old and coming off of knee surgery. If Pronger stays healthy, the Flyers probably win the East and Sergei Bobrovsky is probably still their starting goaltender. That ought to tell you all you need to know about the Bryzgalov signing. It’s an overreaction and it was completely unnecessary.
4. Brad Richards signing - 9 years, $60 million
Yes, Brad Richards put up some pretty numbers the last two years, but no, he’s not as good as those numbers appear and he’s certainly not 9 years/$60 million good. For one, Richards doesn’t do much in the way of puck possession. Dallas has been outshot when Richards was on the ice for three of the last four years, and while Richards has generally played against relatively tough competition over that stretch, he has not shown the ability to drive the play forward, an asset we believe to be an important element of player evaluation. And while there is no doubting Richards is one of the league’s best playmakers, it does not make him one of the league’s best players. This overpayment, coupled with Richards’ general injury history and his non-elite even strength play, makes the signing of the star of the 2011 UFA class a bad one.
3. Ville Leino signing - 6 years, $27 million
Where the Richards deal was more the case of a very good player being paid like an elite one, the Leino deal is a case where a slightly above average player is being paid like a very good one. After struggling to get solid ice time on a stacked Detroit roster, Leino parlayed a good 2010 playoffs and a nice 2010-11 regular season into a 6 year, $27 million dollar deal. The talent is there, but our issue with the deal is that Buffalo likely failed to delve deeper into Leino’s numbers. See, Leino’s numbers had a few things going for them that made them appear to be better than they actually were. First, he played for one of the league’s best teams. This had an impact on the quality of his minutes. Philadelphia had the fortune of having two elite centers to play against the opposing teams’ best players, allowing Leino and his principal linemates, Danny Briere and Scott Hartnell, to reap the benefit of soft minutes. Leino - Briere - Hartnell as a unit also took a disproportionate amount of faceoffs in the offensive zone (Leino’s OZone% was 62.3%). Even under this perfect storm of good teammates and soft minutes, Leino only managed to put up 53 points. Now, his raw point total may rise because of an increase in ice time and power play time, but as we know, a player’s point total is misleading without context, and as of now, it looks like Buffalo mistook a player who took advantage of a very favorable circumstance for a very good player.
2. James Wisniewski signing - 6 years, $33 million
Part of the reason the Jeff Carter trade was so great for Columbus is because it allowed them to acquire an elite player without having to overpay in terms of cap hit. While Wisniewski is not an elite player, he is still quite solid, but nevertheless, we saw the phenomena that afflicts Columbus and similarly sized and located markets take full effect, as the Jackets drastically overpaid to acquire the services of Wiz. The problem is that almost all of Wisniewski’s offensive value comes from his ability on the power play, as 60% of his points came with a man advantage. There is obviously value here, but as power plays occur less frequently, the value of power play specialists fall. Wiz is solid at even strength; he’s not much of a play driver, but in the past he’s shown the ability to play tough minutes. However, all of this doesn’t really add up to a player worth $5.5 million per year. Teams like Columbus generally have internal caps that are pretty rigid, and dedicating such a large proportion of that space to good but not great players is a recipe for sustained mediocrity.
1. Semyon Varlamov trade (Colorado)
To be honest, the first thing I did when I heard about this move was laugh. I didn’t laugh because of Semyon Varlamov, I laughed because a team that is in the middle of rebuilding just moved what will almost assuredly be a top 5 pick for an average (at best) starting goalie. Yes, Varlamov is young and now under team control for three years, no, that is not as valuable as a high first round pick. Where this move is worse than any of the signings (or the other trade) is while this move might make Colorado marginally better this year (but still nowhere near good enough to be a playoff team), it almost assuredly makes Colorado much worse in the future. The recent success of teams like the Blackhawks and Penguins show that rebuilds can happen quick with good drafting, especially in the early rounds. Colorado just traded away what used to be a top organizational asset for a player who will have no appreciable impact on their ability to contend in the future.
Thursday, August 18, 2011
With Or Without You: Patrick Sharp
The usage of Patrick Sharp has been a hot topic in Hawkland for the better part of two years now. Sharp was used primarily as the 2nd line Center during Chicago’s cup run, and placing him on the wing of Kane and Toews confused many Hawks fans last year, especially down the stretch, when David Bolland was injured. Loading up the top line then meant that Michael Frolik or Tomas Kopecky would play Center alongside Marian Hossa. Center depth is still somewhat a concern for the Hawks, and this same conversation about where to put Sharp in the line-up lingers on. Our goal is to use possession numbers to identify whether loading things up by playing Sharp with Kane and Toews actually resulted in an appreciable difference in the team’s ability to drive the play.
The results show that Chicago’s pure possession numbers take a slight hit when Sharp plays with Kane and Toews compared with when somebody else plays with the pair. Sharp – Toews – Kane were together for 427 Even Strength minutes last year. When those three were on the ice, the Hawks’ Corsi/60 was 15.155 against a Quality of Competition of -0.734. Kane and Toews as a pair played 930 minutes with any other teammate not named Patrick Sharp, their Corsi/60 and Corsi Quality of Competition were 19.4 and 0.458, respectively. What makes the decision to load up even more questionable is the impact on Marian Hossa. Mr. Hossa has played 618 even strength minutes with none of Kane, Toews, or Sharp. The Hawks still had a positive Corsi in that sample, though it was much lower, coming in at a Corsi/60 of 4.7.
Now that we’ve established that splitting the pair up makes the most sense, the question becomes how to split them up. The two primary options are either:
· Other – Toews – Hossa / Other – Sharp – Kane
OR
· Other – Toews – Kane / Other – Sharp – Hossa
Toews was paired with Hossa and somebody not named Patrick Sharp or Patrick Kane for 259 EV minutes. The pair did well for themselves, putting up a Corsi/60 of 13.7. This is all the more impressive when realizing this pair was generally out against the opponent’s toughest competition. The Quality of Competition rating was 1.76. In other words, Toews and Hossa took on tough competition and still dominated possession. Sharp and Kane were also impressive, with a Corsi/60 of 20.8. The pair generally faced weaker competition.
The other alternative is pairing Toews with Kane and then Sharp with Hossa. Toews and Kane (and no Sharp/Hossa) put up a Corsi/60 of 19.4 in 929 EV minutes. The pair faced tough competition, though it was not nearly as tough as the minutes that Toews and Hossa played. Sharp and Hossa have been together for 570 minutes, putting up a Corsi/60 of 15.5. It is interesting to note the drop in the quality of Marian Hossa’s opponents when he plays with Toews compared with Sharp. The Quality of Competition rating of Toews – Hossa is 1.76 compared to -0.7 when the Slovak winger is paired with Sharp.
The numbers ultimately bear out that splitting up Sharp and Toews is the optimal solution given Chicago’s current line-up. From there, decisions on personnel get a bit murky, though there are some important implications. First, is that none of Sharp’s minutes at Center can be considered tough. This is interesting, as the defensive reputations of his two potential right wingers are quite different, yet the quality of opposition has not impacted who plays the right side on Sharp’s line. We do, however, see a big drop in the quality of opposition when we compare Toews’ minutes with Kane to Toews’ minutes with Hossa. The captain faced tough minutes regardless, though the 0.458 quality of competition when playing with Kane was a relative cake walk compared to the quality of competition he faced when paired with Hossa.
My personal belief is that the Blackhawks should pair Sharp with Kane and Toews with Hossa. We can see that any line that Sharp centers will generally get softer minutes; given this, why not load up in both directions? A line based Toews and Hossa features two elite two-way forwards who have shown the ability to crush territorially despite playing absurdly tough minutes; Sharp and Kane would reap the benefits of the other pair’s tough minutes. It is also important to note that a Sharp – Kane pairing is considerably better than a Sharp – Hossa pairing in terms of puck possession even though the quality of minutes are effectively the same.
In the end, this, to quote The Wire’s Marlo Stanfield, ‘sounds like one of them good problems’. As a team that likes to play with the puck (and does so better than everybody else), the Blackhawks have an embarrassment of riches in top end talent. The only thing that can undermine that would be playing Patrick Sharp on the left wing.
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